

**FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52)**

**HUMAN INTELLIGENCE  
COLLECTOR OPERATIONS**

**HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

**September 2006**

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# Human Intelligence Collector Operations

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\*This publication supersedes FM 34-52, 28 September 1992, and ST 2-22.7, Tactical Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence Operations, April 2002.

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## Preface

This manual provides doctrinal guidance, techniques, and procedures governing the employment of human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and analytical assets in support of the commander's intelligence needs. It outlines—

- HUMINT operations.
- The HUMINT collector's role within the intelligence operating system.
- The roles and responsibilities of the HUMINT collectors and the roles of those providing the command, control, and technical support of HUMINT collection operations.

**This manual expands upon the information contained in FM 2-0. It supersedes FM 34-52 and rescinds ST 2-22.7. It is consistent with doctrine in FM 3-0, FM 5-0, FM 6-0, and JP 2-0. In accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, the only interrogation approaches and techniques that are authorized for use against any detainee, regardless of status or characterization, are those authorized and listed in this Field Manual. Some of the approaches and techniques authorized and listed in this Field Manual also require additional specified approval before implementation.**

This manual will be reviewed annually and may be amended or updated from time to time to account for changes in doctrine, policy, or law, and to address lessons learned.

This manual provides the doctrinal guidance for HUMINT collectors and commanders and staffs of the MI organizations responsible for planning and executing HUMINT operations. This manual also serves as a reference for personnel developing doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); materiel and force structure; institutional and unit training; and standing operating procedures (SOPs), for HUMINT operations at all army echelons. In accordance with TRADOC Regulation 25-36, the doctrine in this field manual is not policy (in and of itself), but is "...a body of thought on how Army forces operate....[It] provides an authoritative guide for leaders and soldiers, while allowing freedom to adapt to circumstances."

This manual applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. This manual also applies to DOD civilian employees and contractors with responsibility to engage in HUMINT collection activities. It is also intended for commanders and staffs of joint and combined commands, and Service Component Commands (SCC). Although this is Army doctrine, adaptations will have to be made by other Military Departments, based on each of their organizations and specific doctrine.

Material in this manual applies to the full range of military operations. Principles outlined also are valid under conditions involving use of electronic warfare (EW) or nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons.

This manual is intended for use by military, civilian, and civilian contractor HUMINT collectors, as well as commanders, staff officers, and military intelligence (MI) personnel charged with the responsibility of the HUMINT collection effort.

HUMINT operations vary depending on the source of the information. It is essential that all HUMINT collectors understand that, whereas operations and sources may



differ, the handling and treatment of sources must be accomplished in accordance with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military executive orders including fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).

Interrogation, the HUMINT subdiscipline responsible for MI exploitation of enemy personnel and their documents to answer the supported specific information requirements (SIRs), requires the HUMINT collector to be fully familiar with both the classification of the source and applicable law. The principles and techniques of HUMINT collection are to be used within the constraints established by US law including the following:

- The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
- Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (including Common Article III), August 12, 1949; hereinafter referred to as GWS.
- Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (including Common Article III), August 12, 1949; hereinafter referred to as GPW.
- Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (including Common Article III), August 12, 1949; hereinafter referred to as GC.
- Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109-163, Title XIV.

HUMINT collectors must understand specific terms used to identify categories of personnel when referring to the principles and techniques of interrogation. Determination of a detainee's status may take a significant time and may not be completed until well after the time of capture. Therefore, there will be no difference in the treatment of a detainee of any status from the moment of capture until such a determination is made. The following terms are presented here and in the glossary.

- **Civilian Internee:** A person detained or interned in the United States or in occupied territory for security reasons, or for protection, or because he or she has committed an offense against the detaining power, and who is entitled to "protected person" status under the GC.
- **Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW):** A detained person, as defined in Articles 4 and 5 of the GPW. In particular, one who, while engaged in combat under orders of his or her government, is captured by the armed forces of the enemy. As such, he or she is entitled to the combatant's privilege of immunity from the municipal law of the capturing state for warlike acts that do not amount to breaches of the law of armed conflict. For example, an EPW may be, but is not limited to, any person belonging to one of the following categories of personnel who have fallen into the power of the enemy; a member of the armed forces, organized militia or volunteer corps; a person who accompanies the armed forces, without actually being a member thereof; a member of a merchant marine or civilian aircraft crew not qualifying for more favorable treatment; or individuals who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist invading forces.
- **Other Detainees:** Persons in the custody of the US Armed Forces who have not been classified as an EPW (Article 4, GPW), retained personnel (Article 33, GPW), and Civilian Internee (Articles 27, 41, 48, and 78, GC) shall be treated as EPWs until a legal status is ascertained by competent authority; for example, by Article 5 Tribunal.
- **Retained Personnel:** (See Articles 24 and 26, GWS.)

- Official medical personnel of the armed forces exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of wounded or sick, or in the prevention of disease, and staff exclusively engaged in the administration of medical units and facilities.
- Chaplains attached to the armed forces.
- Staff of National Red Cross Societies and that of other Volunteer Aid Societies, duly recognized and authorized by their governments to assist Medical Service personnel of their own armed forces, provided they are exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of wounded or sick, or in the prevention of disease, and provided that the staff of such societies are subject to military laws and regulations.
- Protected Persons: Include civilians entitled to protection under the GC, including those we retain in the course of a conflict, no matter what the reason.
- Enemy Combatant: In general, a person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners during an armed conflict. The term “enemy combatant” includes both “lawful enemy combatants” and “unlawful enemy combatants.” All captured or detained personnel, regardless of status, shall be treated humanely, and in accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and DOD Directive 2310.1E, “Department of Defense Detainee Program”, and no person in the custody or under the control of DOD, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, in accordance with and as defined in US law.
  - **Lawful Enemy Combatant:** Lawful enemy combatants, who are entitled to protections under the Geneva Conventions, include members of the regular armed forces of a State Party to the conflict; militia, volunteer corps, and organized resistance movements belonging to a State Party to the conflict, which are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the laws of war; and members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power.
  - **Unlawful Enemy Combatant:** Unlawful enemy combatants are persons not entitled to combatant immunity, who engage in acts against the United States or its coalition partners in violation of the laws and customs of war during an armed conflict. For the purposes of the war on terrorism, the term “unlawful enemy combatant” is defined to include, but is not limited to, an individual who is or was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.

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Unless otherwise stated, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men. Use of the terms “he” and “him” in this manual should be read as referring to both males and females unless otherwise expressly noted.

## PART ONE

# HUMINT Support, Planning, and Management

HUMINT collection activities include three general categories: screening, interrogation, and debriefing. In some cases these may be distinguished by legal distinctions between source categories such as between interrogation and debriefing. In others, the distinction is in the purpose of the questioning. Regardless of the type of activity, or goal of the collection effort, HUMINT collection operations must be characterized by effective support, planning, and management.

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## Chapter 1

### Introduction

#### INTELLIGENCE BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEM

1-1. The Intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS) is one of seven operating systems—Intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility/countermobility/survivability, combat service support (CSS), and command and control—that enable commanders to build, employ, direct, and sustain combat power. The Intelligence BOS is a flexible force of Intelligence personnel, organizations, and equipment. Individually and collectively, these assets generate knowledge of and products portraying the enemy and the environmental features required by a command planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. Inherent within the Intelligence BOS is the capability to plan, direct, and synchronize intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations; collect and process information; produce relevant intelligence; and disseminate intelligence and critical information in an understandable and presentable form to those who need it, when they need it. As one of the seven disciplines of the Intelligence BOS, HUMINT provides a capability to the supported commander in achieving information superiority on the battlefield.

#### INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

1-2. Intelligence operations consist of the functions that constitute the intelligence process: **plan, prepare, collect, process, produce**, and the common tasks of **analyze, disseminate, and assess** that occur throughout the intelligence process. Just as the activities of the operations process overlap and recur as circumstances demand, so do the functions of the intelligence process. Additionally, the analyze, disseminate, and assess tasks

of the intelligence process occur continuously throughout the intelligence process. (See Figure 1-1.)

- **Plan.** This step of the intelligence process consists of activities that include assessing the situation, envisioning a desired outcome (also known as setting the vision), identifying pertinent information and intelligence requirements, developing a strategy for ISR operations to satisfy those requirements, directing intelligence operations, and synchronizing the ISR effort. The commander's intent, planning guidance, and commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) (priority information requirements [PIRs] and friendly force information requirements [FFIRs]) drive the planning of intelligence operations. Commanders must involve their supporting staff judge advocate (SJA) when planning intelligence operations (especially HUMINT operations). Planning, managing, and coordinating these operations are continuous activities necessary to obtain information and produce intelligence essential to decisionmaking.
- **Prepare.** This step includes those staff and leader activities that take place upon receiving the operations plan (OPLAN), operations order (OPORD), warning order (WARNO), or commander's intent to improve the unit's ability to execute tasks or missions and survive on the battlefield.
- **Collect.** Recent ISR doctrine necessitates that the entire staff, especially the G3/S3 and G2/S2, must change their reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) mindset to conducting ISR. The staff must carefully focus ISR on the CCIR but also enable the quick re-tasking of units and assets as the situation changes. This doctrinal requirement ensures that the enemy situation, not just our OPLAN, "drives" ISR operations. Well-developed procedures and carefully planned flexibility to support emerging targets, changing requirements, and the need to support combat assessment are critical. The G3/S3 and G2/S2 play a critical role in this challenging task that is sometimes referred to as "fighting ISR" because it is so staff intensive during planning and execution (it is an operation within the operation). Elements of all units on the battlefield obtain information and data about enemy forces, activities, facilities, and resources as well as information concerning the environmental and geographical characteristics of a particular area.
- **Process.** This step converts relevant information into a form suitable for analysis, production, or immediate use by the commander. Processing also includes sorting through large amounts of collected information and intelligence (multidiscipline reports from the unit's ISR assets, lateral and higher echelon units and organizations, and non-MI elements in the battlespace). Processing identifies and exploits that information which is pertinent to the commander's intelligence requirements and facilitates situational understanding. Examples of processing include developing film, enhancing imagery, translating a document from a foreign language, converting electronic data into a standardized report that can be analyzed by a system operator, and

correlating dissimilar or jumbled information by assembling like elements before the information is forwarded for analysis.

- **Produce.** In this step, the G2/S2 integrates evaluated, analyzed, and interpreted information from single or multiple sources and disciplines into finished intelligence products. Like collection operations, the G2/S2 must ensure the unit's information processing and intelligence production are prioritized and synchronized to support answering the collection requirements.




Figure 1-1. Intelligence Process.

1-3. For more information on the Intelligence process, see FM 2-0.

## HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

1-4. HUMINT is the collection of information by a trained HUMINT collector (military occupational specialties [MOSs] 97E, 351Y [formerly 351C], 351M [formerly 351E], 35E, and 35F), from people and their associated documents and media sources to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. It uses human sources as a tool and a variety of collection methods, both passively and actively, to gather information to satisfy the commander's intelligence requirements and cross-cue other intelligence disciplines.

1-5. HUMINT tasks include but are not limited to—

- Conducting source operations.
- Liaising with host nation (HN) officials and allied counterparts.
- Eliciting information from select sources.
- Debriefing US and allied forces and civilian personnel including refugees, displaced persons (DPs), third-country nationals, and local inhabitants.
- Interrogating EPWs and other detainees.
- Initially exploiting documents, media, and materiel.

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*Note.* In accordance with Army regulatory and policy guidance, a select set of intelligence personnel may be trained and certified to conduct certain HUMINT tasks outside of those which are standard for their primary MOS. Such selection and training will qualify these personnel to conduct only those specific additional tasks, and will not constitute qualifications as a HUMINT collector.

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## HUMINT SOURCE

1-6. A HUMINT source is a person from whom information can be obtained. The source may either possess first- or second-hand knowledge normally obtained through sight or hearing. Potential HUMINT sources include threat, neutral, and friendly military and civilian personnel. Categories of HUMINT sources include but are not limited to detainees, refugees, DPs, local inhabitants, friendly forces, and members of foreign governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

## HUMINT COLLECTOR

1-7. For the purpose of this manual, a HUMINT collector is a person who is specifically trained and certified for, tasked with, and engages in the collection of information from individuals (HUMINT sources) for the purpose of answering intelligence information requirements. HUMINT collectors specifically include enlisted personnel in MOS 97E, Warrant Officers (WOs) in MOS 351M (351E) and MOS 351Y (351C), commissioned officers in MOS 35E and MOS 35F, select other specially trained MOSs, and their Federal civilian employee and civilian contractor counterparts. These specially trained and certified individuals are the **only** personnel authorized to conduct HUMINT collection operations, although CI agents also use HUMINT collection techniques in the conduct of CI operations. HUMINT

collection operations must be conducted in accordance with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. Additional policies and regulations apply to management of contractors engaged in HUMINT collection. (See Bibliography for additional references on contractor management.) HUMINT collectors are not to be confused with CI agents, MOS 97B and WO MOS 351L (351B). CI agents are trained and certified for, tasked with, and carry out the mission of denying the enemy the ability to collect information on the activities and intentions of friendly forces. Although personnel in 97E and 97B MOSs may use similar methods to carry out their missions, commanders should not use them interchangeably. See Figure 1-2 for HUMINT and CI functions.

## PHASES OF HUMINT COLLECTION

1-8. Every HUMINT questioning session, regardless of the methodology used or the type of operation, consists of five phases. The five phases of HUMINT collection are planning and preparation, approach, questioning, termination, and reporting. They are generally sequential; however, reporting may occur at any point within the process when critical information is obtained and the approach techniques used will be reinforced as required through the questioning and termination phases.

### Planning and Preparation

1-9. During this phase, the HUMINT collector conducts the necessary research and operational planning in preparation for a specific collection effort with a specific source. Chapter 7 discusses this phase in detail.

### Approach

1-10. During the approach phase, the HUMINT collector establishes the conditions of control and rapport to gain the cooperation of the source and to facilitate information collection. Chapter 8 discusses approach and termination strategies in detail.

### Questioning

1-11. During the questioning phase, the HUMINT collector uses an interrogation, debriefing, or elicitation methodology to ask a source questions systematically on relevant topics, collect information in response to the intelligence tasking, and ascertain source veracity. Chapter 9 discusses questioning techniques in detail. (See Appendix B for a source and reliability matrix.)




Figure 1-2. HUMINT and CI Functions.

**Termination**

1-12. During the termination phase, the HUMINT collector completes a questioning session and establishes the necessary conditions for future collection from the same source by himself or another HUMINT collector. (See Chapter 8.)

**Reporting**

1-13. During the reporting phase, the HUMINT collector writes, edits, and submits written, and possibly oral, reports on information collected in the course of a HUMINT collection effort. These reports will be reviewed, edited, and analyzed as they are forwarded through the appropriate channels. Chapter 10 discusses reporting in detail.



## HUMINT COLLECTION AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

1-14. HUMINT collection activities include these categories: tactical questioning, screening, interrogation, debriefing, liaison, human source contact operations (SCOs), document exploitation (DOCEX), and captured enemy equipment (CEE) operations. DOCEX and CEE operations are activities supported by HUMINT collection but usually are only conducted by HUMINT collectors when the CEE or captured enemy document (CED) is associated with a source being questioned. In some cases, these determinations may depend on legal distinctions between collection methods such as interrogation and debriefing. In others, the distinction is in the purpose of the questioning. For example, screening is used to identify the knowledgeability and cooperation of a source, as opposed to the other activities that are used to collect information for intelligence purposes.

1-15. The activities may be conducted interactively. For example, a HUMINT collector may be screening a potential source. During the course of the screening, the HUMINT collector identifies that the individual has information that can answer requirements. He might at that point debrief or interrogate the source on that specific area. He will then return to screening the source to identify other potential areas of interest.

1-16. HUMINT collection activities vary depending on the source of the information. Once the type of activity has been determined, leaders use the process of plan, prepare, execute, and assess to conduct the activity. The following are the different types of HUMINT collection activities.

### TACTICAL QUESTIONING

1-17. Tactical questioning is expedient initial questioning for information of immediate tactical value. Tactical questioning is generally performed by members of patrols, but can be done by any DOD personnel. (See ST 2-91.6.)

### SCREENING

1-18. Screening is the process of identifying and assessing the areas of knowledge, cooperation, and possible approach techniques for an individual who has information of intelligence value. Indicators and discriminators used in screening can range from general appearance, possessions, and attitude to specific questions to assess areas of knowledge and degree of cooperation to establish if an individual matches a predetermined source profile. Screening is not in itself an intelligence collection technique but a timesaving measure that identifies those individuals most likely to have information of value.

1-19. Screening operations are conducted to identify the level of knowledge, level of cooperation, and the placement and access of a given source. Screening operations can also assist in the determination of which discipline or agency can best conduct the exploitation. Chapter 6 discusses screening in detail. Screening operations include but are not limited to—

- Mobile and static checkpoint screening, including screening of refugees and DPs.
- Locally employed personnel screening.

- Screening as part of a cordon and search operation.
- EPW and detainee screening.

## INTERROGATION

1-20. Interrogation is the systematic effort to procure information to answer specific collection requirements by direct and indirect questioning techniques of a person who is in the custody of the forces conducting the questioning. Some examples of interrogation sources include EPWs and other detainees. Interrogation sources range from totally cooperative to highly antagonistic. Interrogations may be conducted at all echelons in all operational environments. Detainee interrogation operations conducted at a Military Police (MP) facility, coalition-operated facility, or other agency-operated collection facility are more robust and require greater planning, but have greater logistical support. Interrogations may only be conducted by personnel trained and certified in the interrogation methodology, including personnel in MOSs 97E, 351M (351E), or select others as may be approved by DOD policy. Interrogations are always to be conducted in accordance with the Law of War, regardless of the echelon or operational environment in which the HUMINT collector is operating.

## DEBRIEFING

1-21. Debriefing is the process of questioning cooperating human sources to satisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with applicable law. The source usually is not in custody and usually is willing to cooperate. Debriefing may be conducted at all echelons and in all operational environments. The primary categories of sources for debriefing are refugees, émigrés, DPs, and local civilians; and friendly forces.

- **Refugees, Émigrés, DPs, and Local Civilians Debriefing Operations.** Refugee, émigré, and DP debriefing operations are the process of questioning cooperating refugees and émigrés to satisfy intelligence requirements. The refugee may or may not be in custody, and a refugee or émigré's willingness to cooperate need not be immediate or constant. Refugee debriefings are usually conducted at refugee collection points or checkpoints and may be conducted in coordination with civil affairs (CA) or MP operations. Local civilian debriefing operations are the process of questioning cooperating local civilians to satisfy intelligence requirements. As with refugees and émigrés, the local civilians being debriefed may or may not be in custody and the civilian's willingness to cooperate may not be immediate or constant. Debriefing operations must be conducted consistent with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs.
- **Friendly Force Debriefing Operations.** Friendly force debriefing operations are the systematic debriefing of US forces to answer

collection requirements. These operations must be coordinated with US units. (See Chapter 6.)

## **LIAISON OPERATIONS**

1-22. Liaison operations are programs to coordinate activities and exchange information with host country and allied military and civilian agencies and NGOs.

## **HUMAN SOURCE CONTACT OPERATIONS**

1-23. Human SCO are operations directed toward the establishment of human sources who have agreed to meet and cooperate with HUMINT collectors for the purpose of providing information. Within the Army, SCO are conducted by trained personnel under the direction of military commanders. The entire range of HUMINT collection operations can be employed. SCO sources include one-time contacts, continuous contacts, and formal contacts from debriefings, liaison, and contact operations. SCO consist of collection activities that utilize human sources to identify attitude, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, target development, personnel, and capabilities of those elements that pose a potential or actual threat to US and coalition forces. SCO are also employed to develop local source or informant networks that provide early warning of imminent danger to US and coalition forces and contribute to the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). See Chapter 5 for discussion of approval, coordination, and review for each type of activity.

## **DOCEX OPERATIONS**

1-24. DOCEX operations are the systematic extraction of information from open, closed, published, and electronic source documents. These documents may include documents or data inside electronic communications equipment, including computers, telephones, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), and Global Positioning System (GPS) terminals. This operation is not solely a HUMINT function, but may be conducted by any intelligence personnel with appropriate language support.

1-25. Many CEDs are associated with EPWs and other human sources. Consequently, a HUMINT collector is often the first person to screen them. HUMINT collectors will screen the documents associated with human sources and will extract information of use to them in their immediate collection operation. Any information discovered during this initial screening that might cross-cue another collection effort will be forwarded to the appropriate unit.

1-26. A captured document is usually something that the enemy has written for his own use. For this reason, captured documents are usually truthful and accurate. There are cases in which falsified documents have been permitted to fall into enemy hands as a means of deception but these cases are not the norm. Normal policy of not relying on single-source information should help prevent deceptions of this type from being effective. Documents also do not forget or misinterpret information although it must be remembered that their authors may have. Usually, each document provides a portion of a

larger body of information. Each captured document, much like a single piece of a puzzle, contributes to the whole. In addition to tactical intelligence, technical data and political indicators that are important to strategic and national level agencies can sometimes be extracted from captured documents. Captured documents, while not affected by memory loss, are often time sensitive; therefore, they are to be quickly screened for possible exploitation.

## CEE OPERATIONS

1-27. CEE includes all types of foreign and non-foreign materiel found on a detainee or on the battlefield that may have a military application or answer a collection requirement. The capturing unit must—

- Recognize certain CEE as having immediate intelligence value, and immediately forward such CEE to the unit's S2. Such items include—
  - All electronic communications equipment with a memory card, including computers, telephones, PDAs, and GPS terminals.
  - All video or photographic equipment.
- Recognize certain CEE as having technical intelligence (TECHINT) value. Such items include—
  - New weapons.
  - All communications equipment not immediately exploitable for HUMINT value.
  - Track vehicles.
  - Equipment manuals.
  - All CEE known or believed to be of TECHINT interest.
- Evacuate the equipment with the detainee.
- Confiscate, tag, and evacuate weapons and other equipment found on the detainee the same as CEDs. (See Appendix D.)
- Secure and report the capture of TECHINT items to the unit's S2 for disposition instructions.

## TRAITS OF A HUMINT COLLECTOR

1-28. HUMINT collection is a science and an art. Although many HUMINT collection skills may be taught, the development of a skilled HUMINT collector requires experience in dealing with people in all conditions and under all circumstances. Although there are many intangibles in the definition of a "good" HUMINT collector, certain character traits are invaluable:

- **Alertness.** The HUMINT collector must be alert on several levels while conducting HUMINT collection. He must concentrate on the information being provided by the source and be constantly evaluating the information for both value and veracity based on collection requirements, current intelligence, and other information obtained from the source. Simultaneously, he must be alert not only to what the source says but also to how it is said and the accompanying body language to assess the source's truthfulness, degree of cooperation, and current mood. He needs to know when to give the source a break and

when to press the source harder. In addition, the HUMINT collector constantly must be alert to his environment to ensure his personal security and that of his source.

- **Patience and Tact.** The HUMINT collector must have patience and tact in creating and maintaining rapport between himself and the source, thereby enhancing the success of the questioning. Displaying impatience may—
  - Encourage a difficult source to think that if he remains unresponsive for a little longer, the HUMINT collector will stop questioning.
  - Cause the source to lose respect for the HUMINT collector, thereby reducing the HUMINT collector's effectiveness.
- **Credibility.** The HUMINT collector must provide a clear, accurate, and professional product and an accurate assessment of his capabilities. He must be able to clearly articulate complex situations and concepts. The HUMINT collector must also maintain credibility with his source. He must present himself in a believable and consistent manner, and follow through on any promises made as well as never to promise what cannot be delivered.
- **Objectivity and Self-control.** The HUMINT collector must also be totally objective in evaluating the information obtained. The HUMINT collector must maintain an objective and dispassionate attitude regardless of the emotional reactions he may actually experience or simulate during a questioning session. Without objectivity, he may unconsciously distort the information acquired. He may also be unable to vary his questioning and approach techniques effectively. He must have exceptional self-control to avoid displays of genuine anger, irritation, sympathy, or weariness that may cause him to lose the initiative during questioning but be able to fake any of these emotions as necessary. He must not become emotionally involved with the source.
- **Adaptability.** A HUMINT collector must adapt to the many and varied personalities which he will encounter. He must also adapt to all types of locations, operational tempos, and operational environments. He should try to imagine himself in the source's position. By being adaptable, he can smoothly shift his questioning and approach techniques according to the operational environment and the personality of the source.
- **Perseverance.** A tenacity of purpose can be the difference between a HUMINT collector who is merely good and one who is superior. A HUMINT collector who becomes easily discouraged by opposition, non-cooperation, or other difficulties will not aggressively pursue the objective to a successful conclusion or exploit leads to other valuable information.
- **Appearance and Demeanor.** The HUMINT collector's personal appearance may greatly influence the conduct of any HUMINT collection operation and attitude of the source toward the HUMINT collector. Usually an organized and professional appearance will favorably influence the source. If the HUMINT collector's manner

reflects fairness, strength, and efficiency, the source may prove more cooperative and more receptive to questioning.

- **Initiative.** Achieving and maintaining the initiative are essential to a successful questioning session just as the offensive is the key to success in combat operations. The HUMINT collector must grasp the initiative and maintain it throughout all questioning phases. This does not mean he has to dominate the source physically; rather, it means that the HUMINT collector knows his requirements and continues to direct the collection toward those requirements.

## REQUIRED AREAS OF KNOWLEDGE

1-29. The HUMINT collector must be knowledgeable in a variety of areas in order to question sources effectively. The collector must prepare himself for operations in a particular theater or area of intelligence responsibility (AOIR) by conducting research. The G2 can be a valuable source of information for this preparatory research. The HUMINT collector should consult with order of battle (OB) technicians and analysts and collect information from open sources and from the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) to enhance his knowledge of the AOIR. Some of these areas of required knowledge are—

- **The area of operations (AO)** including the social, political, and economic institutions; geography; history; language; and culture of the target area. Collectors must be aware of all ethnic, social, religious, political, criminal, tribal, and economic groups and the interrelationships between these groups.
- **All current and potential threat forces** within the AOIR and their organization, equipment, motivation, capabilities, limitations, and normal operational methodology.
- **Applicable law and policy that might affect HUMINT collection activities.** Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning”; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee Program”; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. HUMINT collectors are subject to applicable law, which includes US law, the law of war (including the Geneva Conventions as applicable), and relevant international law. Additionally, local agreements with HNs or allies and the applicable execute orders and rules of engagement (ROE) may further restrict HUMINT collection activities. However, these documents cannot permit interrogation actions that would be illegal under applicable US or international law.
- **The collection requirements,** including all specific information requirements (SIRs) and indicators that will lead to the answering of the intelligence requirements.

- **Cultural awareness** in the various AOs will have different social and regional considerations that affect communications and can affect the conduct of operations. These may include social taboos, desired behaviors, customs, and courtesies. The staff must include this information in pre-deployment training at all levels to ensure that personnel are properly equipped to interact with the local populace.

1-30. There are other areas of knowledge that help to develop more effective questioning:

- **Proficiency in the target language.** The HUMINT collector can normally use an interpreter (see Chapter 11) and machine translation as they are developed to conduct questioning. Language proficiency is a benefit to the HUMINT collector in a number of ways: He can save time in questioning, be more aware of nuances in the language that might verify or deny truthfulness, and better control and evaluate interpreters.
- **Understanding basic human behavior.** A HUMINT collector can best adapt himself to the source's personality and control of the source's reactions when he understands basic behavioral factors, traits, attitudes, drives, motivations, and inhibitions. He must not only understand basic behavioral principles but also know how these principles are manifested in the area and culture in which he is operating.
- **Neurolinguistics.** Neurolinguistics is a behavioral communication model and a set of procedures that improve communication skills. The HUMINT collector should read and react to nonverbal communications. He must be aware of the specific neurolinguistic clues of the cultural framework in which he is operating.

## CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

### CAPABILITIES

1-31. HUMINT collection capabilities include the ability to—

- Collect information and cross-cue from an almost endless variety of potential sources including friendly forces, civilians, detainees, and source-related documents.
- Focus on the collection of detailed information not available by other means. This includes information on threat intentions and local civilian and threat force attitudes and morale. It also includes building interiors and facilities that cannot be collected on by other means due to restrictive terrain.
- Corroborate or refute information collected from other R&S assets.
- Operate with minimal equipment and deploy in all operational environments in support of offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction operations, or civil support operations. Based on solid planning and preparation, HUMINT collection can provide timely information if deployed forward in support of maneuver elements.

## LIMITATIONS

### 1-32. HUMINT collection limitations include—

- Interpersonal abilities. HUMINT is dependent on the subjective interpersonal capabilities of the individual rather than on the abilities to operate collection equipment. HUMINT collection capability is based on experience within a specific AO that can only be developed over time.
- Identification of knowledgeable sources. There is often a multitude of potential HUMINT sources. Information in response to specific requirements can only be collected if sources are available and identified that have that information.
- Limited numbers. There are never enough HUMINT collectors to meet all requirements. Limited assets must be prioritized in support of units and operations based on their criticality.
- Time limitations. HUMINT collection, particularly source operations, takes time to develop. Collection requirements must be developed with sufficient lead-time for collection.
- Language limitations. Although HUMINT collectors can normally use an interpreter, a lack of language proficiency by the collector can significantly slow collection efforts. Such language proficiency takes time to develop.
- Misunderstanding of the HUMINT mission. HUMINT collectors are frequently used incorrectly and assigned missions that belong to CA, MP, interpreter or translators, CI, or other operational specialties.
- Commanders' risk management. Maneuver commanders, in weighing the risks associated with employing HUMINT collection teams (HCTs), should seriously consider the potential loss of a wealth of information such as enemy activities, locations of high-value personnel, and threats to the force that they will incur if they restrict HCT collection activities. J/G2Xs, operational management teams (OMTs), and HCT leaders must educate maneuver commanders on the benefits of providing security for HCTs and employing them in accordance with their capabilities.
- Legal obligations. Applicable law and policy govern HUMINT collection operations. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. HUMINT operations may be further restricted by Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) and other agreements, execute orders and ROE, local laws, and an operational umbrella concept. Such documents, however, cannot permit interrogation actions that are illegal under applicable law.
- Connectivity and bandwidth requirements. With the exception of the size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment (SALUTE) report, most HUMINT reporting requires considerable bandwidth. Deployed



HUMINT teams must be able to travel to, and report from, all areas of the battlefield. Digital communication equipment must be able to provide reliable connectivity with teams' reporting channels and sufficient bandwidth for transmission of reports, including digital imagery.

- Timely reporting and immediate access to sources. Except in tactical situations when HUMINT collectors are in immediate support of maneuver units, HUMINT collection and reporting takes time. In stability and reconstruction operations, sources need to be assessed and developed. Once they are developed, they need to be contacted which often takes time and coordination. In offensive and defensive operations, HUMINT collection at detainee holding areas sometimes may still be timely enough to meet tactical and operational requirements. See paragraphs 3-2 and 3-7 for more information on offensive and defensive operations.

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
## Chapter 2

# Human Intelligence Structure

### ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

2-1. The success of the HUMINT collection effort depends on a complex interrelationship between command and control (C2) elements, requirements, technical control and support, and collection assets. Each echelon of command has its supporting HUMINT elements although no MI organization in the Army is robust enough to conduct sustained HUMINT operations under all operational environments using only its organic HUMINT assets. HUMINT units have specific support requirements to the commander. HUMINT units must be flexible, versatile, and prepared to conduct HUMINT collection and analysis operations in support of any echelon of command. A coherent C2 structure within these HUMINT organizations is necessary in order to ensure successful, disciplined, and legal HUMINT operations. This structure must include experienced commissioned officers, warrant officers, and senior NCOs conscientiously discharging their responsibilities and providing HUMINT collectors with guidance from higher headquarters.

2-2. Regardless of the echelon, there are four basic elements that work together to provide the deployed commander with well-focused, thoroughly planned HUMINT support. The four elements are staff support, analysis, C2, and collection. Each piece of the infrastructure builds on the next and is based on the size, complexity, and type of operation as shown in Figure 2-1.



**Figure 2-1. Tactical HUMINT Organization.**

## HUMINT CONTROL ORGANIZATIONS

2-3. HUMINT control organizations are the means by which a commander exercises command of a unit's operations. HUMINT control organizations are vital to the effective use of HUMINT collection assets. HUMINT control organizations consist of the C/J/G/S2X and the HUMINT operations cell (HOC) at the brigade and above level and the OMTs at the battalion and below level.

### C/J/G/S2X

2-4. The C/J/G/S2X is a staff element subordinate to the C/J/G/S2, is the primary advisor on HUMINT and CI, and is the focal point for all HUMINT and CI activities within a joint task force (JTF) (J2X), an Army component task force (G2X) or a brigade combat team (BCT) (S2X). The 2X can be organic to the unit staff or can be attached or under operational control (OPCON) to the staff from another organization such as the theater MI brigade. The C/J/G/S2X is part of a coherent architecture that includes organic HUMINT assets and HUMINT resources from national, theater, and non-DOD HUMINT organizations.

2-5. The C/J2X is responsible for controlling Joint Force HUMINT assets, coordinating all HUMINT and CI collection activities, and keeping the joint force C/J/2 informed on all HUMINT and CI activities conducted in the joint force area of responsibility (AOR). The C/J2X is also part of the review and recommendation process concerned with the retention or release of detainees. HUMINT reports maintained at the C/J2X are considered during the review for release process. The C/J2X consists of the 2X Officer, a HOC, a Counterintelligence Coordination Authority (CICA), a HUMINT Analysis Cell (HAC), and a CI Analysis Cell (CIAC). At all echelons, the 2X should also include an Operational Support Cell (OSC) staffed to operate 24 hours a day. The authority and operational responsibilities of a C/J2X in combined or joint contingency operations (CONOP) takes precedence over service-specific CI and HUMINT technical control agencies. Specifically, the C/J/G/S2X—

- Accomplishes technical control and support, and deconfliction of all HUMINT and CI assets through the Army component G2X, the HUMINT and CI operations sections, or the OMTs.
- Participates in planning for deployment of HUMINT and CI assets in support of operations.
- Coordinates, through the HOC and the CICA, all HUMINT and CI activities to support intelligence collection and the intelligence aspects of force protection for the deployed commander.
- Coordinates and deconflicts all HUMINT and CI operations within the operational area.
- Coordinates with the senior US national intelligence representative for specific operational approval when required by standing agreements.
- Is the release authority for HUMINT reporting at his echelon and only releases reports to the all-source system after ensuring all technical control measures for reporting have been met.

- Coordinates with other HUMINT collection agencies not under the control of the command, such as Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
- Does not exercise OPCON over HUMINT and CI assets assigned, attached, or reinforcing the unit; however, he is the staff support responsible for creating a cohesive HUMINT and CI effort.
- Coordinates with non-DOD agencies conducting HUMINT collection operations in the joint area of operations (JAO) to ensure deconfliction of sources, informants, or contacts and the HUMINT reporting that is generated by these collection operations.

2-6. The J2X will maintain technical control (see para 4-10) of all CI investigative actions within its AOIR; however, all investigative matters will be in accordance with DOD policies, joint or Military Department doctrine, applicable US law and policy, SOFAs, or other International Standardization Agreements (ISAs). The J2X will advise the responsible Theater CICA (TCICA) of any Army CI element conducting investigative activities that fall under the purview of AR 381-20.

#### **OPERATIONS SUPPORT CELL (OSC)**

2-7. The OSC in the C/J/G/S2X staff will maintain the consolidated source registry for all HUMINT and CI activities in the unit's designated AOIR. The OSC will provide management of intelligence property book operations, source incentive programs, and intelligence contingency funds (ICFs) for subordinate HUMINT and CI elements. The OSC responsibilities also include requests for information (RFIs) and/or source-directed requirements (SDRs) management and the release of intelligence information reports (IIRs).

#### **COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COORDINATION AUTHORITY**

2-8. The CICA is assigned under the J/G2X and coordinates all CI activities within its designated AOIR. (See FM 34-60 for a detailed explanation of the CI mission.) The CICA—

- Provides technical support to all CI assets and coordinates and deconflicts CI activities in the deployed AOIR.
- Coordinates and supervises CI investigations and collection activities conducted by all services and components in the AOIR.
- Establishes and maintains the theater CI source database.
- Coordinates with the HOC for CI support to detention, interrogation, refugee, and other facilities.
- Manages requirements and taskings for CI collectors in the AO in coordination with the HOC.
- Expedites preparation of CI reports and their distribution to consumers at all levels.
- Coordinates CI activities with senior CI officers from all CI organizations on the battlefield.

- Performs liaison with HN and US national level CI organizations.
- Informs the appropriate TCICA when Army CI elements are conducting CI investigative activities within the purview of AR 381-20.

### **HUMINT OPERATIONS CELL**

2-9. The HOC is assigned under the J/G2X to track all HUMINT activities in the AOIR. The J/G2X uses this information to advise the senior intelligence officer (SIO) on all HUMINT activities conducted within the AOIR. The HOC—

- Provides technical support to all HUMINT collection operations and deconflicts HUMINT collection operations in the designated AOIR.
- Establishes and maintains a consolidated HUMINT source database in coordination with the CICA.
- Coordinates with collection managers and the HAC to identify collection requirements and to ensure requirements are met.
- Coordinates the activities of HUMINT collectors assigned or attached to interrogation, debriefing, refugee, DOCEX, and other facilities.
- Manages requirements and taskings for HUMINT collectors in the AOIR, in coordination with the CICA.
- Expedites preparation of intelligence reports and their distribution to consumers at all levels.
- Performs liaison with HN and US national HUMINT organizations.

### **OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT TEAM**

2-10. A HUMINT OMT consists of senior individuals in MOS 351M (351E) and MOS 97E. Each OMT can control 2 to 4 HCTs depending upon assigned mission and operational tempo (OPTEMPO). The OMT performs a necessary function when two or more HCTs deploy by assisting the HUMINT element commander in tasking and providing technical support to assigned or attached HCTs. The OMT is optimally collocated with the command post (CP) of the supported unit. However, it must be located where it can provide oversight of team operations and best support the dissemination of tasking, reports, and technical data between the unit and the deployed collection assets. When a higher echelon augments subordinate elements with collection teams, it should include proportional OMT augmentation. When a single collection team is attached in direct support (DS) of a subordinate element, the senior team member exerts mission and technical control over the team. The OMT—

- Provides operational and technical control and guidance to deployed HCTs.
- Normally consists of a WO and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) whose experience and knowledge provide the necessary guidance for effective team collection operations.
- Manages the use of ICFs and incentives for the HCTs.
- Provides the collection focus for HCTs.

- Provides quality control and dissemination of reports for subordinate HCTs.
- Directs the activities of subordinate HCTs and controls their operations.
- Conducts limited single-discipline HUMINT analysis and mission analysis for the supported commander.
- Acts as a conduit between subordinate HCTs, the HOC, and the C/J/G/S2X.
- Reports the HCT mission and equipment status to the HOC and the command element.

### **HUMINT COLLECTION TEAM**

2-11. HCTs are the elements that collect information from human sources. The HUMINT collectors deploy in teams of approximately four personnel in MOS 97E (HUMINT Collector) and MOS 351M (351E) (HUMINT Technician).

2-12. The HCT may be augmented based on factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Interpreters from the RC or civilian contractors with appropriate security clearances are added when necessary. TECHINT personnel or other specific subject-matter experts (SMEs) may augment the team to meet technical collection requirements. Another example would be pairing HUMINT collectors with dedicated analysts to provide sharper focus to the interrogation effort. In fixed detention facilities, these HUMINT collector or analyst relationships may become more enduring. Commanders are not encouraged to mix HUMINT collectors and CI agents on a single team. Doing so seriously undermines the ability to conduct both the HUMINT collection and CI missions simultaneously. However, commanders may find times when METT-TC factors make it reasonable to augment a CI team with HUMINT support for a mission, or vice versa.

### **COMMAND DEBRIEFING TEAM**

2-13. A command debriefing team is normally not a table of organization and equipment (TOE) organization but may be task organized to meet mission requirements. This task-organized team is normally OPCON to the HOC. Although more prevalent during stability and reconstruction operations, senior personnel will often acquire information of intelligence interest during the normal course of their duties. The HUMINT collection assets, particularly at division echelon or higher, will normally task organize a team of more senior, experienced individuals to debrief these senior unit personnel. In offensive and defensive operations, this same team is prepared to interrogate high-value detainees (including EPWs) or debrief senior civilians. The command debriefing team should not be confused with the G2/S2 debriefing program, which also is critical and is an important conduit of information.

### **DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION TEAM**

2-14. DOCEX teams are normally found at theater and national level organizations. Lower echelon HCTs may also be designated to perform the DOCEX mission based upon mission parameters and linguist availability. However, if organic assets are used, there will be a mission tradeoff. Dependent on the priority of exploitation and volume of documents, HCTs assigned the DOCEX mission may be augmented by military, civilian, or contractor personnel to accomplish their assigned mission. During operations, the DOCEX team will normally screen documents, extract information, and expedite the evacuation of documents to the Joint or Theater Document Exploitation Facility.

## HUMINT ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION ORGANIZATIONS

2-15. HUMINT analysis and production organizations analyze information collected from HUMINT sources, support the requirements management (RM) system, and produce single-discipline intelligence products. HUMINT analysis and production are conducted at all echelons, separate brigades, and higher. (See Chapter 12 for a description of the HUMINT analysis system and methodologies.)

### HUMINT ANALYSIS CELL

2-16. The HAC is part of the J/G2X; however, it may be collocated with an analysis and control element (ACE) or Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE) single-source enclave depending on facilities and operational environment considerations. The HAC works closely with the all-source intelligence elements and the CIAC to ensure that HUMINT reporting is incorporated into the all-source analysis and common operational picture (COP). The HAC is the “fusion point” for all HUMINT reporting and operational analysis in the JISE and ACE. It determines gaps in reporting and coordinates with the RM to cross-cue other intelligence sensor systems. The HAC—

- Produces and disseminates HUMINT products and provides input to intelligence summaries (INTSUMs).
- Uses analytical tools found at the ACE or JISE to develop long-term analyses and provides reporting feedback that supports the HOC, OMTs, and HCTs.
- Provides analytical expertise to the C/J/G/S2X, HOC, and OMTs.
- Produces country and regional studies tailored to HUMINT collection.
- Compiles target folders to assist C/J/G/S2X assets in focusing collection efforts.
- Analyzes and reports on trends and patterns found in HUMINT reporting.
- Analyzes source reliability and credibility as reflected in reporting and communicates that analysis to the collector.
- Develops and maintains databases specific to HUMINT collection activities.
- Produces HUMINT requirements.



- Answers HUMINT-related RFIs.
- Identifies collection gaps and provides context for better collection at their echelon.

## **JOINT INTERROGATION AND DEBRIEFING CENTER ANALYSIS SECTION**

2-17. This section ensures that all members of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) (see para 5-102) are aware of the current situation through the distribution of INTSUMs and products from external agencies. The Analysis Section also supports the JIDC by—

- Providing situation update briefings to all facility personnel every 12 hours.
- Preparing research and background packets and briefings for interrogations and debriefings.
- Developing indicators for each intelligence requirement to support screening operations.
- Conducting single-discipline HUMINT analysis based on collected information to support further collection efforts.
- Correlating reports produced by the JIDC to facilitate analysis at higher levels.
- Answering RFIs from interrogators and formulating RFIs that cannot be answered by the analytical section on behalf of the interrogators.
- Reviewing IIRs and extracting information into analysis tools tailored to support the interrogation process.
- Pursuing products and resources to support the interrogation effort.

## **HUMINT ANALYSIS TEAM**

2-18. The HUMINT analysis team (HAT) is subordinate to the G2 ACE. The HAT supports the G2 in the development of IPB products and in developing and tailoring SIRs to match HUMINT collection capabilities.

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## Chapter 3

# HUMINT in Support of Army Operations

3-1. Army doctrine for full spectrum operations recognizes four types of military operations: offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction, and civil support. Missions in any environment require the Army to conduct or be prepared to conduct any combination of these operations. HUMINT assets will be called on to provide information in support of all four operations. Simultaneous operations, for example elements of a force conducting offensive operations while other elements are engaged in stability and reconstruction operations, will cause a similar division of the limited HUMINT assets based on METT-TC.

## OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

3-2. Offensive operations aim at destroying or defeating the enemy. Rapid maneuver, constantly changing situations, and a vital need for intelligence support at the point of contact influence HUMINT missions during offensive operations. The guiding principle to the use of HUMINT in support of offensive operations is to minimize the time between when friendly forces encounter potential sources (detainees, refugees, and local civilians) and when a HUMINT collector screens them.

3-3. During offensive operations, at echelons corps and below, HCTs normally operate in the engaged maneuver brigades' AOs and are further deployed in support of maneuver battalions based on advice from the OMTs. These collection assets may be in general support (GS) of the parent brigade or in DS of the maneuver battalions, reconnaissance squadrons, and other forward-deployed maneuver assets. The HCTs and their supporting control structure are deployed in accordance with METT-TC based on three principles:

- The relative importance of that subordinate element's operations to the overall parent unit's scheme of maneuver and the overall ISR plan.
- The potential for that subordinate element to capture detainees, media and materiel, or to encounter civilians on the battlefield.
- The criticality of information that could be obtained from those sources to the success of the parent unit's overall OPLANs.

3-4. HUMINT missions in support of offensive operations include screening and interrogating EPWs and other detainees, questioning and debriefing civilians in the supported unit's AO, and conducting DOCEX, limited to extracting information of immediate tactical value. EAC assets normally support offensive operations through theater interrogation and debriefing facility operations and mobile interrogation teams. These facilities are better equipped to conduct in-depth interrogations and DOCEX, so it is imperative

that EPWs and other detainees who will be evacuated to theater facilities be transported there as soon as possible.

### **HUMINT IN SUPPORT OF FORCED ENTRY OPERATIONS**

3-5. Forced entry operations (FEOs) are offensive operations conducted to establish an initial military presence in a target area in the face of expected enemy opposition. HUMINT collection assets may be able to provide vital information to tactical commanders in the critical early stages of the entry operation. Key considerations for HUMINT support to FEOs include:

- HUMINT collectors attached or under OPCON of the initial force package to provide HUMINT collection support for the entry force. Collection teams will normally operate in support of battalion-sized or smaller elements. HUMINT collection assets should be integrated early and should participate in all aspects of planning and training, including rehearsals, to smoothly integrate and execute operations.
- HUMINT assets supporting the entry force must include proportional OMT elements. For example, if 2 to 4 teams are attached to a maneuver brigade, an OMT also needs to be attached. Even if the teams are further attached to maneuver battalions, there must be an OMT at the brigade level to coordinate and control HUMINT collection activities.
- HCTs and OMTs must be as mobile and as survivable as the entry forces. Team leaders should ensure that the supported unit will be able to provide maintenance support to the team vehicles, as appropriate, in accordance with the support relationship.
- Attached or OPCON HUMINT teams must have robust communications connectivity with the supported unit and must have reach connectivity through their OMT.
- HCTs must contain organic or attached language capability in order to conduct HUMINT collection effectively during FEO. It is unlikely that the teams can be augmented with attached civilian interpreters during this type of operation.

### **HUMINT IN SUPPORT OF EARLY ENTRY OPERATIONS**

3-6. Early entry operations differ from FEOs in that early entry operations do not anticipate large-scale armed opposition. Early entry operations establish or enhance US presence, stabilize the situation, and shape the environment for follow-on forces. HUMINT collection provides critical support to defining the operational environment and assessing the threat to US forces. The considerations listed above for FEOs apply equally to early entry operations.

### **DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS**

3-7. Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, hold the enemy in one area while attacking in another, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Forces conducting defensive

operations must be able to identify rapidly the enemy's main effort and rapidly assess the operational conditions to determine the timing of counter-offensive or other operations. HUMINT support to defensive operations centers on the ability to provide the forward-deployed maneuver commander with information and intelligence of immediate tactical value. HUMINT assets should be placed in the AO of the forward elements to minimize the time between when friendly forces encounter potential sources (detainees, refugees, local civilians) and when a HUMINT collector screens them. HUMINT collectors are placed where the potential for HUMINT collection and the criticality of the information are greatest.

3-8. In defensive operations, it may be necessary to divide the HUMINT assets equally among the subordinate elements to provide area coverage until the primary enemy threat is identified. The HUMINT C2 elements (team leader, OMTs, and unit C2) must be prepared to task organize rapidly and shift resources as the situation dictates, based on the changing situation and higher headquarters FRAGO. HUMINT missions in defensive operations normally include interrogation of detainees, refugee debriefings, and assisting in friendly force patrol debriefings.

## **STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS**

3-9. Stability and reconstruction operations sustain and exploit security and control over areas, populations, and resources. They employ military and civilian capabilities to help establish order that advances US interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and robust civil society. Stability and reconstruction operations involve both coercive and cooperative actions. They may occur before, during, and after offensive and defensive operations; however, they also occur separately, usually at the lower end of the range of military operations. The primary focus of the HCTs during stability and reconstruction operations is to answer the commander's information requirements (IRs) and provide support to force protection. In stability and reconstruction operations, the HUMINT collectors must be able to maintain daily contact with the local population. The nature of the threat in stability operations can range from conventional forces to terrorists and organized crime and civil disturbances. Consequently, intelligence requirements can vary greatly. Examples of HUMINT collection requirements include TECHINT to support arms control; extensive political information and demographic data; order of battle (OB) regarding several different former warring factions during peace operations; or extremely detailed target data. HUMINT collectors also help to ascertain the feelings, attitudes, and activities of the local populace. Stability and reconstruction operations may be conducted in coordination with other US departments and agencies, and in conjunction with other countries and international organizations.

3-10. Centralized management and databasing are key to successful HUMINT operations. The HUMINT assets may operate in GS to the parent unit or operate in the AO of subordinate elements of the parent unit. For

example, in a division AO, the HCTs would normally operate in DS to the division but each team would normally have an AOIR that corresponds to the AO of the division's brigades or battalion task forces. There is close coordination between the HUMINT staff officer (C/J/G/S2X) and the OMTs to synchronize HUMINT operations properly, to develop the overall threat awareness, and to deconflict sources. The HCTs screen and debrief contacts to increase the security posture of US forces, to provide information in response to command collection requirements, and to provide early warning of threats to US forces. They may also interrogate detainees if permitted to do so by the mission-specific orders and in accordance with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs.

3-11. Many stability and reconstruction operations are initiated with the establishment of a lodgment or base area. There is a subsequent expansion of operations to encompass the entire AO. The general concept of an HCT's operation is that of a two-phased effort. In the initial phase, the HCT establishes concentric rings of operations around the US forces starting from the supported unit's base of operations and working outward. Each ring is based on the threat environment and the commander's need to develop his knowledge of the tactical situation. The second, or continuation phase, begins once the initial information collection ring is established. The initial ring is not abandoned but rather is added to as the HCT shifts its focus to expand and establish the second and successive rings. The amount of time spent establishing each ring is situationally dependent.

## INITIAL PHASE

3-12. The initial phase of stability and reconstruction operations is used to lay the foundation for future team operations. In general, the priority of effort is focused inward on security. The HCT conducts initial and follow-up screenings of locally employed personnel, to establish base data for subsequent source operations. The supported unit S2, with the assistance of the HUMINT team leader, establishes procedures to debrief reconnaissance and surveillance assets operating in the supported unit AO, as well as regular combat patrols or logistics convoys. The HCT lays the groundwork for future collection efforts by establishing liaison with local authorities, as well as developing plans and profiles for HUMINT collection. While establishing the initial and subsequent rings, the HCT actively seeks to collect PIR information, whether it pertains to the current ring or any other geographic location.

## CONTINUATION PHASE

3-13. Following the initial phase, the HCT's focus shifts outward. While the HCT continues performing HUMINT collection and analysis functions within the base camp, it also expands its collection effort to outside the base camp to answer the supported unit's requirements. During the continuation phase, the HCT conducts contact operations with local personnel who may be able to

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provide information of interest to the local commander or to satisfy the requirements of the tasking or request. The HCT also conducts liaison with local authorities, coalition forces (if present), NGOs, and others whose knowledge or activities may affect the success of the US mission. Any time the HCT is outside the base camp, it must be careful to observe the local population and report what it sees. The activities and attitudes of the general population will often have an effect on the commander's decisions on how to conduct US missions in the area.

## LEVELS OF EMPLOYMENT

3-14. HCTs may be employed with varying degrees of contact with the local population. As the degree of contact with the population increases, the quantity and diversity of HUMINT collection increases. In many instances, however, there is a risk to the HCT inherent with increased exposure to the local population. The ability of the HCT members to fit in with the local populace can become very important to their safety. Consequently, the commander should consider exceptions to the ROE, as well as relaxed grooming and uniform standards, to help HCT members blend in and provide additional security. Commanders must consider the culture in which the HCT members will be operating. In some cultures, bearded men are more highly respected than clean-shaven men. Relaxing grooming standards for HCTs in these situations will support the team's ability to collect information. The decision regarding what level to employ an HCT is METT-TC dependent. The risk to the collection assets must be balanced with the need to collect information and to protect the force as a whole. The deployment and use of HUMINT collection assets may be limited by legal restrictions, mission-specific orders, directions from higher headquarters, and the overall threat level. The four basic levels of employment for the HCT are discussed below. Figure 3-1 shows these levels as well as their collection potential versus team security.

### Base Camp

- Restricting the HCT to operations within the base camp minimizes the risk to the team. This action, however, minimizes the collection potential and maximizes the risk to the force as a whole. While restricted to a base camp, the HCT can maintain an extremely limited level of information collection by—
  - Interviewing walk-in sources and locally employed personnel.
  - Debriefing combat and ISR patrols.
  - Conducting limited local open-source information collection.
- This mode of deployment should be used only when dictated by operational restrictions. These would be at the initial stages of stability and reconstruction operations when the operational environment is being assessed, or as a temporary expedient when the force protection level exceeds the ability to provide reasonable protection for the collectors. A supported unit commander is often tempted to keep the HCT “inside the wire” when the force protection level or threat

condition (THREATCON) level increases. The supported unit and parent commanders must compare the gains of the HCT collection effort with the risks posed. This is necessary especially during high THREATCON levels when the supported unit commander needs as complete a picture as possible of the threat arrayed against US or multinational forces.




Figure 3-1. Team Level of Employment.

### Integrated with Other Operations

- Under some circumstances, when it is not expedient to deploy the HCT independently due to threat levels or other restrictions, it can be integrated into other ongoing operations. The HCT may be employed as part of a combat patrol, ISR patrol, or in support of an MP patrol or stationed at a checkpoint or roadblock. It can also be used to support CA, psychological operations (PSYOP), engineer, or other operations. This method reduces the risk to the team while greatly increasing its collection potential over the confined-to-base-camp method. It has the advantage of placing the team in contact with the local population and allowing it to spot, assess, and interact with potential sources of information.
- The integration into other operations can also facilitate the elicitation of information. However, this deployment method restricts collection by subordinating the team's efforts to the requirements, locations, and timetables of the unit or operation into which it is integrated. Integration can be done at the team or individual collector level. HUMINT collectors should be used only in situations with an



intelligence collection potential. It is a waste of a valuable asset to use them in a function that could be performed by a civilian translator.

### **As an Independent Patrol**

- **Defensive.** One of the key elements of the HCT success is the opportunity to spot, assess, and develop relationships with potential sources of information. Operating as independent patrols, without being tied to ISR or combat assets, enables the HCTs maximum interaction with the local population, thereby maximizing the pool of potential sources of information. The HCT must be integrated into the supported unit's ISR plan and be provided with other command elements as needed to support the collection mission. The team leader will advise the supported unit on the specific capabilities and requirements of the team to maximize mission success. This method also increases the risk to the team. HCT members must carry the necessary firepower for self-protection. They must also have adequate communications equipment to call for help if needed. The team's posture, equipment, and appearance will be dictated by overall force restrictions and posture. When operating as an independent patrol, the HCT should not stand out from overall US forces operations. If US forces are in battle-dress uniforms and operating out of military vehicles, so should the HUMINT collectors.
- **Soft.** If the threat situation is such that soldiers are authorized to wear civilian clothes when outside base areas, the HUMINT collectors should also move among the civilian population in civilian clothes, so that they do not stand out from others in the area.

## **CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

3-15. Army support supplements the efforts and resources of state and local governments and organizations. If a presidential declaration initiates civil support for a major disaster or emergency, involvement of DOD intelligence components would be by exception. Civil support requires extensive coordination and liaison among many organizations—interagency, joint, AC, and RC—as well as with state and local governments, and in any case will require compliance with the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C., § 1385, when US forces are employed to assist Federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies (LEAs). The National Response Plan provides a national level architecture to coordinate the actions of all supporting agencies.

## **MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN ENVIRONMENT**

3-16. Units are often task organized with additional ISR units and assets to meet the detailed collection requirements in the urban operations. The complexities of urban terrain cause degradation in the capabilities of many of the sensor systems. HUMINT collectors may have to be placed in DS of lower echelon combat maneuver forces (battalion and lower) to support operations. HUMINT and combat reporting by units in direct contact with threat forces and local inhabitants becomes the means of collection. For successful ISR

planning, the S2 must be aware of the capabilities and limitations of the various organic and attached collection systems as they apply to urban operations. As in all environments, commanders must assess the risk involved in the forward deployment of HUMINT assets.

3-17. In urban operations, people (for example, detainees and civilians) are the preeminent source of information. HUMINT collection provides information not otherwise available through signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) such as threat and local population intentions. They collect information on, for example, floor plans, defensive plans, locations of combatants and noncombatants, including civilians in the buildings and surrounding neighborhoods, and other information. The collected information is passed directly to the individuals conducting the combat operation.

3-18. In small-scale contingencies (SSCs) and in peacetime military engagements (PMEs), contact with local officials and populace by the HUMINT collectors can be a prime source of information about the local environment and is a vital component of intelligence support to force protection. During routine patrolling of urban areas it is often expedient to place a HUMINT collector with individual patrols. The key difference between urban and other operations, from major theater war (MTW) to PME, is the number of HUMINT collectors required. The need for HUMINT collectors is a function of population density. Whereas in a rural environment, a HUMINT team may be able to cover an area in excess of 1,200 square kilometers; the same team in a dense urban environment may be able to cover only 10 square blocks or less.

## **HUMINT COLLECTION ENVIRONMENTS**

### **HUMINT COLLECTION IN A PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT**

3-19. In a permissive environment, HCTs normally travel throughout their specific AOR as separate teams or as part of a larger reconnaissance team. HUMINT collectors may frequently make direct contact with the individual, view the activity, or visit the area that is the subject of the ISR effort. They normally use debriefing and elicitation to obtain first-hand information from local civilians and officials as their primary collection techniques. Additional information can be obtained from exploitation of open-source material such as newspapers, television, and other media. The priority requirements in this environment are normally linked to force protection. HCTs should establish liaison and casual source contacts throughout their AOIR. Reporting is normally via IIRs, although SALUTE reports are used for critical time-sensitive reporting. Even in a permissive environment, the HUMINT collector conducts the majority of his collection through the debriefing of individuals who have first-hand knowledge of the information they are reporting.

## HUMINT COLLECTION IN A SEMI-PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT

3-20. In a semi-permissive environment, security considerations increase, but the risk to the collector still must be weighed against the potential intelligence gain. HCTs should still be used throughout their AOIR but will normally be integrated into other ground reconnaissance operations or other planned operations. For example, a HUMINT collector may accompany a CA team or PSYOP team visiting a village. Security for the team and their sources is a prime consideration. The HCTs are careful not to establish a fixed pattern of activity and arrange contacts in a manner that could compromise the source or the collector. Debriefing and elicitation are still the primary collection techniques. Teams are frequently deployed to conduct collection at roadblocks, refugee collection points, and detainee collection points. They may conduct interrogations of EPWs and other detainees within the limits of the mission-specific orders, and applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. DOCEX is also used to accomplish exploitation of threat documents. Reporting is normally via SALUTE report and IIR.

## HUMINT COLLECTION IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

3-21. In a hostile environment, the three concerns for HUMINT collection are access to the sources of information, timeliness of reporting, and security for the HUMINT collectors. Prior to the entry of a force into a hostile AO, HUMINT collectors are used to debrief civilians, particularly refugees, and to interrogate EPWs and other detainees who have been in the AO. HCTs are normally located with the friendly units on the peripheries of the AO to facilitate timely collection and reporting. If a refugee or EPW/detainee population exists prior to this mission, they are screened to determine knowledgability of the AO and are debriefed or interrogated as appropriate. HUMINT collectors accompany the friendly ground reconnaissance elements as they enter the AO. As part of the ground reconnaissance force, they interrogate EPWs and other detainees and debrief refugees, displaced persons, and friendly force patrols. Reporting is normally via oral or written SALUTE reports with more detailed information reported via IIRs. They may also support the S2 through the systematic debriefing of friendly ground reconnaissance assets and the translation of any documents collected by them.

## EAC HUMINT

### MI BRIGADES AND MI GROUPS SUPPORTING COMPONENT COMMANDS

3-22. Each SCC with an outside continental United States (OCONUS) responsibility has an US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) MI brigade or group to provide operational HUMINT support to that command. These MI elements provide peacetime support to the unified

command and add a consistent, forward-deployed presence in a particular theater of operations. Theater MI brigade and group assets provide HUMINT support during contingency operations. These HCTs can support a JTF, an army combatant command, or any deployed element that requires augmentation.

## JOINT, COMBINED, AND DOD HUMINT ORGANIZATIONS

3-23. The Departments of the Air Force and the Navy have limited HUMINT collection capability. They will normally provide strategic debriefing trained and certified personnel to joint interrogation and debriefing facilities primarily to collect information on areas of particular interest to that Military Department. Within the Department of the Navy, however, the US Marine Corps has a robust tactical HUMINT collection capability that operates primarily in support of engaged Marine Corps forces. Marine expeditionary elements deploy with human exploitation teams (HETs) that provide organic HUMINT and CI support to the deployed Marine force. Marine HETs are rapidly deployable and fully equipped to conduct the full range of tactical HUMINT and CI functions. They can provide support to either the deployed Marine force or as part of JTF HUMINT or CI teams. Each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) has organic HETs. HETs can also be attached to a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) for a particular operation.

## SUPPORT AGENCIES

3-24. HUMINT agencies from DOD, national level intelligence agencies, and LEAs can support the battlefield commander. In a JTF, a national intelligence support team (NIST) works with the J2X to coordinate national level activities with JTF and component HUMINT and analytical assets. Sometimes liaison officers (LNOs) are assigned directly to the C/J/2X to facilitate collection activities.

- **Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).** The DIA is a DOD combat support (CS) agency and an important member of the United States Intelligence Community. With more than 7,000 military and civilian employees worldwide, DIA is a major producer and manager of foreign military intelligence. DIA provides military intelligence to warfighters, defense policymakers and force planners in DOD and the Intelligence Community in support of US military planning and operations and weapon systems acquisition.
- **Defense HUMINT (DH) Service.** The DH Service, a branch of the DIA, is the force provider for strategic HUMINT forces and capabilities. During operations, elements from DH form a partnership within the supported JTF headquarters J2X element for the coordination and deconfliction of HUMINT source-related collection activities. DH support to a joint force is outlined in the classified DIAM 58-11 and DIAM 58-12.
- **Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).** The CIA supports US national security policy by providing accurate, evidence-based, comprehensive, and timely foreign intelligence related to national security. The CIA

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conducts CI activities, HUMINT collection, special activities, and other functions related to foreign intelligence and national security as directed by the President. Joint Pub 2-01.2 (S//NF) contains details of CIA contributions to the deployed force.

- **Department of State.** The State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security provides CI support to diplomatic missions worldwide and gathers extensive information on intelligence capabilities of adversaries within that diplomatic mission's area of concern. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research is the State Department's primary source for interpretive analysis of global developments. It is also the focal point in the State Department for all policy issues and activities involving the Intelligence Community.
- **National Security Agency (NSA).** The NSA is a DOD agency that coordinates, directs, and performs highly specialized activities to protect US information systems and produce foreign intelligence information. It is also one of the most important centers of foreign language analysis and research within the Government.
- **Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS).** The DCIS is the criminal investigative arm of the Inspector General (IG) of DOD. The DCIS's mission is to protect America's warfighters by initiating, conducting, and supervising investigations in support of crucial National Defense priorities.
- **Department of Justice:**
  - **Federal Bureau of Investigation.** The FBI may provide the deployed commander with national level expertise on criminal and CI issues if currently operating in a task force (TF) AO and liaison is established early.
  - **Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).** The DEA provides counterdrug operational expertise to a deployed TF and coordinates its operations with those of a deployed TF.
- **Department of Homeland Security (DHS).** The DHS mission is to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, protect the homeland, its citizens, and critical infrastructure and key resources against terrorist attack. DHS provides a lead for Federal incident response, management, and recovery in the event of terrorist attack and natural disasters. The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federal official for domestic incident management. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary is responsible for coordinating Federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. DHS operates the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) and the DHS-led Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG). The DHS AOR is the US and its territories. DHS secures and protects the entry points to the nation, the areas between the entry points, land and water, for people, and cargo or conveyances. DHS enforces immigration, customs, and transportation security laws and

regulations, counter-narcotics, counterfeiting, financial crimes, and threats to the President. As legislated in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, DHS is chartered as the primary outreach Federal activity for state, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector. Although DHS has no direct role in support of a "battlefield commander" outside the United States, DHS component organizations have representatives deployed in support of US Government missions in the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) AOR.

- **Department of Energy (DOE).** The DOE can assist with the—
  - Exploitation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
  - Protection or elimination of weapons and weapons-useable (dual-use) nuclear material or infrastructure.
  - Redirection of excess foreign weapons expertise to civilian enterprises.
  - Prevention and reversal of the proliferation of WMD.
  - Reduction of the risk of accidents in nuclear fuel cycle facilities worldwide.
  - The capability enhancement of WMD detection including nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC).
- **National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA).** The NGA is a member of the US Intelligence Community and a DOD Combat Support Agency. NGA provides timely, relevant, and accurate geospatial intelligence in support of national security objectives. Geospatial intelligence is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth.
- **Counterintelligence Field Agency (CIFA).** The mission of CIFA is to develop and manage DOD CI programs and functions that support the protection of the Department. These programs and functions include CI support to protect DOD personnel, resources, critical information, research and development programs, technology, critical infrastructure, economic security, and US interests against foreign influence and manipulation, as well as to detect and neutralize espionage against the Department.

3-25. Most potential coalition partners have some type of HUMINT capability. Less developed nations may use HUMINT as their primary collection system and may be quite skilled in HUMINT operations. These assets will be present on the battlefield, and US assets are likely to work with them. HCTs should perform regular liaison with coalition HUMINT personnel. It is likely that some coalition partners will be more knowledgeable of the culture in the AO and be able to share insights with US HCTs.

## Chapter 4

# HUMINT Operations Planning and Management

4-1. HUMINT operations planning and management are supported by a robust structure that includes staff elements such as the C2X when working with non-US forces at the Joint intelligence staff level, G2X at the Division, Corps intelligence staff, the HUMINT operations section in the MI Battalion, and HAT in the Division and Corps ACE. It also includes C2 elements at the MI battalion, company, platoon, and team levels. The OMT provides the first level of staff and C2 functions when two or more HCTs deploy in support of an operation. (See Table 4-1.)

**Table 4-1. HUMINT Operations.**

<b>ECHELON</b>	<b>ISR PLANNING</b>	<b>TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND DECONFLICTION</b>	<b>MISSION EXECUTION</b>
COMBINED	C2/ACE	C2X/OMT	MI CDR
JOINT	J2/ACE	J2X/OMT	MI CDR (AMIB or MI Battalion)
CORPS/DIVISION	G2/ACE	G2X/OMT	MI CDR/OMT
BRIGADE	S2	MI CDR/OMT	MI CDR/OMT

## HUMINT AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS

4-2. Following the operations process defined in FM 3-0, Chapter 6, there are four components within HUMINT operations: Plan, Prepare, Execute, and Assess.

### PLAN

4-3. HUMINT planning defines collection objectives, when to collect it, and which resources will be tasked to do the collection. Commanders with HUMINT collection assets in their units receive collection tasking based on requirements developed during ISR planning. The commander and staff, in concert with their supporting OMTs, assess the requirements and task the team or teams best capable of answering the requirement based on contact placement and access.

4-4. Another aspect to consider carefully during the Plan phase of the operational cycle is technical control. Technical control is ensuring adherence to existing policies and regulations, providing information and guidance of a technical nature, and supervising the MOS-specific TTP required in

conducting collection missions. Planning must take into account that technical control does not interfere with or supersede any C2 that a commander has over an asset or unit nor does it interfere with collection of the commander's requirements. For HUMINT collectors, the technical control network includes the C/J/G/S2X, the HOC, and OMTs. Technical control includes the management of source and other sensitive data and databases, the management of intelligence contingency and incentive funds, the liaison with other HUMINT organizations, and the deconfliction of operations. Technical control provides HCTs with specific requirements and data that they need to conduct operations and, in certain circumstances, specific instructions on how to execute missions.

## PREPARE

4-5. During this phase, commanders and staff, including HUMINT management sections, review HUMINT mission plans. This review is to ensure all areas of the mission are considered and addressed in the plan and included in rehearsals. Items to cover include but are not limited to—

- Route (primary and alternate).
- Communications.
- Security plan.
- Convoy procedures including actions on contact and rally points.
- Initial requirements to be covered.
- Mission duration.

4-6. The HUMINT collector then researches the topic area addressing the requirement and prepares a questioning plan. The HCTs and OMTs must coordinate all mission requirements. It is important that HUMINT elements are included in all rehearsals conducted by their supported unit. These rehearsals will enable HCTs to carry out essential coordination with other units and ensure that they are included in and familiar with procedures such as resupply, communications, casualty evacuation, fire support, and fratricide avoidance. Rehearsals and briefbacks will allow the supported command to see and correct problems with their support to the HUMINT elements prior to deployment.

## EXECUTE

4-7. Mission execution consists of the collection of information in accordance with the integrated ISR plan. The requirements manager validates the requirements based on command guidance. The G3 tasks the requirements to the units and the individual asset managers (that is, OMT) to identify the assets best capable to answer the requirement. When requirements are levied against a specific HCT, the HCT leader decides which of his team's contacts can best answer the requirements. He then turns the requirement into specific team tasks.

## ASSESS

4-8. Assessment is the continuous monitoring—throughout planning, preparation, and execution—of the current situation and progress of an



operation, and the evaluation of it against criteria of success to make decisions and adjustments. Assessment plays an integral role in all aspects of the intelligence process (see FM 2-0).

## HUMINT COMMAND AND CONTROL

4-9. Commanders of organizations that conduct HUMINT operations are responsible for task organization, mission tasking, execution, mission accomplishment, and designation of subordinate AOs (within the guidelines of the OPOD or OPLAN). MI unit commanders who exercise direct control of HUMINT operations, including interrogation operations, at all levels are responsible for and stand accountable to ensure HUMINT collection activities comply with this manual and applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. The MI unit commanders must ensure mission accomplishment by properly allocating resources and logistics in support of all HUMINT collection assets assigned to their units. Commanders must ensure that their HUMINT collection personnel are trained and ready for the mission. There is a need for a partnership between the J/G2X, who exercises technical direction and oversight responsibility and the MI commander, who exercises direct command authority and responsibility. The MI unit commander analyzes the higher headquarters mission, concept of operations, and the specified and implied tasks given to his unit. He restates the unit mission, designs the concept of operations, task organizes his assets, and provides support to subordinate units. Specifically, the MI unit commander—

- Issues mission orders with sufficient details and time for subordinate commanders and leaders to plan and lead their units.
- Must know the threat, his organization, ISR systems, counter-ISR systems, operations, and terrain over which his units will operate and how that terrain enhances or limits HUMINT collection operations.
- Must be aware of the operational and technical limitations of his unit and ensures that all assets are task organized, properly positioned, and fully synchronized to accomplish the mission.
- Oversees the collective and individual training within his unit.
- Coordinates continuously with the higher headquarters staff, the supported maneuver unit staff, and other commanders to ensure integrated R&S operations and support.
- Establishes clear, consistent standards and guidance for current and future operations in order to adhere to policy and the higher headquarters commander's intent without his constant personal supervision.
- Continually assesses his unit's ability to sustain its internal operations and its ability to support assigned missions and keeps the higher headquarters staff informed of unit, equipment, and personnel status that affect collection operations.

- Advises his higher headquarters commander and staff on the capabilities, limitations, and most effective employment of his assets.
- Remains flexible during operations to adjust or execute missions upon receipt of new orders and when the situation changes.
- Ensures personnel are working within legal, regulatory, and policy guidelines.

## TECHNICAL CONTROL

4-10. Technical control refers to supervision of the TTP of HUMINT collection. Technical control ensures adherence to existing policies or regulations and provides technical guidance for HUMINT operations. The elements that provide technical control also assist teams in translating collection requirements into executable tasks. Commanders rely on the expertise of intelligence personnel organic to their unit and within higher echelons to plan, execute, and assess the HUMINT collection effort. The OMTs, HATs, and the HOC of the C/J/G/S2X provide technical control. They—

- Define and manage operational coverage and direction.
- Identify critical collection criteria such as indicators associated with targeting.
- Prioritize collection missions in accordance with collection requirements.
- Advise teams on collection techniques and procedures in accordance with policy, regulations, and law.
- Register and deconflict sources.
- Conduct operational reviews.
- Advise commanders.
- Conduct operational coordination with staff elements and other intelligence agencies.
- Manage ICF and incentive usage.

## COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

4-11. The activities of HUMINT assets are governed by their command or support relationship. There are subtle differences in the Joint versus the Army description of some of the command and support relationships. Tables 4-2 through 4-4 show these relationships.

4-12. During interrogation operations, close coordination must occur between intelligence personnel and personnel responsible for detainee operations including MP security forces, Master at Arms, and other individuals providing security for detainees. The facility commander is responsible for all actions involving the humane treatment, custody, evacuation, and administration of detainees, and force protection. Whereas, the intelligence commander is responsible for the conduct of interrogation operations.

## COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS FOR HUMINT OPERATIONS

4-13. Clear command and support relationships are fundamental in organizing for all operations. These relationships identify responsibilities and authorities among subordinate and supporting units. The commander designates command and support relationships within his authority to weight the decisive operation and support his scheme of maneuver. Some forces available to a commander are given command or support relationships that limit his authority to prescribe additional relationships. Command and support relationships carry with them varying responsibilities to the subordinate unit by parent and gaining units. By knowing the inherent responsibilities, a commander may organize his forces to establish clear relationships.

4-14. Command relationships establish the degree of control and responsibility commanders have for forces operating under their tactical control (TACON). When commanders establish command relationships, they determine if the command relationship includes administrative control (ADCON). Table 4-2 shows Army command and support relationships and Table 4-3 shows joint command relationships chart from FM 3-0 (derived from JP 0-2 and JP 3-0).

4-15. Support relationships define the purpose, scope, and effect desired when one capability supports another. Support relationships establish specific responsibilities between supporting and supported units. Table 4-2 shows Army command and support relationships and Table 4-4 shows joint support relationships from FM 3-0 (derived from JP 0-2 and JP 3-0).

## HUMINT REQUIREMENTS MANAGEMENT

4-16. The G2/S2 is responsible for RM. He uses the requirements management (RM) process to orchestrate the actions of the unit's organic and supporting ISR capabilities into a unified effort to gain situational understanding and answer the commander's PIRs. Through centralized planning and decentralized execution, RM optimizes the integration of ISR operations into the commander's scheme of maneuver and fire and into the unit's long- and short-range planning. Control mechanisms within the RM structure facilitate the identification of information shortfalls and the redirection of ISR assets to new intelligence production, reconnaissance, or surveillance missions.

**Table 4-2. Army Command and Support Relationships.**

IF RELATIONSHIP IS:		INHERENT RESPONSIBILITIES ARE:							
		Has Command Relationship with:	May Be Task Organized by:	Receives CSS from:	Assigned Position or AO By:	Provides Liaison To:	Establishes/ Maintains Communications with:	Has Priorities Established by:	Gaining Unit Can Impose Further Command or Support Relationship of:
<b>COMMAND</b>	<b>Attached</b>	Gaining unit	Gaining unit	Gaining unit	Gaining unit	As required by gaining unit	Unit to which attached	Gaining unit	Attached; OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS
	<b>OPCON</b>	Gaining unit	Parent unit and gaining unit; gaining unit may pass OPCON to lower HQ. Note 1	Parent unit	Gaining unit	As required by gaining unit	As required by gaining unit and parent unit	Gaining unit	OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS
	<b>TACON</b>	Gaining unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Gaining unit	As required by gaining unit	As required by gaining unit and parent unit	Gaining unit	GS; GSR; R; DS
	<b>Assigned</b>	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Gaining unit	As required by parent unit	As required by parent unit	Parent unit	Not Applicable
<b>SUPPORT</b>	<b>Direct Support (DS)</b>	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Supported unit	Supported unit	Parent unit; Supported unit	Supported unit	Note 2
	<b>Reinforcing (R)</b>	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Reinforced unit	Reinforced unit	Parent unit; reinforced unit	Reinforced unit; then parent unit	Not Applicable
	<b>General Support Reinforcing (GSR)</b>	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Reinforced unit and as required by parent unit	Reinforced unit and as required by parent unit	Parent unit; then reinforced unit	Not Applicable
	<b>General Support (GS)</b>	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	As required by parent unit	As required by parent unit	Parent unit	Not Applicable

NOTE 1. In NATO, the gaining unit may not task organize a multinational unit (see TACON).

NOTE 2. Commanders of units in DS may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and elements of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander.

**Table 4-3. Joint Command Relationships and Inherent Responsibilities.**  
 (from FM 3-0, derived from JP 0-2 and JP 3-0)

Inherent Responsibilities Are:	If relationship is:		
	COCOM	OPCON	TACON
Has command Relationship with:	Gaining combatant commander; gaining service component commander	Gaining Command	Gaining Command
May be task organized by:	Gaining combatant commander; gaining service component commander	Gaining Command	Parent Unit
Receives logistic support from:	Gaining service component commander	Service component command; parent unit	Parent Unit
Assigned position or AO by:	Gaining component commander	Gaining Command	Gaining Command
Provides liaison to:	As required by gaining component commander	As required by gaining command	As required by gaining command
Establishes and maintains communications with:	As required by gaining component commander	As required by gaining command	As required by gaining command and parent units
Has priorities established by:	Gaining component commander	Gaining Command	Gaining Command
Gaining unit can impose further command relationship/authority of:	OPCON; TACON; direct support; mutual support ; general support; close support	OPCON; TACON; direct support; mutual support; general support; close support	Direct support; mutual support; general support; close support

**Table 4-4. Joint Support Categories.**

(from FM 3-0, derived from JP 0-2 and JP 3-0)

CATEGORY	DEFINITION
<b>General Support</b>	The action given to the supported force as a whole rather than to a particular subdivision thereof.
<b>Mutual Support</b>	The action that units render each other against an enemy because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities.
<b>Direct Support</b>	A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force's request for assistance.
<b>Close Support</b>	The action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force.

**DEVELOP HUMINT REQUIREMENTS**

4-17. The first step in the RM process is to develop intelligence requirements that accurately identify and prioritize the commander's concerns about the threat and the battlefield environment that must be resolved to accomplish the mission. The G2/S2X, or his representative, normally supports the G2/S2 by identifying HUMINT collection requirements and opportunities and advises the command and staff on HUMINT capabilities. The HUMINT representative must be able to discuss any delays or risks involved in using HUMINT assets. Through participation in the requirements development process, the HUMINT representative has a thorough understanding of the commander's intent and concept of operations and is better able to support the overall ISR effort.

4-18. The analysis of HUMINT requirements is normally a coordinated effort between the HUMINT and CI staff officer (C/J/G/S2X) and the HAT of the supporting analysis element. The C/J/G/S2X team—

- Records all HUMINT requirements whether generated internally (Specific Orders) or received from other echelons or units (Requests).
- Tracks each requirement from receipt to final satisfaction.
- Reviews each requirement for its—
  - **Feasibility.** Feasibility is a determination if a requirement can be answered given available time and resources.
  - **Completeness.** Does the requirement contain all the specifics needed for collection, such as: What the collection requirement is? When the latest time information is of value (LTIOV)? Why it needs to be collected? Who needs the results of the collection?
  - **Necessity.** The C/J/G/S2X team, with the assistance of the HAT, checks available intelligence databases to determine if the required

information has already been collected or is included in an intelligence product.

4-19. The RM team, with the assistance of the C/J/G/S2X team and the HAT, breaks the HUMINT-related PIR into SIRs. Each SIR describes the indicator of threat activity linked to an area or specific location and time. The HOC evaluates—

- Reportable criteria that are linked to the threat activity. The HOC associates these characteristics with a SIR, and compares the characteristics to a particular HUMINT asset's capability to collect.
- Range, which is the distance from the current location of the HUMINT asset or resource to the source. In other words, are there sources available that had or have access to relevant information on the area or activity in question, and can the HUMINT team contact them in a timely manner?
- Timeliness, which is when the information must reach the commander to be of value; that is, the LTIOV.

4-20. The RM team, supported by the C/J/G/S2X and the HAT, attempts to answer the SIRs with intelligence products developed from information available within the existing intelligence databases or pulled from other organizations within the intelligence architecture. If the requirement can be answered in this manner, the intelligence is immediately disseminated. When the required information is neither available nor extractable from archived information or from lower, lateral, or higher echelons, the C/J/G/S2X team develops it into an RFI to higher or an ISR tasking for organic or attached HUMINT assets. The compilation of unanswered requirements and how to answer them form the basis of the ISR plan. The tasking may be in the form of an SDR. An SDR is a specific request or tasking for a collector to question a source on a particular collection requirement. This request involves analysis that results in the conclusion that a specific source possibly has the placement and access to answer a SIR. SDRs are specific; whereas, HUMINT collection requirements (HCRs) are general.

## **DEVELOP THE HUMINT PORTION OF THE INTEGRATED ISR PLAN**

4-21. The HOC within the C/J/G/S2X section assists the G3/G2 in developing the HUMINT portion of the ISR plan in coordination with the HAT and the RM team. The HOC ensures that the HUMINT capabilities and taskings are included in the plan although the plan often will not contain the specifics of HUMINT operations due to the sensitivity of the sources and techniques. The HOC will coordinate with the Office of the SJA to ensure the HUMINT portion of the integrated ISR plan complies with applicable law and policy prior to its implementation. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. The HOC coordinates with C/J/G/S2X for mission deconfliction at that echelon to specify the collection capability and current

status of the various HUMINT organizations to better enable him to select the "best" organization to collect on various SIRs. HUMINT collection generally requires time to develop the environment and access sources.

4-22. The HUMINT collection environment during an SSC is different from an MTW. During an MTW where the force is moving, a division normally plans 48 hours out; a corps plans 72 hours out. In contrast, the planning focus for units supporting an SSC may be 3 to 6 months out. The longer HCTs are in an area, the better the collector is able to develop leads to answer collection requirements. Requirements may be continuous or may be concerned with specific upcoming events such as national elections. HUMINT is a key asset to determine adversary intentions; however, it is highly dependent on the ability to cultivate or locate sources with the desired information. HUMINT in support of stability and reconstruction operations is not a short-term undertaking. [Example: National level elections are taking place in the AO in 3 months. As a part of integrated ISR planning, an assessment must be conducted to determine the capability to answer post-election collection requirements based upon current contacts and HUMINT leads. If there are no leads or contacts that could answer election-related collection requirements, it is necessary to spot, assess, and contact sources to meet requirements.]

4-23. A second part of the HUMINT portion of the integrated ISR plan is the HUMINT collection focus, which—

- Designates which collection requirements comprise the emphasis for collectors' missions.
- Prioritizes collection requirements based upon the operational environment in the AO and future missions in the AO.
- Includes future operational collection tasks which aid in causing a gap or pause in collection as the unit transitions to the next operational phase or the next operation.

4-24. In addition to specific requirements, a statement of intelligence interest (SII) at the joint level or a collection emphasis message at division or corps is issued to identify the overall collection goals for a time period. As the collection request or requirement is passed down, each echelon performs additional planning for its own specific requirements.

### **Evaluate HUMINT Resources**

4-25. After identifying the SIRs, the HOC and the C/J/G/S2X determine the availability and capability of HUMINT assets and resources that might contribute to requirement satisfaction and which are most suited to collect against each SIR. This does not necessarily imply that the C/J/G/S2X assigns a tasking to a specific team; rather, it develops the requirements or requests for an organization that then executes the mission. The HOC and C/J/G/S2X should also consult the HAT for its analysis of additional potential HUMINT assets and resources which might be available, both on and off the battlefield, to contribute to requirement satisfaction. For example, the HAT may be aware of a group of émigrés now living elsewhere who previously lived near a target site, and who might be able to provide answers to collection requirements if debriefed.



## Determine Asset or Resource Capabilities

4-26. The HOC translates the capabilities and limitations of the available HUMINT assets into a set of factors that they can compare to the SIR characteristics. Asset capability factors are technical or performance characteristics, location, and source access. Each HUMINT asset is evaluated for its—

- **Availability.** The HOC reviews the list of viable HUMINT assets for current availability and the addition or deletion of capabilities. This includes considerations such as maintenance time and previous taskings. Coordination with adjacent and higher headquarters and national level agencies by the C/J/G/S2X will determine the availability of higher echelon resources.
- **Survivability.** Survivability must be commensurate with the threats to which the HUMINT assets will be exposed during the course of operations. These assets must be as survivable as, or in certain circumstances more survivable than, the forces they support. The HOC and the commander must weigh the risk versus the gain in using HUMINT assets.
- **Reliability.** Reliability is the ability of the asset to overcome threat deception measures such as misinformation or false information. In HUMINT there are two areas of reliability: source and collector. Source reliability is the determination on the part of the collector if the source is providing accurate information. Collector reliability is a determination on the part of the HOC that the HUMINT collectors within a particular organization have the level of training and experience to collect against a given requirement.
- **Suitability.** Tasking must be based on an asset's capability and on its suitability within the context of the overall plan. For example, HUMINT assets may be capable of collecting against a single target but have unique capabilities against a second target. Intelligence requirements may necessitate tasking these HUMINT assets against the second target if other assets can maintain adequate coverage of the first target.
- **Connectivity.** Connectivity is a critical aspect of any R&S operation. Interoperability, reliability, and robustness of sensors, communications, and supporting automated data processing (ADP) are crucial to the responsiveness, survivability, and overall combat effectiveness of a HUMINT asset. If the automation and communications systems of a HUMINT asset are dissimilar to those of other units in the AO, or if connectivity among assets, supporting systems, and supported systems and elements is too fragile to withstand the stress of operations, commanders will be deprived of important information essential to conducting tactical operations. The HUMINT asset must be able to transmit accurate and timely information to those who must receive it when they need it. Report formats should adhere to established standards in order to ensure that information is easily retrieval at the user desktop through automated queries (push/pull). Planners must look carefully at systems compatibility and the degree of interoperability among the components

of the communications architecture. The better the interoperability of assets and the more robust and redundant the communications links, the better the cross-cueing and analytical exchange.

### **Develop the Scheme of Support**

4-27. The scheme of support is the orchestration of HUMINT assets, resources, and requirements to facilitate the collection of information most effectively. It includes all assets that the G3/S3 can task (organic, attached, and DS) and the G2 can request (from higher or adjacent units). By reviewing available HUMINT assets and higher echelon resources, the HOC and the G/S2X determine whether unit assets or higher echelon resources are best able to answer the requirements. If another echelon can answer an SIR, then the J/G/S2, normally through the C/J/G/S2X, requests them to collect the information and deliver the intelligence product. When planning the HUMINT portion of the ISR plan, the HOC should consider the following:

- **Cueing** is using one asset to tip off another to a possible target. The HOC should look for opportunities for HUMINT assets to cue other collection assets and vice versa.
- **Asset redundancy** uses a combination of the same type of assets against a high-priority collection target. This is vital in HUMINT collection since, in dealing with human sources, the information collected is often part of the overall picture or is influenced by the perception and prejudice of the source. The collection on the same target from a number of different assets gives a more accurate intelligence picture and is a method to validate source reporting.
- **Asset mix** uses a combination of different types of assets against a high-priority collection target. When the probability of success of one asset to satisfy the requirement completely is lower than acceptable, the use of multiple capabilities of different assets increases the likelihood of success; for example, using SIGINT assets to intercept voice communications while HUMINT assets observe activities. Neither can collect all the available information, but the information collected by both can be fused into a more complete picture. Like asset redundancy, asset mix places greater demands on the limited assets available, both collection and analysis, and has to be clearly justified by the potential intelligence gain.
- **Integration of new requirements** into ongoing missions may make it possible to reduce timelines, make collection more responsive to the request, and decrease cost and risk. This is critical in HUMINT due to the long time that it takes to develop sources. The use of an existing source to answer new requirements often facilitates collection.

### **Develop and Prioritize Taskings and Requests for Information**

4-28. After the G2/S2X and the G2/S2 approve the HUMINT portion of the ISR plan, the HOC develops specific orders to task assets, develop additional assets, and/or requests to seek higher and lateral support and production. Specific taskings or RFIs are tailored to that specific ISR asset's capabilities and limitations. The G2/S2X supports the requirements manager and the G2/S2 in developing and prioritizing HUMINT taskings. The HOC works

with the unit requirements manager to incorporate the HUMINT plan into the overall unit ISR plan and works with the G3/S3 as necessary to help develop OPODs or FRAGOs to organic or attached ISR units. HUMINT taskings will often include technical data that cannot be passed through normal tasking channels. The HOC will pass that information directly to the applicable HUMINT OMT or unit operations section.

4-29. The HOC and G2/S2X cannot provide operational taskings to a unit for collection. Collection is a stated mission that the commander executes. However, the technical control the HOC can provide as the HUMINT manager affords the J2/G2X the ability to steer and direct collection assets and operations. The MI commander and OMT determine specifically which teams will collect on a given requirement and are responsible for the TTP used. They report on the status and availability of their collection assets. On the HCT level, the team chief determines which sources will be contacted and the details of how the information will be collected from a given source. A specific plan is developed for each source. This plan should—

- Identify the requirement.
- Identify the proposed source.
- Identify questions to be asked during the source meeting.
- Contain an outline of how the meeting should proceed.
- Identify which collector will conduct the source meeting.

4-30. At the HCT level, the senior team member reviews each plan to ensure the proper planning for the collection mission. The plan is a minimum goal for the collection. The collector must be fully aware of the overall collection priorities and be prepared to take advantage of any additional leads.

## **DIRECT PRODUCTION**

4-31. The G2 coordinates intelligence production to provide non-duplicative all-source intelligence products to the commander, staff, and subordinate forces. Some type of production occurs in the intelligence staff or separate analysis element at every echelon from national to battalion level. The HCT of the ACE at echelon's division and higher will support the intelligence production process through the analysis of HUMINT information and the development of single-discipline HUMINT products.

## **DISSEMINATE INFORMATION**

4-32. The 2X element at each level is normally the release authority for HUMINT reporting and products, ensuring that reporting, products, and data are disseminated to the lowest appropriate level. The G/S2X should preplan criteria for the immediate release of combat information on high-value targets, impending attacks, or other time-sensitive requirements. This preplanning will ensure that commanders and other users quickly receive the information in a format that supports situational understanding, strategic responsiveness, and ISR and provides support to effects. Special effort is also made to ensure that information obtained from detainees is passed back down to the unit that detained them. This measure will support the efforts of the commander as well as building trust in the intelligence process.

## EVALUATE REPORTING

4-33. The HAT and the HOC provide the requirements manager and the G2/S2 with expertise to support report evaluation. An important part of the evaluation process is providing feedback to the collectors. Feedback is important in HUMINT operations since the same source may be contacted again for additional information. The collector needs feedback on the accuracy, reliability, and appropriateness of the information reported. The G/S2X team tracks reporting to determine how well the HUMINT collection and production efforts are satisfying the PIRs. The G/S2X team supports the RM team's requirements to—

- **Monitor and Maintain Synchronization.** Through coordination with the G2/S2, the G/S2X, and the HAT, the HOC knows when and what critical pieces of information are missing from the commander's estimate of the situation. The HOC uses the HUMINT portion of the ISR plan to ensure synchronization with the overall operation and scheme of maneuver. The other critical tool for the HOC is the decision support template (DST). The HOC must have a complete copy of this document, ensuring the HUMINT assets do not miss a collection requirement.
- **Correlate Reports to Requirements.** The HOC tracks which specific order or group of specific orders originates from which PIR to ensure that the collected information was provided to the original requester. This also allows the HOC to rapidly determine which asset is available for retasking.
- **Screen Reports.** Each report received is screened for accuracy, timeliness, and applicability to the original tasking or request. If the HOC determines that it completely fulfills the tasking or request, the HOC informs the G/S2X and G2/S2 so that the tasking or request can be closed and the information provided to the original requesting unit.
- **Provide Feedback to Collectors and Analysts.** The HOC provides feedback to all the HUMINT R&S assets. This is normally provided through the C2 element of that unit. By doing so, the HOC quickly reinforces if the reporting is answering the original order or request, or the HOC can provide guidance if it is not. This feedback is essential. The RM team may provide additional information on its collection or analysis if the HOC tells the team exactly what is needed or has been missed in the original report.

## UPDATE ISR PLAN

4-34. This step aids the G2/G3 in updating the ISR plan by eliminating satisfied collection requirements, redirecting assets to cover non-satisfied requirements, cross-cueing requirements, and adding new collection requirements to the ISR. This process is accomplished by adjusting the HUMINT portion of the overall integrated ISR plan. It maintains intelligence synchronization and optimizes the exploitation of information in response to situation changes in the AO. The updated HUMINT plan is distributed to the G/S2X requirements manager to ensure its incorporation into the overall unit ISR plan. Continuously updating the HUMINT portion of the ISR plan is vital due to the time involved in redirecting HUMINT assets.

## HUMINT MISSION PLANNING

4-35. HUMINT mission planning begins when a unit receives a tasking to conduct HUMINT collection in support of a specific mission, operation, or collection plan. The mission analysis portion of the MDMP is explained in FM 5-0. Special factors must be considered when applying the MDMP to HUMINT operations as discussed below.

### RECEIVE AND ANALYZE THE HIGHER HEADQUARTERS ORDER

4-36. Attention must be paid to the support relationship (GS or DS) that exists between HUMINT assets and the unit. The operational environment, including applicable law and policy under which the units are operating must be understood, as this affects the ability of the units to perform certain missions. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. Because of frequently overlapping AOIRs in HUMINT operations, other unit missions and potential areas of conflict must be identified. Missions of other non-HUMINT units must be understood for coordination and possible integration of HUMINT assets. The availability of assets from higher echelons, requirements to provide support to lower echelons, and the existence of technical control from higher echelons must be identified. Tasking, reporting, and communications channels must be clearly understood.

### ISSUE A WARNING ORDER

4-37. After the commander has analyzed his orders and worked out the mission and related tasks, he must quickly pass on this information to his team. This is accomplished through the WARNO. As a minimum, the WARNO must include to whom the order applies, time and nature of the operation, the earliest time of movement, and the time and place where the OPORD will be issued. Unit members should prepare for movement while the leader is performing the remaining preparatory tasks.

### MAKE A TENTATIVE PLAN

4-38. When determining how the mission will be carried out, the commander works with the factors of METT-TC. When planning for HUMINT collection missions, focus must be placed on the human beings (threat, friendly, and neutral) as well as the key terrain on the battlefield, including information on—

- The demographics of both the AO and AOI.
- The organization and structure of all opposition in the AO and AOI.
- The history of the AO and AOI pertinent to the current situation.
- The economic and social data of all groups in the AO and AOI.

- All key leaders (political, military, social, religious, tribal), opinion leaders, and other influences on public opinion.
- The media and its influence on the population of both the AO and AOI.
- The primary and secondary languages and dialects spoken in all parts of the AO.

4-39. A target folder, if one is used, provides valuable up-to-date intelligence information about the AO for mission analysis and planning. Once intelligence products identify the contentious areas, trends, capabilities, and latest issues concerning the AO, the commander may request a target folder prepared on specific items, such as a hostile organization with the inclination and potential to cause harm to friendly forces. Target folders may include—

- Imagery of the AO and personalities.
- Terrain models of the AO.
- Latest information reports from the AO.
- Biographical data on key leaders in the AO.

### **Review Available Assets**

4-40. The commander and staff, including the OMTs or HUMINT operations section, must look at organic assets and consider factors such as language capability, experience in various aspects of collection, analysis, and management. If organic assets are inadequate, the commander and staff should consider additional available assets within the organization and resources from higher echelons. The commander and staff must consider the analysis and management structure of a HUMINT operations section in addition to the OMT and HCTs. During this step the mission analysis and planning group should determine, among other things—

- The number of HUMINT collectors available.
- The number of collectors who are qualified linguists.
- The number of linguists available to support the collectors.
- Force protection considerations.
- The optimal number of HCTs, OMTs, and HUMINT operations sections that can be configured from the available assets.
- Whether additional assets such as CI agents, TECHINT personnel, analysts, additional linguists, or other experts need to be added to some or all the HCTs to meet mission requirements.

### **Determine Constraints**

4-41. This is a critical step in HUMINT mission analysis. HUMINT collection operations are affected by applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. The degree of restriction may depend on the type of operation being conducted. Constraints are normally found in the scheme of maneuver, the concept of operations, and coordinating instructions. Specific to intelligence interrogation operations, in

accordance with DOD Directive 3115.09, "all captured or detained personnel shall be treated humanely, and all intelligence interrogations or debriefings to gain intelligence from captured or detained personnel shall be conducted humanely, in accordance with applicable law and policy. Acts of physical or mental torture are prohibited."

### Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions

4-42. The human factor is preeminent in this step. Assumptions and facts include—

- How HUMINT collectors can interact with the local population.
- What types of sources are available.
- What types of adversary intelligence and unconventional threats are present.

### Conduct Risk Assessment

4-43. There are inherent risks involved in HUMINT collection. HUMINT collectors need access to the local population to perform their mission. Rules that restrict all forces to base areas to protect the force may be prudent; however, these restrictions can severely degrade HUMINT collection capabilities, particularly in support of force protection requirements. This measure deprives the collectors of sources needed to anticipate and prevent violent incidents. HUMINT collectors receive cultural training as well as security training to allow them to minimize the dangers of interacting with the local population. Commanders must weigh the risk to collectors against the risk to the force as a whole, and determine whether to provide additional security to the HCT in order to allow the team to perform missions outside the base area to gain needed intelligence. DA Pam 385-1 provides guidance for risk assessment.

### Select Courses of Action (COAs)

4-44. During COA development the staff, under the commander's guidance, analyzes various options for deploying and implementing HUMINT assets. Input from HUMINT senior NCOs and WOs is vital to COA development and analysis. Items to consider during COA development include—

- The distribution of the HCTs and OMTs within the AO.
- The support relationship (GS and DS) that exists for the deployed teams.
- The command relationship in effect for the HCTs and OMTs (assigned, attached, or OPCON).
- The manner in which the HUMINT assets are phased into the theater.
- The tactical configuration (personnel and equipment) of the HCT.
- The actual number of the HCTs and OMTs and the size of the supporting HUMINT operations section (if any) deployed.
- The priority of the OMT's efforts.
- The priority of linguist support.

## COLLECTION PRIORITY

4-45. During the MDMP, the MI commander advises his higher headquarters on the most efficient use of the HUMINT collectors to meet collection requirements. Depending on the particular higher echelon mission and the capabilities of the specific personnel under his command, the supported S2 must decide whether to concentrate collection efforts on source, debriefing, interrogation, tactical questioning, liaison, or DOCEX operations to answer collection requirements. (See Chapter 5 for a description of these operations.) The MI commander may be required by his operational tasking to support any or all of these operations. He must decide how to task organize his assets to meet these requirements. When faced with limited assets, prioritization of collection is paramount.

4-46. A commander normally must prioritize HUMINT collections and DOCEX. Although the decision is primarily dependent on which type of source (human or document) is most likely to give the priority information, other factors such as phase of operation, ROE, source availability, and collection resource capabilities may influence his decision. At the tactical level, both human sources and documents are screened and the senior HUMINT soldier establishes the priorities. If documents and human sources are determined to be equally likely of containing priority information, human sources are normally exploited first due to—

- The ability of the HUMINT collector to get a human source to elaborate and explain his information, which cannot be done with a document.
- The rate at which people forget detailed information.
- The fact that an individual's resistance is easier to bypass immediately after undergoing a significant traumatic experience (capture). Capture thrusts them into an unfamiliar environment over which they have no control and are vulnerable to various approach techniques. This initial vulnerability passes quickly. An individual's established values begin to assert themselves again within a day or two, and the individual's willingness to cooperate might also decrease.

## TASK ORGANIZATION

4-47. Because of the need to place HUMINT collectors in contact with the local population and the need in many cases to integrate the HUMINT collection process into other operations, the planning and analysis staff for HUMINT missions is somewhat expanded from the norm. They should include the C/J/G/S2X, SJA, S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, other staff officers, as necessary, Provost Marshal, MP, and US Army Criminal Investigation Command, CA, unit HUMINT commanders, and senior HUMINT technicians of the deploying unit. If the unit's mission is to replace a currently deployed HUMINT unit, a representative of that unit should be included.

4-48. The challenge to the MI commander is the proper training during operations, task organization, placement, and coordination of movement of HUMINT elements to meet collection requirements. The unit modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) organization, which is designed for an MTW, may have to be modified to meet the specific requirements of



operations in PMEs and SSCs. Augmentation is often needed and must be requested. Task organization must be flexible to adjust to the dynamic mission objectives. Commanders must allow for the augmentation of HCT with other MI specialties and non-MI personnel as mission analysis and planning indicate the need. Mission analysis and planning identify the specific requirements for the HUMINT operations section, HAT, OMTs, and HCTs.

4-49. The composition of the HUMINT elements must be based on METT-TC factors. The number of HCTs and OMTs in the theater depends on the intensity of the collection effort and the geographical coverage of the AO. HCT members should be prepared to support any HUMINT missions they may receive through command channels. They must have the skills to shift easily from one set of functions to another based on the dynamic mission requirements. The number of OMTs in a designated theater will depend on the type and nature of the mission. A single OMT is capable of managing and controlling 2 to 4 HCTs. The size and staffing of the OMT will depend on a number of factors:

- Whether a HUMINT operations section is deployed and how many HCTs are subordinate to it.
- If a single HCT deploys to support a small contingency, there may be no need for an OMT. In this case the team leader must serve as the OMT.
- If three or more OMTs deploy, then a tactical HUMINT operations section should be deployed.
- For every 3 to 4 HCTs and their designated OMT, there should be one headquarters element composed of a platoon leader and a platoon sergeant to handle all administrative and logistical matters.

## OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

### RESERVE COMPONENT INTEGRATION

4-50. Given the Army's OPTEMPO and force structure, the integration of RC forces into the AC is highly likely for future operational deployments. Commanders must identify their requirements early and establish proactive coordination (both in garrison and while deployed) with their RC counterparts to fully integrate them during all phases of training and operations. During operations that include significant RC participation, an RC liaison officer normally will be assigned, either temporarily or permanently (at higher echelons), at the appropriate level of command. The commander and staff must ensure that the RC LNO is involved in all aspects of operational planning and execution.

4-51. There are three general categories of RC augmentation:

- Category 1: Formation of specialized units that include a fully integrated AC and RC TOE. The activation of the RC of these units is required for their full operational capability.
- Category 2: Augmentation of active duty units by RC units to fill out unit strength levels or to provide additional functionality. For example, an AC division might require additional HUMINT teams to support it

during a stability operation. If a division required one additional team, it should request a team and not request four HUMINT collectors. If the requirement is for three additional teams, it should request a HUMINT platoon with its organic C2 and OMTs.

- Category 3: The requirement for individual augmentees. This usually occurs when a unit has the C2 structure but needs either additional personnel or additional capability within the command structure. For example, a unit may have a HUMINT platoon but the platoon is at 50 percent strength. Individual augmentation is the easiest method of integration since the individual is integrated in the same manner as any replacement. The augmented unit normally is required to provide all equipment other than initial issue-type equipment.

4-52. There are several items to consider in unit augmentation:

- **Accurate Identification of Requirements:** During the MDMP, units need to identify those mission-essential capabilities not already present in the unit. The G3/S3, working in conjunction with the G1/S1, considers options that may include RC augmentation of organic units although the final decision to employ RC units is usually determined at Headquarters, Department of Army (HQDA). The requirement for augmentation is forwarded through appropriate personnel channels to US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and HQDA, which will identify the appropriate units or personnel. If approved, they will work with the appropriate agencies to establish the timeline in which the units can respond on the Time-Phased Forces Deployment Data List (TPFDDL). When developing requirements, the requesting unit must be sure to articulate its needs accurately, specifying required skills, numbers, and any additional skill identifiers (ASI). [Example: Request augmentation by a HUMINT platoon consisting of at least a platoon headquarters, three HCTs, one OMT, two linguists, and one CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHATS) proficient operator. The augmenting element will be operating in support of the commander's force protection program in the gaining unit's AOR.]
- **Activation Timeline:** Units need time to mobilize and conduct any additional collective and individual training that may be specific to the unit's mission or operational environment. The requesting unit needs to be aware of the time required to activate the requested RC and that there may be differences in levels of training or equipment. Timelines should be established by FORSCOM to allow resolution of these problems and should be reflected in the commander's operational planning sequence. Timelines will vary from unit to unit and mission to mission.
- **Training:** USAR and ARNG units usually cannot train their units or individuals to the same proficiency as the AC. Normally, this is due to the limited amount of training time. Because of this limitation, a certain degree of train-up prior to deployment may be necessary. Commanders should identify available training opportunities and request the participation of personnel identified for augmentation. For an ongoing mission, you should also plan for an extended "right seat

ride” mission handover period once the individuals or unit arrives in the theater of operations.

- **Command and Control:** If the RC augmentation requires activation of an entire unit, it should include their C2 element. If the augmentation is by individuals, then they will fall under the command and control of the gaining units.
- **Time on Active Status:** USAR and ARNG soldiers are restricted as to the amount of time they can remain on active status. This timeline begins on the date of mobilization and ends on the day the soldier leaves active duty status. Deployed units must take this into account when conducting continuous operations and must identify the requirement to replace RC forces early enough to allow for the required training and handoff procedures.
- **Experience:** While RC personnel normally lack current military experience, they often perform jobs in the civilian sector that either mitigate this lack of experience or they are able to bring a new and useful capability with them. Care should be taken that reservists who have civilian jobs which are similar to their HUMINT MOS (such as police officers or investigators) recognize the different constraints under which they operate in the military environment. For example, police officers who might normally task informants with minimal oversight cannot do that in their position as a HUMINT collector. Commanders should try to capitalize on these skills, but ensure proper training and understanding of the policies and regulations that govern HUMINT collection operations.

## OPERATIONS PLANS, OPERATIONS ORDERS, AND ANNEXES

4-53. An OPLAN is any plan for the conduct of military operations. When a commander issues a directive for the coordinated execution of a military operation, it becomes an OPORD. Although plans are based on specific conditions or assumptions, they are not static. Plans are changed, refined, and updated as a result of continuous estimates and studies. It is critical to include HUMINT plans in the Intelligence Annex to the OPLAN.

4-54. The OPORD gives the HUMINT element approval to execute its mission. OPORDs define the mission, set the parameters of operations, identify who is responsible for what, and how it is to be supported. Additions that are necessary to amplify an OPLAN or OPORD are contained in annexes, appendices, tabs, and enclosures. Tasking for units to conduct HUMINT collection operations is listed in the main body of the OPORD under **Tasks to Subordinate Units**. The HUMINT appendix to Annex B provides the technical guidance for HUMINT collection including the umbrella concept for HUMINT operations.

4-55. The HUMINT appendices provide details on planning, coordinating, approving, and managing HUMINT operations as they relate to the unit's overall mission. These appendices serve as the basic document authorizing most HUMINT operations and programs. They must be reviewed and approved by the appropriate office or commander. The HUMINT appendix to the ISR Annex is necessary to ensure that augmentation of HUMINT assets

from other components and agencies are integrated throughout the TF as required to facilitate their specialized collection requirements. Specific tabs may include joint debriefing and interrogation facility operations, source operations, DOCEX, or open-source information.

## **OPERATIONAL COORDINATION**

4-56. HUMINT collection is not conducted in a vacuum. Coordination with MI organizations and non-MI agencies, units, and staff organizations is often critical to expedite and complete HUMINT collection operations. (See Appendix C for predeployment planning.)

## **MI ORGANIZATIONS**

4-57. Elements involved in HUMINT planning, execution, and analysis need to maintain close coordination with their counterparts in the other intelligence disciplines. Coordination includes but is not limited to the disciplines shown below.

### **Imagery Intelligence:**

- Support imagery analysis by using HUMINT sources to identify or confirm the identification of items in imagery. This includes, for example, using human sources to identify the functions of buildings that have been tentatively identified through external imagery.
- Coordinate for current military or civilian imagery to use in the questioning of sources.
- Cue requirements managers and others involved in imagery tasking on locations or activities for imagery collection.
- Coordinate for IMINT information to verify information obtained through HUMINT collection.
- Provide imagery for analysis (through still and video photography and captured imagery).
- Coordinate for technical support as required when questioning personnel on subjects related to imagery.
- Obtain imagery-related collection requirements that can be answered by human sources.

### **Signals Intelligence:**

- Support signals analysis by using HUMINT sources to identify or confirm the information obtained through SIGINT collection.
- Coordinate for current SIGINT information to use in the questioning of sources.
- Cue requirements managers and others involved in SIGINT tasking on locations or activities (including communications types and frequencies) for SIGINT collection.
- Coordinate for information to verify information obtained through HUMINT collection.
- Provide SIGINT-related CEDs for SIGINT analysis.

- 
- Coordinate for technical support as required when questioning personnel on SIGINT-related topics.
  - Obtain SIGINT-related collection requirements that can be answered by human sources.

**Measurement and Signature Intelligence:**

- Support measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) analysis by using HUMINT sources to identify or confirm the information obtained through MASINT collection.
- Cue requirements managers and others involved in MASINT tasking on locations or activities for the location of MASINT sensors.
- Coordinate for information to verify information obtained through HUMINT collection.
- Provide MASINT-related CEDs for MASINT analysis.
- Coordinate for technical support as required when questioning personnel on MASINT-related topics.
- Obtain MASINT-related collection requirements that can be answered by human sources.

**Technical Intelligence:**

- Support TECHINT analysis by using HUMINT sources and documents to provide information concerning threat equipment and to support TECHINT materiel analysis. This includes, for example, the interrogation or debriefing of equipment operators of the translation of operators manuals for a piece of equipment being investigated.
- Coordinate for current information on equipment capabilities to use in the questioning of sources.
- Cue requirements managers and others involved in TECHINT tasking on locations or activities for TECHINT collection. This includes forwarding the identification and location of equipment of TECHINT interest obtained during HUMINT collection operations.
- Coordinate for TECHINT information to verify information obtained through HUMINT collection.
- Provide information from CEDs in support of TECHINT.
- Coordinate for technical support as required when questioning personnel on subjects related to areas of TECHINT interest.
- Obtain TECHINT-related collection requirements that can be answered by human sources.

**Counterintelligence:**

- Support CI analysis by using HUMINT sources to provide information concerning adversary intelligence collection capabilities and operations.
- Identify human and document sources that have information of CI interest.

- Cue requirements managers and others involved in CI tasking individuals or activities of CI interest.
- Coordinate for CI information to verify information obtained through HUMINT collection.
- Provide information from CEDs in support of CI.
- Coordinate for CI support as required when questioning personnel on topics related to areas of CI interest.
- Obtain CI-related collection requirements that can be answered by human sources.
- Integrate CI elements into HUMINT collection operations as applicable.

#### **Open-Source Intelligence:**

- Support open-source intelligence (OSINT).
- Provide open source maps, charts, phone directories, business directories, newspapers, video and audio media (including tapes and compact discs) to the appropriate J/G/S2X and Intelligence Community agencies and liaison officers.

#### **OTHER ORGANIZATIONS**

4-58. In addition to MI units, HUMINT collection organizations frequently conduct coordination with other military organizations.

- **Military Police Units:** Close coordination between HUMINT collectors and MPs is mutually beneficial. The MPs are responsible for maneuver and mobility support, area security, internment and resettlement, law and order, and police intelligence operations. Both activities (HUMINT collection and MP operations) require close contact with the local civilian, refugee, and detainee populations. HUMINT collection at checkpoints and at EPW and other detainee collection points must be coordinated with the MPs, who are normally responsible for internment and resettlement operations. In return, the HUMINT collectors, because of their screening and questioning of these population groups, can help facilitate the MP's population control missions by providing information about the population's activities and intentions that may be of MP concern. At EPW/detainee collection points, HUMINT collectors should arrange with the MP leadership to be allowed to debrief MPs since MPs are in regular contact with the detainees. This does not constitute tasking. Information collected in this manner may provide valuable insight, which can aid the collector in formulating approach strategies. MPs should be debriefed in such a way so as not to interfere with their mission. Liaison with the MP chain of command is vital to gain their support and assure them that HUMINT collection will not interfere with MP operations. Joint patrols containing MPs and HUMINT collectors can also be mutually beneficial in many situations.
- **Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and Provost Marshal Office (PMO):** The goals of HUMINT collection and those of the MPs (particularly CID) are different. CID and PMO are concerned with

identification and apprehension of criminal elements. The goal of HUMINT collection is the collection of information in response to PIRs that in many situations are centered on force protection. In the situation where the threat includes a criminal element, the HCTs might collect OB type information on the criminal element to ascertain their activities and threat to friendly forces. HUMINT collectors are not trained to conduct criminal investigations and must not be used for this purpose. Criminal investigators and HUMINT collectors must carefully coordinate their activities as necessary. HUMINT collectors are required to report to the proper agency information collected on criminal activities that the HUMINT collectors uncover in the normal course of their activities.

- **Psychological Operations Units:** As with the MP force, HUMINT collectors and PSYOP units are often interested in the same target audience but for different reasons. PSYOP units are interested in modifying the target audience beliefs and actions to be more supportive of US goals. Normally, HUMINT collection elements coordinate with PSYOP elements to obtain information concerning the motivational factors and cultural value systems of the individuals to be questioned. PSYOP units, as a part of their normal operations, develop detailed analysis concerning psychological and cultural factors of friendly and hostile elements in the AO. Such information will help HUMINT collection personnel to understand the source's attitude, value system, and perception; it will also help to obtain information more rapidly. At the same time, PSYOP units often will develop collection requirements to determine local attitudes and for information on the effectiveness of PSYOP campaigns. HUMINT collectors can be tasked to collect on these requirements if they are included as PIRs.
- **Civil Affairs Units:** The CA mission often places CA units in contact with the HUMINT collection target audience. If possible, HUMINT collection missions can be established in coordination with CA missions. If the HUMINT collection mission is viewed as having the potential of interfering with the CA mission and coordinated operations are not possible, CA personnel can still be sensitized to intelligence collection requirements and debriefed by HUMINT collectors as part of a friendly force debriefing operation.
- **Drug and Law Enforcement Agency Operations:** Personnel who are employees of DOD intelligence components may be assigned to assist Federal law enforcement authorities and, when lives are endangered, state and local law enforcement authorities; provided such use is consistent with, and has been approved by an official authorized pursuant to DOD Directive 5525.5, Enclosure 4 (reference (i)). Such official shall ensure that the General Counsel of the providing DOD component concurs in such use. Assistance may be rendered to LEAs and security services of foreign governments or international organizations in accordance with established policy and applicable SOFAs, provided that DOD intelligence components may not request or participate in activities of such agencies undertaken against US persons that would not be permitted activities of such components under the procedures of AR 381-10. HUMINT collectors may assist

foreign law enforcement authorities, with prior approval of the J2X. Under no circumstances will HUMINT collectors assist any US or foreign law enforcement authorities in any manner without prior approval by competent authority after a legal review of the proposal.

- **Maneuver Units:** HCTs may be utilized in GS for coverage of an AOIR or in DS to support a specific maneuver unit. The type of coordination needed with maneuver units will vary depending on the type of support relationship the HCT has. HCTs operating in GS should coordinate with maneuver unit commanders when the HCT will be operating in that unit's AO. At a minimum, the HCTs should announce their presence and request information on any conditions or ongoing situations that may affect on the conduct of their mission. An HCT operating in DS of a specific unit will coordinate with the unit for force augmentation to HUMINT patrols as needed in accordance with force protection requirements. The HCT leader should also coordinate with the supported unit's S2 for involvement in debriefings of returning patrol members, checkpoint personnel, convoy leaders and others. HCT leaders may also coordinate to be included in the unit's reconnaissance patrols, as appropriate.
- **Combat Service Support Units:** Current and future combat operations will be conducted in a noncontiguous battlespace. CSS formations and units may be an excellent source for HUMINT collectors. In many situations, DPs and refugees will perceive CSS activities as non-threatening and an activity which can provide them with aid and comfort. CSS operations will naturally draw DPs and refugees hoping to receive support. This could provide opportunities for HUMINT collectors to access this sector of the population. CSS unit S2s should conduct patrol debriefings of returning convoy personnel to capture observations made during convoys, with the goal of cross-cueing the supporting HCT, CI team, or law enforcement element as appropriate.

## STAFF COORDINATION

4-59. Successful HUMINT collection operations require support from the staff elements of the supported unit. These elements are collectively responsible for the planning that results in HUMINT tasking. Below is a partial list of the staff responsibilities that affect HUMINT collection:

- G1/S1 HUMINT-related responsibilities include but are not limited to—
  - Supervising the medical support furnished to EPW/detainees.
  - Maintaining a list (by language and proficiency) of qualified linguists within their command.
  - Coordinating with the G4 or G5 for procurement and payment of other interpreters and translators needed to perform intelligence and non-intelligence duties.
  - Ensuring the echelon's OPLAN contains complete provisions for handling and evacuating detainees, refugees, DPs, and local civilians



as required. This plan must satisfy the interests of all other staff officers and provide for—

- Ensuring humane treatment of all personnel.
- Promptly evacuating personnel from the combat zone.
- Integrating procedures for the evacuation, control, and administration of personnel with other combat service (CS) and CSS operations.
- Ensuring delivery of mail to EPWs and other detainees.
- Maintaining detainee (including EPW) statistics.
- Providing administration and control of detainee currency and pay records, including coordinating with appropriate intelligence authorities about investigating large sums of money.
- G2/S2 is responsible for developing intelligence in support of unit operations. The G2/S2 at division and higher and in the interim BCT is supported by a G/S2X and normally a HAT in the performance of his HUMINT-related functions. His HUMINT-related responsibilities include but are not limited to—
  - Obtaining intelligence through intelligence reach to support HUMINT collection.
  - Incorporating HUMINT into the ISR plan.
  - Developing the HUMINT annex to the OPOD and OPLAN.
  - Coordinating to provide technical support for all HUMINT collection operations.
  - Ensuring deconfliction and synchronization for all HUMINT collection assets within the unit's AO. A particular effort must be made to coordinate with all DOD military source operations (MSO), and DOD and other government agencies (OGAs) that may be operating in the AO; with the theater J2X, as part of deconfliction. Failure to deconflict with DOD MSO and OGAs may result in compromise of assets and interruption of collection operations and potentially unintended casualties.
    - Obtaining documents and materials of intelligence interest, including visual and audio media and electronic equipment (such as computers, phones, PDAs) taken from detainees, or seized or loaned, in coordination with the Provost Marshal and other elements.
    - Recording, evaluating, and analyzing collected information and providing feedback to HUMINT collectors.
    - Ensuring adequate HUMINT collection and reporting nets and systems are available.
    - Coordinating with the G3 to ensure plans for HUMINT collection operations are included in unit OPLANs.
    - Coordinating with the G3 to ensure that HUMINT collectors are included in unit training plans, rehearsals, and briefbacks.
    - Drafting instructions for handling, evacuating, and exploiting captured enemy personnel and CEDs. (They coordinate with the G3 to ensure draft instructions are included in the command standing operating procedures (SOPs), OPLANs, and OPOD.)
    - Projecting capture rates as well as refugee and DP rates.

- Determining the number of interpreters and translators needed to perform intelligence duties.
- Coordinating with other agencies and HUMINT collectors for intelligence sharing.
- Controlling the procedures used to process and grant clearances to the interpreters and translators as required.
- Coordinating with the civil-military operations (CMO) officer for intelligence screening of local nationals, refugees, and DPs.
- Coordinating with SJA for legal review of proposed operations.
- G3/S3 is responsible for operations, plans, organization, and training. His HUMINT collection-related responsibilities include but are not limited to—
  - Ensuring the inclusion of HUMINT collection units in the main body of OPLANs and OPORDs under **Tasks to Subordinate Units and Task Organization**.
  - Ensuring instructions for handling, evacuating, and exploiting captured enemy personnel and CEDs in all unit command SOPs, OPLANs, and OPORDs.
  - Incorporating HUMINT collection operations into future plans and operations.
  - Ensuring subordinate units are trained in proper handling and evacuation of captured enemy personnel, materiel, and CEDs.
  - Ensuring that the subordinate elements are trained in OPORDs including ROE and the proper handling of local civilians, foreign nationals, refugees, and DPs.
  - Obtaining, organizing, and supervising employment of additional personnel as guards for EPWs and other detainees where MP assets are not available or insufficient.
  - Tasking the Division/Brigade Engineer Officer in conjunction with the G2/S2 to conduct a site survey for possible EPW/detainee holding area facilities within the operational area. Priority should go to existing facilities needing little or no renovation to meet operational requirements. If suitable facilities cannot be found, the engineer officer should provide detailed facilities design specifications to the G4/S4 for coordination and development of contracted resources.
- G4/S4 responsibilities related to HUMINT collection include but are not limited to—
  - Developing command policy for evacuation and internment of captured enemy personnel, and evacuation and safekeeping of CEE and CEDs.
  - Coordinating contracts for real estate and construction of source-holding facilities if local capabilities are not available. Ideally, existing facilities will be occupied and renovated whenever possible.
  - Collecting and distributing captured enemy supplies. (This is coordinated with the intelligence and operations staffs.)
  - Procuring and distributing rations to personnel holding areas.
  - Transporting EPWs and other detainees in a timely, safe manner to the appropriate facility for processing.

- Determining requirements for use of source labor for the logistical support needed in source-handling operations.
- Providing logistical support to interpreter personnel.
- G5/S5 responsibilities related to HUMINT collection include but are not limited to—
  - Coordinating with local US government, personnel staff representatives, and HN armed forces for procuring native linguists for interpreter support.
  - Coordinating military support of populous.
  - Providing technical advice and assistance in reorientation of sources and enemy defectors.
  - Coordinating MI aspects of CMO activities with the G2.

## ADDITIONAL SUPPORT

4-60. In addition to the major staff elements, a HUMINT collection element requires support from several other elements in order to conduct operations. These elements are discussed below.

- The US Army Criminal Investigation Command is the organization with primary responsibility for investigating allegations of criminal acts or reportable incidents committed by or against detainees.
- The SJA can provide legal support and advice on the interpretation and application of applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOS. The SJA is also a channel for reporting known or suspected reportable incidents of abuse or inhumane treatment.
- The Inspector General is a channel for reporting known or suspected reportable incidents of abuse or inhumane treatment.
- The PMO is the channel for reporting criminal activity other than reportable incidents, but also can be used for reporting known or suspected reportable incidents.
- The Chaplain can also receive reports of reportable incidents.
- The G7 provides information on Information Operations and conducts liaison with PSYOP, the Electronic Warfare Officer, the Military Deception Officer, and Operations Security personnel.

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## PART TWO

# HUMINT Collection In Military Source Operations

Part Two discusses HUMINT collection as it pertains to MSO. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) has established a DOD-wide HUMINT Enterprise consisting of the following executors: The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Combatant Commands (COCOMs), the Military Departments, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). All Defense HUMINT Enterprise executors support and satisfy Defense requirements by employing their available resources and capabilities.

MSO refer to the collection of foreign military and military-related intelligence by humans from humans. MSO are conducted under SECDEF authorities, to satisfy DOD needs in compliance with DOD policy. Within the Army, MSO are conducted by trained personnel under the direction of military commanders. These specially trained personnel may employ the entire range of HUMINT collection operations. MSO sources include one-time, continuous, and formal contacts, from contact operations; and sources from interrogations, debriefings, and liaison activities.

Each type of MSO activity has specific operational requirements, specific legal restrictions, and operational guidelines. HUMINT collection activities in each of these categories require specific approval, coordination, and review. MSO include human source contact operations, debriefing, liaison, and interrogations. This chapter introduces each of these collection operations.

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## Chapter 5

# HUMINT Collection

## HUMINT COLLECTION OPERATIONS

5-1. Full spectrum operations require focused MSO with strong capabilities dispersed across the battlefield. In offensive and defensive operations, the HCTs need to be placed in support of the engaged maneuver battalions. In stability and reconstruction operations and civil support operations, the HUMINT teams need to be located in battalion AOs throughout the AOIR.

5-2. The rapid pace of operations, the need to provide near-real time (NRT) support of command decisions and the inherent time delays in moving detainees, including EPWs and civilian refugees to centralized locations, necessitate the dispersion of HUMINT collection assets to forward areas in

support of critical operations rather than their retention at detainee and refugee holding facilities at echelons corps and below. This forward deployment gives HUMINT collectors earlier access to sources and is facilitated by enhanced communication and automation capabilities down to the collection team level.

5-3. All operations are different, and deployment of HUMINT assets is METT-TC dependent. Brigades need the capability to provide 24-hour HUMINT collection capability to each battalion AO. The command relationship of the HUMINT collection capability is also METT-TC dependent. The OMT should be located at the echelon that is best able to manage and support the HCTs and to provide the best capability to answer the commander's PIRs.

5-4. The Division and Corps elements should cover their respective areas not covered by their subordinate commands. They also, as needed, reinforce those target areas that are most effective in answering their respective command PIRs already covered by subordinate command capability. EAC HUMINT units normally are responsible for supporting theater or national requirements and providing HUMINT support at theater level facilities such as the JIDC. The EAC units will also augment the echelon below corps units and conduct source operations in the Corps area as required. Operations, particularly in challenging terrain and in stability and reconstruction environments, may require additional HUMINT assets normally obtained from the RC.

## HUMAN SOURCE CONTACT OPERATIONS

5-5. HUMINT collection requires the contact between the HUMINT collector, who attempts to gather information through a variety of HUMINT collection techniques, and a human contact, who hopefully has the information that the HUMINT collector wants and who can be convinced to divulge the information. Operations with formal contacts are only conducted by HUMINT collectors and CI agents who are specifically trained and authorized to do so. There are three levels of contacts:

- One-time contact.
- Continuous contact.
- Formal contact.

5-6. The basic goal of all levels of contact is to collect information in response to collection tasking; however, only under certain conditions can HUMINT collectors task contacts to get information for them (see para 5-28). Understanding the types of contacts is key to understanding each type of human source contact operation. The following levels are not all-inclusive nor are the listed categories exclusive. For example, a contact who was initially a one-time contact (such as a walk-in) may later be developed into a continuous contact. A continuous contact may be developed into a formal contact, who can then be tasked, trained, and paid. There is no limit on the number of times a team can meet contacts without recruiting them and making them into a formal contact.

## ONE-TIME CONTACT

5-7. The one-time contact is a source of information of value that was, and will be, encountered only once. In all operational environments the HUMINT collector will frequently encounter a source only once, particularly at lower echelons. This may be a local civilian encountered during a patrol, a detainee who is quickly questioned and then evacuated, or a refugee at a checkpoint.

5-8. In addition to the information obtained from a one-time contact, the HUMINT collector must make a reasonable effort to obtain as much basic data as possible about the one-time contact. Complete name, occupation, address, and other basic data of this source are crucial for a thorough analysis of the information provided. The one-time contact and the information he provides cannot be assessed and evaluated independently; however, the information provided by a one-time contact must be reported and corroborated through other HUMINT sources and even other intelligence disciplines.

5-9. Contact reports must be filed with the OMT and source registries maintained in accordance with FM 34-5 (S//NF), AR 381-100 (S//NF), and DIAM 58-11 (S//NF) in order to support analysis of information obtained. If a one-time contact is encountered for a second time and again provides information of value, then the contact may be thereafter treated as a continuous contact.

5-10. A walk-in is a one-time contact who volunteers information of value to US forces on his own initiative. The walk-in source may volunteer information by approaching an HCT, other ISR elements, or US forces or civilian personnel anywhere in the AO. Each unit must have in place a program to identify, safeguard, and direct the walk-in to the appropriate collection asset, to be screened and debriefed as required. For example, a walk-in who wanted to report a crime would be directed to the PMO rather than to a HUMINT collector.

5-11. The collection asset will screen the walk-in to determine the type of information the source has and to determine and evaluate the reliability of the individual. After identifying the type of information, the collector determines if he has the jurisdiction to collect that information. If, for example, the walk-in wishes to report a crime, the collector refers that individual to the proper criminal investigative agency.

5-12. Systematic questioning, deception detection techniques, and cross-checking of information are used extensively in the evaluation process. Concurrently, there are national level directives, DOD directives, and Army regulations that direct specific actions to be taken with a walk-in. When dealing with a walk-in source, HUMINT collectors must guard against adversary intelligence collection. They must also protect legitimate sources of information. The walk-in is thoroughly debriefed on all areas of information relevant to collection requirements, and any information of value is reported.

5-13. On occasion, the HUMINT collector may determine that a one-time contact has the potential to become a continuous contact or a formal contact. This is referred to as a developmental lead. A developmental lead is an

individual identified through social and professional status, leads, source profiling, or other techniques, who has knowledge required by the commander. A developmental lead is any person the HUMINT collector expects to see or would like to see again, or a person who indicates that they intend to return in the future.

5-14. When a HUMINT collector identifies a developmental lead, he reports his interest in elevating the source to continuous or formal contact status as soon as possible to the OMT. Although not every developmental lead becomes a source of information, the HUMINT collector should see each developmental lead as a potential source of information and apply the appropriate security measures. The developmental lead is continuously assessed to verify his placement and access to the type of information the HCT is seeking. Additionally, the HUMINT collector continuously assesses the motivation and characteristics of the developmental lead.

5-15. A one-time source cannot be tasked to collect information, but can be sensitized to information in which the HUMINT collector is interested. For example, if a walk-in source provides information on activity in a house in his neighborhood, he might ask if the collector would be interested in more of the same type information in the future. The HUMINT collector cannot tell him to go get more information, but can indicate that he would listen if the walk-in returned with more information on the topic. If the walk-in returns a second time, he must be handled as a continuous contact.

## **CONTINUOUS CONTACTS**

5-16. Continuous contacts are individuals who have been identified as having more information than could be obtained through a one-time contact, and have been met again by HUMINT collection personnel for the purpose of collecting additional information. HUMINT collectors do **not** task continuous contacts, but they can be sensitized in the same way as one-time contacts. Continuous contacts provide their knowledge through informal debriefings and elicitation.

5-17. All contacts who are seen more than once by HUMINT collectors must be tracked by registering them in the Source Registry and reporting the contacts to the OMT. As an example, a one-time contact who reported information to a HCT contacts them again with follow-up information. That person will now be registered as a continuous contact and tracked by the OMT. This registration process helps to prevent the same information from being collected by multiple collectors from the same contact without realizing it. See AR 381-172 (S//NF) and FM 34-5 (S//NF) for further information on source registration and for the required forms. Types of continuous contacts are discussed below.

### **Local National and Third-Country National Employees**

5-18. Local national and third-country national employees are non-US personnel from either the country in which the US forces are operating or a third country who are either employed by US forces directly or through a contractor to provide logistical support and services. One of the purposes of locally employed personnel screening is to assess these individuals as



potential sources of information. Local national and third-country national employees can be a prolific source of information about local attitudes and events, particularly in a restrictive environment where US contact with the local population is curtailed. Their information can also be significant in a force protection role. The HUMINT collector must register these individuals with the J/G2X. While the HUMINT collector is assessing the local national employee as an intelligence source, CI agents are assessing the same source pool as potential security risks.

5-19. Coordination between HUMINT collectors and CI elements is essential for deconfliction and to avoid duplication of effort. If the HUMINT collector identifies an employee that may be of CI interest, he should immediately notify the appropriate CI unit.

### **Displaced Personnel and Refugees**

5-20. DPs and refugees are excellent sources of information about denied areas and can be used to help identify threat agents and infiltrators. The degree of access HUMINT collectors have to DPs is dependent on the OPODs, ROE, and SOFAs in effect. HUMINT collectors can work with CA or other programs dealing with DPs or refugees.

5-21. DPs and refugees are normally considered one-time sources but may be incorporated into other long-term collection programs if their degree of knowledge warrants this. In this case, adherence to the restrictions involving source operations is necessary. Those restrictions can be found in AR 380-10, AR 381-100 (S//NF), DIAM 58-11 (S//NF), DIAM 58-12 (S//NF), and other publications as well as existing ROE and SOFAs.

### **US Forces**

5-22. US forces have many opportunities to interact with the local population in the normal course of their duties in operations. This source perhaps is the most under-utilized HUMINT collection resource. Some US forces, such as combat and reconnaissance patrols, are routinely tasked and debriefed by the appropriate level G2/S2. Others, such as medical teams or engineers who have extensive contact with the local population, should also be debriefed.

5-23. Commanders and staff members who serve as liaison with the local population and local government officials can be fruitful sources of information. CA, PSYOP, MP, and other elements also have legitimate reasons to conduct liaison with local authorities and should be debriefed as appropriate. The friendly force debriefing effort can succeed only with command emphasis.

5-24. HUMINT collection elements need to coordinate with local units to identify those individuals who would be most profitable to debrief and to further coordinate with them for time to conduct the debriefing. Although the S2 and S3 can and should task their soldiers to conduct collection tasks during the course of their normal duties, HUMINT collectors must ensure that their friendly force debriefing effort does not interfere with the primary mission accomplishment of the soldiers being debriefed. HCTs should ensure that the necessary staff S2s and S3s are aware of the HUMINT collection

requirements and request that the staffs incorporate these into their respective collection taskings. The results of debriefings by units should also be disseminated to the HCTs for source development, collection targeting, and analysis.

### **Official Liaison**

5-25. Liaison with local military, government, or civilian agency officials provides an opportunity to collect information required by the commander. The HUMINT collector meets with these officials to conduct liaison, coordinate certain operations, collect information, and obtain leads to potential sources of information. Elicitation is the primary technique used with liaison contacts, although in many cases there is a more formal exchange of information. Information obtained by these elements through liaison normally tends to reflect the official positions of their superiors and may not be entirely accurate or complete.

### **Detainees**

5-26. A detainee is any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force. An EPW is a detainee who meets the criteria of Articles 4 and 5 of the GPW. (See Appendix A.) Detainees may be interrogated. They are frequently excellent sources of information but in many instances the access of the HUMINT collector to the detainees may be curtailed.

5-27. For example, when supporting a counterinsurgency, the supported government may consider all captured insurgents to be criminals and not allow US forces access to them. In these instances, US HUMINT collectors should attempt to sit in during local questioning; they could submit questions or, at a minimum, coordinate to receive the reports from local authority questioning. US HUMINT collectors must remember that regardless of the legal status of the detainees they must be treated in a manner consistent with the Geneva Conventions. (See Appendix A.)

### **FORMAL CONTACT**

5-28. Formal contacts are individuals who have agreed to meet and cooperate with HUMINT collectors for the purpose of providing information. HUMINT collectors who have met with a particular continuous contact three or more times should consider assessing him for use as a formal contact. Formal contacts meet repeatedly with HUMINT collectors, and their operation and tasking must be carried out in accordance with AR 381-172 (S//NF), DIAM 58-11 (S//NF), and DIAM 58-12 (S//NF).

5-29. Formal contacts are generally local nationals or third-country national employees. Knowledge of their meeting with HUMINT collectors is restricted. This can be accomplished by either disguising the fact that the HUMINT collection personnel are indeed HUMINT personnel, or by concealing the purpose of overt meetings with HUMINT personnel. HCTs take extraordinary measures to protect their relationship with these contacts. Depending on METT-TC factors, meetings with formal contacts may range from overt meetings, which are conducted discreetly in order to protect the

relationship between the source and HUMINT collectors, to meetings whereby only the collector and the source know the meeting has occurred. When contact operations are conducted using this methodology, the operation must be coordinated in accordance with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) policy cited in Appendix J. Specific direction regarding documentation required for recruitment, and the designation of approval authority (usually the J/G2X) for recruitment of a formal contact, will be specified in Appendix 5 (HUMINT) of Annex B (Intelligence) to the governing OPLAN or OPORD.

## DEBRIEFING OPERATIONS

5-30. Debriefing operations refer to the systematic questioning of individuals not in the custody of the US, to procure information to answer collection tasks by direct and indirect questioning techniques. The primary categories of sources for debriefings are friendly forces and civilians including refugees, DPs, and local inhabitants.

5-31. Debriefing operations are those operations directed towards collecting information from a segment of the target population using primarily debriefing techniques. These debriefing operations are separate from the G2/S2 debriefing program to debrief personnel returning from missions. Debriefing operations often include the debriefing of personnel who may not usually be debriefed as part of their assigned duties.

5-32. Normally Army debriefing operations will be directly related to collection tasks at the operational and tactical levels. Strategic debriefing of high-level personnel in response to theater and national level requirements is often under the purview of the DIA/DH. Army HUMINT collectors frequently participate in this type of collection, which is under the control, rules, regulations, and operational guidance of DH.

## PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES

5-33. Debriefing operations are conducted under the guidelines of DIAM 58-11 (S//NF) and DIAM 58-12 (S//NF). They are further subject to applicable executive orders and the specific ROE and classified "umbrella concept" that apply to the specific AO.

## OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS

5-34. Debriefing requires relatively unconstrained access to the target audience. Debriefing operations are frequently constrained by the umbrella concept, overt operational proposal (OVOP), and OPORDs. Debriefing is a time- and resource-demanding operation that often shows limited immediate results. Since the potential target audience is so large, debriefing operations require careful planning and careful screening and selection of specific targets.

## **DEBRIEFING OPERATIONS AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL**

5-35. Debriefing operations at the tactical level include the debriefing of elements of the local and transient civilian population in support of ongoing tactical operations. This is different from but often supportive of tactical SCOs as described in Chapter 1. Although tactical SCOs use specific identified sources to obtain and report information, tactical debriefing operations use one-time and continuous contacts to answer requirements. Tactical debriefing operations are frequently combined with tactical interrogation operations and may identify potential sources for tactical SCOs.

## **REFUGEE FACILITY AND CHECKPOINT OPERATIONS**

5-36. Refugee facility and checkpoint operations involve placing HCTs at points where US forces expect to encounter large numbers of refugees. Deployment of HUMINT collectors at checkpoints is normally preferred due to their ability to collect and report more timely information. As in the questioning of detainees, the debriefing of refugees should not delay their movement out of the danger area.

5-37. Checkpoint debriefing is normally done in coordination with MP or combat forces that are manning the checkpoint. Debriefing at refugee camps is used to obtain longer term and less immediate information. HUMINT collection units established at refugee camps coordinate their activities with the CA, MP, NGO, or other organizations that has responsibility for operating the refugee camp.

5-38. In internment facilities operated by the MPs, HUMINT collectors coordinate with MPs for access to the detainees and for guard support. In facilities operated by NGOs, HUMINT collectors coordinate with NGOs for permission to speak to the refugees. NGOs are civilian agencies and may decide not to permit HUMINT collectors to have access to refugees.

## **FRIENDLY FORCE DEBRIEFING**

5-39. Every member of the friendly force is a potential source for HUMINT collection. Friendly force personnel frequently have contact with the threat, civilian population, or the environment. Although many individuals report their information in the form of combat information, many do not report the information, do not realize its significance, or do not know how to report key information. Frequently a systematic questioning by a trained HUMINT collector will identify key information that can contribute to the intelligence picture and help an individual recall details. It also helps to place his information into a systematic format for the analyst to use.

5-40. HUMINT collectors debrief selected friendly force personnel including combat patrols, aircraft pilots and crew, long-range surveillance teams, deep insert special forces teams, and other high-risk mission personnel. Often the personnel assigned to a sector of responsibility are the first to notice changes in the attitude of the local populace or differences in the mission environment.

5-41. They are also able to provide indicators concerning the mission environment. HUMINT collectors also conduct debriefings of returned

prisoners of war (POWs), freed hostages, returned US defectors, and soldiers reported as missing in action. These debriefings help to determine enemy methods of operations, enemy intentions, POW handling and interrogations, enemy weaknesses, information concerning other POWs not returned, and battle damage assessment (BDA).

5-42. HUMINT assets lose access to valuable information if they are not regularly coordinating with the following elements:

- **Cavalry Troops, Unit Patrols, and Scouts.** Unit patrols and scouts have a unique view of the battle area that sensors cannot detect. During operations, units and scouts often patrol villages or populated areas that are contentious and therefore of interest. The unit will gain valuable information on the current status of the AO, potentially answering intelligence requirements, through mission reporting and debriefing by their unit S2 or HUMINT collector.
- **Military Police.** HUMINT collection assets work with the MPs who gain area knowledge through their extensive foot patrols and vehicular convoys. MPs also staff checkpoints and traffic control points (TCPs) where they interact with large numbers of the civilian populace and encounter people and situations that often answer intelligence requirements. MP guards at any internment facility are a valuable source of information on the attitude and behavior of detainees. HUMINT collectors should coordinate with the MP detainee facility commander in order to obtain information on detainees obtained through custodial observation and conversations.
- **Civil Affairs.** CA units have daily interaction with the civilian populace including key members of the civilian community such as politicians, technical personnel, and military leadership.
- **Psychological Operations.** PSYOP teams often interview civilians on the battlefield to determine the effectiveness of friendly and threat PSYOP campaigns. PSYOP elements also gather information on political, social, and other PSYOP requirements. PSYOP elements produce and disseminate intelligence products based partially on their interaction with the civilian populace.
- **Special Operations Forces.** The Special Operations Forces (SOF) team often has greater access to humans and areas on a battlefield than any other collection asset. Their observation of and interaction with the local population provides them access to information that often answers collection requirements. The following are examples of these types of collection missions:
  - Special reconnaissance missions into denied territory to satisfy intelligence gaps or to confirm information from another source.
  - Unconventional warfare (UW) missions normally of a long duration. SOF are inserted into hostile territory to conduct sensitive operations that support US tactical and national objectives. During these missions, SOF units often come in contact with the local population and gather information that meets intelligence requirements.
- **Long-Range Surveillance.** Direct observation and reporting on targets such as activities and facilities may provide timely and

accurate intelligence to support a decision or cross-cue other collection capabilities. Long-range surveillance (LRS) is often employed when discreet observation of an activity is necessary over a long period of time or when a collection system that can respond to redirection is necessary.

- **Criminal Intelligence Operations.** CID personnel, in cooperation with MP soldiers, play a key role by linking criminal intelligence to specific groups and events. The criminal intelligence collection effort specifically targets weapons, drugs, organized crime, and identities of smuggling routes. The identification of smuggling routes results in a significant increase in numbers of weapons being confiscated. The timely transfer of criminal intelligence products to tactical units enables a rapid response to serious confrontations, increased confiscation of arms and ammunition, and improved stability in a TF and AO. The Fusion Cell within the ACE develops intelligence products from national, theater, and operational sources. Due to the significant threat that criminal elements pose, CID military agents and CID civilian analysts may be attached to the Fusion Cell to facilitate the police intelligence function.

## STRATEGIC DEBRIEFING OPERATIONS

5-43. Strategic debriefing is debriefing activity conducted to collect information or to verify previously collected information in response to national or theater level collection priorities. This avoids surprises of a strategic nature and is used to support long-range strategic planning. Strategic debriefing is conducted in peacetime as well as in wartime. It often fills intelligence gaps on extremely sensitive topics or areas. The sources for strategic debriefing include but are not limited to émigrés, refugees, displaced persons, defectors, and selected US personnel. Strategic debriefing guidance is provided in DIAM 58-11 (S//NF), DIAM 58-12 (S//NF), and DODD 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence, Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning."

5-44. Strategic debriefing is conducted in a non-hostile, business-like manner. The rapport posture is usually amicable as the source is usually willingly answering national level intelligence needs. Although voluntary sources may not be motivated by a desire for money or other material incentives, it is necessary to ensure that any promised incentives are delivered. The time used in a strategic debriefing can range from days to years. Sources typically have high-level backgrounds in scientific, industrial, political, or military areas.

5-45. Information gathered as strategic intelligence is categorized into eight components. Each of these components can be divided into subcomponents. These components and subcomponents are neither all-encompassing nor mutually exclusive. This approach enhances familiarization with the types of information included in strategic intelligence. An easy way to remember these components is the acronym "BEST MAPS":

<p>Biographic Intelligence  Economic Intelligence  Sociological Intelligence  Transportation and Telecommunications Intelligence</p> <p>Military Geographic Intelligence  Armed Forces Intelligence  Political Intelligence  Science and Technological Intelligence</p>
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- **Biographic intelligence** is the study of individuals of actual or potential importance through knowledge of their personalities and backgrounds. For further guidance on collecting and reporting biographic intelligence, see DIAM 58-12 (S//NF). The subcomponents are—
  - Educational and occupational history—civilian and military backgrounds of individuals.
  - Individual accomplishment—notable accomplishments of an individual's professional or private life.
  - Idiosyncrasies and habits—mannerisms and unusual lifestyles.
  - Position, influence, and potential—present and/or future positions of power or influence.
  - Attitudes and hobbies—significant interests that may affect an individual's accessibility.
- **Economic intelligence** studies economic strengths and weaknesses of a country. The subcomponents are—
  - Economic warfare—information on the diplomatic or financial steps a country may take to induce neutral countries to cease trading with its enemies.
  - Economic vulnerabilities—the degree to which a country's military would be hampered by the loss of materials or facilities.
  - Manufacturing—information on processes, facilities, logistics, and raw materials.
  - Source of economic capability—any means a country has to sustain its economy (for example, black market trade, legitimate business or trades, and imports and exports).
- **Sociological intelligence** deals with people, customs, behaviors, and institutions. The subcomponents are—
  - Population—rates of increase, decrease, or migrations.
  - Social characteristics—customs, morals, and values.
  - Manpower—divisions and distribution within the workforce.
  - Welfare—health and education.
  - Public information—information services within the country.
- **Transportation and telecommunications intelligence** studies systems dedicated to and used during military emergencies and peacetime.

- **Military geographic intelligence** studies all geographic factors (physical and cultural) that may affect military operations. Physical geography is concerned with natural or manmade geophysical features. Cultural geography provides demographics information.
- **Armed forces intelligence** is the integrated study of the ground, sea, and air forces of the country. The subcomponents are—
  - Strategy—military alternatives in terms of position, terrain, economics, and politics.
  - Tactics—military deployments and operations doctrine.
  - OB—location, organization, weapons, strengths.
  - Equipment—analysis of all military materiel.
  - Logistics—procurement, storage, and distribution.
  - Training—as carried out at all echelons to support doctrine.
  - Organization—detailed analysis of command structures.
  - Manpower—available resources and their conditioning.
- **Political intelligence** studies all political aspects which may affect military operations. The subcomponents are—
  - Government structure—organization of departments and ministries.
  - National policies—government actions and decisions.
  - Political dynamics—government views and reactions to events.
  - Propaganda—information and disinformation programs.
  - Policy and intelligence services—organization and functions.
  - Subversion—subversive acts sponsored by the government.
- **Science and technological intelligence** studies the country's potential and capability to support objectives through development of new processes, equipment, and weapons systems. The subcomponents are—
  - Weapons and weapon systems.
  - Missile and space programs.
  - Nuclear energy and weapons technology.
  - NBC developments.
  - Basic applied science.
  - Research and development systems.

## LIAISON OPERATIONS

5-46. Liaison is conducted to obtain information and assistance, to coordinate or procure material, and to develop views necessary to understand counterparts. Liaison contacts are normally members of the government, military, law enforcement, or other member of the local or coalition infrastructure. The basic tenet of liaison is *quid pro quo*. An exchange of information, services, material, or other assistance is usually a part of the transaction. The nature of this exchange varies widely depending upon the culture, location, and personalities involved.

5-47. Because the nature of liaison tasks varies widely, the general goals of the liaison operation and the objective of each liaison contact should be



clearly defined. The objective should include the type of information to be collected, methods of operations unique to the area, and the command objectives. Additionally, the collector should know limitations on liaison activities. These limitations include—

- Prohibitions against collecting certain types of information or contacting certain types of individuals or organizations.
- Memorandums of understanding with other echelons which delineate each echelon's AOR and AORs for subordinate units.
- Coordination requirements per DCID 5/1 dated 19 December 1984, which are required for selected types of liaison activities.

5-48. Administrative considerations include—

- Type, method, and channels of reporting information obtained from liaison activities.
- Project and contingency fund site numbers to be used.
- Funding and incentive acquisition procedures.
- Limitations on the use of ICFs or incentives.
- Reporting system used.
- Authority under which the specific liaison program is conducted and guidelines for joint and combined operations are set.

5-49. Benefits of liaison include—

- Establishing working relations with various commands, agencies, or governments.
- Arranging for and coordinating joint and combined operations.
- Exchanging operational information and intelligence within legal limits.
- Facilitating access to records and personnel of other agencies not otherwise accessible.
- Acquiring information to satisfy US requirements.
- Accessing a larger pool of information.

## INTERROGATION OPERATIONS

5-50. HUMINT interrogation is the systematic process of using approved interrogation approaches to question a captured or detained person to obtain reliable information to satisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. Interrogation is to be conducted by personnel trained and certified to use legal, approved methods of convincing EPWs/detainees to give their cooperation. Interrogation sources are detainees, including EPWs.

5-51. Definitions of EPWs and rules for their treatment are contained in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). The definition and rules for the treatment of civilians are contained in the

Geneva Conventions Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC). (See Appendix A.) For persons covered by those Conventions, applicable GPW and GC provisions must be adhered to at all times. (Regarding treatment of detained personnel, see also paragraph 5-74.)

5-52. There is an additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions called Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 1977, which also contains definitions of who is a civilian and who is an EPW (Articles 50 and 44). The US has not ratified Protocol I nor does it accept the expanded definition of EPWs that it contains. Requirements managers, J/G/S2X personnel, and HUMINT collectors should understand, however, that coalition military personnel with whom they may work may be bound by Protocol I, and those coalition personnel may be required to treat additional personnel as EPWs. Any questions concerning the GPW and Protocol I must be directed to the SJA office for clarification.

5-53. Interrogation operations are specific operations normally conducted at detainee collection facilities directed at the wide-scale collection of information from detainees using interrogation techniques. Although field interrogations are conducted at all echelons and during all operations in which there are detainees, detention facilities where interrogation operations occur are normally located only at theater or JTF level.

5-54. Compliance with laws and regulations, including proper treatment of detainees, is a matter of command responsibility. Commanders have an affirmative duty to ensure their subordinates are not mistreating detainees or their property. HCT leaders must effectively supervise their subordinate collectors during all interrogation operations. Supervisors must ensure that each HUMINT collector has properly completed an interrogation plan and sound collection strategy, and fully understands the intelligence requirements he is seeking to satisfy prior to beginning an interrogation. NCOs and WOs should regularly participate in interrogations with their subordinates to ensure that the highest standards of conduct are maintained. Interrogation supervisors should also monitor interrogations by video, where video monitoring is available. The production, use, and dissemination of interrogation videos must be tightly controlled by HCT leaders. Such videos must not be released for dissemination outside the Intelligence Community without the express permission of the SECDEF or his delegate.

## **NON-DOD AGENCIES**

5-55. Non-DOD agencies may on occasion request permission to conduct interrogations in Army facilities. These requests must be approved by the JTF commander or, if there is no JTF commander, the theater commander or appropriate higher level official. The interrogation activity commander will assign a trained and certified interrogator to escort non-DOD interrogators to observe their interrogation operations. The non-DOD personnel will sign for any detainee they want to question from the MPs, following the same established procedures that DOD personnel must follow. In all instances, interrogations or debriefings conducted by non-DOD agencies will be observed by DOD personnel. In all instances, non-DOD agencies must observe the same standards for the conduct of interrogation operations and

treatment of detainees as do Army personnel. All personnel who observe or become aware of violations of Army interrogation operation standards will report the infractions immediately to the commander. The personnel who become aware of mistreatment of detainees will report the infractions immediately and suspend the access of non-DOD personnel to the facility until the matter has been referred to higher headquarters. Non-DOD personnel conducting interrogation operations in an Army facility must sign a statement acknowledging receipt of these rules, and agree to follow them prior to conducting any interrogation operations. Non-DOD personnel working in DOD interrogation facilities have no authority over Army interrogators. Army interrogators (active duty, civilian, or contractor employees) will only use DOD-approved interrogation approaches and techniques.

## **FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INTERROGATORS**

5-56. Foreign governments may request to participate, or may be invited to participate in interrogations in Army facilities. Requests for foreign government access to detainees will be forwarded through the operational chain of command for appropriate action pursuant to DOD policy. Foreign government personnel must comply with US DOD policies and observe the same standards for the conduct of interrogation operations and treatment of detainees as do Army personnel. The interrogation activity commander will assign a trained and certified interrogator to escort foreign government interrogators to observe their interrogation operations. The foreign government personnel will sign for any detainee they want to question from the MPs, following the same established procedures that US DOD personnel must follow. In all instances, interrogations or debriefings conducted by foreign government interrogators will be observed by US DOD personnel. In all instances, foreign government interrogators must observe the same standards for the conduct of interrogation operations and treatment of detainees as do US Army personnel.

## **MP FUNCTIONS IN ASSOCIATION WITH INTERROGATION OPERATIONS**

5-57. MP and MI personnel both have responsibilities with regard to EPW/detainees, but with different goals and responsibilities. (See DOD Directive 3115.09.) Therefore, close coordination must occur between MP and MI personnel in order to facilitate the effective accomplishment of the MP and MI missions. Both MP and MI personnel must ensure that they treat detainees in accordance with the baseline standards of humane treatment.

5-58. MPs are responsible for the humane treatment, evacuation, custody and control (reception, processing, administration, internment, and safety) of detainees; force protection; and the operation of the internment facility, under the supervision of the provost marshal. The MPs do not conduct intelligence interrogations. Intelligence interrogation is strictly a HUMINT function. DOD policy requires that all detainees in its control, whether or not interrogation has commenced, are assigned an internment serial number as soon as possible, normally within 14 days of capture. (See AR 190-8.)

5-59. The standard MP security and internment functions are the only involvement the MPs have in the interrogation process. MPs will not take any actions to set conditions for interrogations (for example, “softening up” a detainee). For purposes of interrogation, military working dogs will not be used.

5-60. MPs may support interrogators as requested for detainee custody, control, escort, and/or additional security (for example, for combative detainees). When interrogators promise an incentive to a detainee, the interrogators must coordinate with the MPs to ensure that the detainee receives the incentive and is allowed to retain it. MPs may provide incentives in support of interrogation operations under the following conditions:

- Using incentives is coordinated with and approved by the MP facility commander.
- Providing and withdrawing incentives does not affect the baseline standards of humane treatment. This means that MPs can provide incentives such as special food items. However, when the incentive is withdrawn, the MPs still must provide the normal rations.
- Using incentives does not violate detainee custody and control or facility security. This means that if a HUMINT collector requests MPs to provide an incentive (for instance, specialty food) but the detainee has been spitting on the guards, then MPs would not provide the incentive because it might reinforce inappropriate behavior.

5-61. MPs exercise the overall responsibility for the safety of detainees, even in those cases in which detainees are in the temporary custody of HUMINT collectors or other agency personnel for the purpose of interrogation. HUMINT collectors should arrange with the MP supervisor to debrief MP guards. Guards who observe and interact with detainees can report the detainees’ disposition, activities, mood, and other observable characteristics.

5-62. HUMINT collectors conduct interrogations for intelligence information. They normally work within the confines of the detainee detention facility, but have no involvement in the mission of the security of detainees. MPs follow a strict protocol concerning access to detainees. Accompanied and unaccompanied access to detainees must be coordinated and approved in advance by the MP commander responsible for the detainees or that commander’s designated representative.

5-63. When HUMINT collectors coordinate for a detainee interrogation in an internment facility, the MPs escort the detainee to the interrogation site, which is collocated with, or located within the internment facility. MPs verify that the HUMINT collector is authorized access to the detainee. Depending on security concerns, the HUMINT collector may request that the MP remain, or he may request the MP depart until the detainee needs to be returned to the living area. If the MP remains, his functions are to maintain the security, accountability, and safety of the detainee and the safety of the interrogator, interpreter, and others in the interrogation site. The MP will perform no role in the interrogation. When conducting interrogations in a holding area such as a detainee collection point (DCP), MPs may not be available to provide security for interrogation operations. In that case, the

HUMINT collector will need to arrange for security from the unit that has established the holding area.

5-64. If the MP departs the immediate area where the detainee is being questioned (for example, asked to wait outside the interrogation room), the HUMINT collector will assume custody and responsibility for the detainee by signing for the detainee, noting the detainee's physical condition.

5-65. SOPs should be written to comply with a requirement that interrogation operations will always be under observation, whether conducted in fixed sites, holding areas, or in the field. Physical setup and logistical availability will dictate whether observation is conducted directly, from a concealed location, or by video monitoring. HUMINT collectors should never be alone with a detainee without being under observation.

5-66. Once a HUMINT collector has assumed custody of a detainee, he will not turn the detainee over to anyone other than an MP. Specifically, he will not allow another government agency to assume custody from him. The HUMINT collector will instead return the detainee to the custody of the MP, and the agency seeking custody of the detainee will then be required to do so from the MP. Likewise, HUMINT collectors will not assume custody of a detainee directly from another government agency, but will require them to return the detainee directly to the custody of the MP.

## **LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND POLICY PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES**

5-67. The GPW (Appendix A, Section I), the GC (Appendix A, Section III), and the UCMJ are relevant documents pertaining to interrogations of detainees.

5-68. The approaches, psychological techniques, and other principles presented in this manual must be conducted in accordance with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. US policy is to treat all detainees and conduct all interrogations, wherever they may occur, in a manner consistent with this commitment. Authority for conducting interrogations of personnel detained by military forces rests primarily upon the traditional concept that the commander may use all available resources and lawful means to accomplish the mission and to protect and secure the unit.

*“Prisoners of war do not belong to the power for which they have fought; they are all under the safeguard of honor and generosity of the nation that has disarmed them.”*

*—Napoleon, The Military Maxims of Napoleon  
1927, ed. Burnod*

<b>POINT OF CAPTURE THROUGH EVACUATION</b>	
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>MP Functions</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations</li> <li>• Area Security</li> <li>• Internment and Resettlement Operations</li> <li>• Law and Order Operations</li> <li>• Police Intelligence Operations</li> <li>• Ensure detainee abuse is avoided and reported</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>HUMINT Functions</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Screen and question detainees at TCPs and checkpoints</li> <li>• Question contacts, local civilians, refugees, and EPWs</li> <li>• Conduct liaison with military and civilian agencies</li> <li>• Report information obtained</li> <li>• Ensure detainee abuse is avoided and reported</li> <li>• Support DOCEX</li> </ul>
<b>DETENTION FACILITY</b>	
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>MP Functions</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Detain and guard EPWs, civilian internees, and other detainees</li> <li>• Conduct reception and processing</li> <li>• Coordinate Classes I, II, and VIII supplies</li> <li>• Coordinate NGOs, PVOs, and interagency visits</li> <li>• Ensure detainee abuse is avoided and reported</li> <li>• Transport detainees within the detention facility to interrogation area</li> <li>• Maintain security during interrogation operations</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>HUMINT Functions</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Debrief guards</li> <li>• Screen detainees and EPWs for PIR and IR</li> <li>• Provide linguist support when possible</li> <li>• Observe detainees under MP control</li> <li>• Ensure detainee abuse is avoided and reported</li> <li>• Conduct interrogations</li> <li>• Report information obtained</li> <li>• Cross-cue other intelligence disciplines (as needed)</li> <li>• Support DOCEX</li> </ul>

**Figure 5-1. MP vs HUMINT Responsibilities.**

5-69. The Geneva Conventions establish specific standards for humane care and treatment of enemy personnel captured, retained, or detained by US military forces and its allies. All persons who have knowledge of suspected or alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions are obligated by regulation to report such matters through command channels or to designated individuals, such as the SJA or IG. For example, HUMINT collectors who are working with others must ensure that no incidents of detainee abuse occur, whether committed by a fellow HUMINT collector, an interpreter, HN or coalition personnel, MP, representative of another government agency, or anyone else.

5-70. Failure to report a suspected or alleged violation of the law of war may subject the service member to disciplinary actions. Violations of the Geneva Conventions committed by US personnel may constitute violations of the UCMJ. The commander is responsible for ensuring that the forces under his command comply with the Geneva Conventions. If violations occur in the conduct of warfare, the commander bears primary responsibility for investigating and taking appropriate action with respect to the violators.

5-71. Every soldier has the duty to report serious incidents, whether observed or suspected, in accordance with AR 190-40. Such incidents are reported to the chain of command. If the chain of command itself is

implicated, the soldier can report the incident to the SJA, IG, chaplain, or provost marshal.

5-72. There are reasons for reporting serious incidents beyond those related to legal requirements. For instance, the publishing of enemy war crimes can be used to influence public opinion against the enemy. Also, reporting war crimes of other countries provides important information that may become relevant, since we would not be able to transfer detainees to any power that we could not rely on to treat them appropriately under the law of war, including the Geneva Conventions.

5-73. Several articles of the GPW apply to HUMINT collectors and interrogation operations. Excerpts from some of the most relevant articles of the Geneva Conventions are listed below. Although the following excerpts are specific to EPWs, service members must treat all detainees captured during armed conflict consistent with the provisions of the GPW unless a determination to the contrary is made. Moreover, US policy requires that US forces apply the principles of the Geneva Conventions, during military operations. (See Appendix A.)

- Article 5 - Should any doubt arise as to whether persons having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.
- Article 13 - PWs must at all times be treated humanely. Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a PW in its custody is prohibited. Likewise, PWs must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.
- Article 14 - PWs are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons and honor. Women shall be treated with all regard due to their sex, and shall in all cases benefit by treatment as favorable as that granted to men.
- Article 15 - The Power detaining PWs shall be bound to provide, free of charge, for their maintenance and medical attention required by their state of health.
- Article 17 - This article covers several requirements with direct impact on interrogation.
  - Every PW, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information. If he willfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a restriction of the privileges (emphasis added) accorded to his rank or status.
  - For example, this does not mean if a prisoner fails to give this information he loses status as a prisoner, only special privileges. An example might be an officer who fails to identify himself as such. An officer cannot be compelled to work (Article 49). An officer who fails to identify himself as such could lose this privilege.

- The questioning of PWs shall be carried out in a language they understand.
- No physical or mental torture or any other form of coercion may be inflicted on EPWs to secure from them information of any kind whatever. PWs who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.
- Article 18 - All effects and articles of personal use, except arms, horses, military equipment and documents, shall remain in the possession of PWs, likewise their metal helmets and protective masks and like articles issued for personal protection. Effects and articles used for their clothing or feeding shall also remain in their possession, even if such effects and articles belong to their regulation military equipment.
  - Badges of rank and nationality, decorations and articles having above all a personal or sentimental value may not be taken from PWs.
  - Sums of money carried by PWs may not be taken away from them except by order of an officer, and after the amount and particulars of the owner have been recorded in a special register and an itemized receipt has been given, legibly inscribed with the name, rank, and unit of the person issuing said receipt. (Note: Unit SOP should require initial impounding of all sums of money from detainees, properly documented and accounted for, in order to prevent detainees from using money to buy influence of any kind, or participate in black market or other improper activity.)
- Article 19 - PWs shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in an area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger. Only those PWs, who, owing to wounds and sickness, would run greater risks by being evacuated than by remaining where they are, may be temporarily kept back in a danger zone.
- Article 33 - Medical personnel and chaplains, while retained by the Detaining Power with a view to assisting PWs, shall not be considered as PWs. They shall, however, receive as a minimum, the benefits and protection of the Geneva Convention. They shall continue to exercise their medical and spiritual functions for the benefits of PWs.

**5-74. All captured or detained personnel, regardless of status, shall be treated humanely, and in accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and DOD Directive 2310.1E, "Department of Defense Detainee Program," and no person in the custody or under the control of DOD, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, in accordance with and as defined in US law. All intelligence interrogations, debriefings, or tactical questioning to gain intelligence from captured or detained personnel shall be conducted in accordance with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E,**



“The Department of Defense Detainee Program”; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. Use of torture is not only illegal but also it is a poor technique that yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say what he thinks the HUMINT collector wants to hear. Use of torture can also have many possible negative consequences at national and international levels.

### **Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment Prohibited**

All prisoners and detainees, regardless of status, will be treated humanely. Cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is prohibited. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 defines “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” as the cruel unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. This definition refers to an extensive body of law developed by the courts of the United States to determine when, under various circumstances, treatment of individuals would be inconsistent with American constitutional standards related to concepts of dignity, civilization, humanity, decency and fundamental fairness. All DOD procedures for treatment of prisoners and detainees have been reviewed and are consistent with these standards, as well as our obligations under international law as interpreted by the United States.<sup>1</sup>

Questions about applications not resolved in the field by reference to DOD publications, must be forwarded to higher headquarters for legal review and specific approval by the appropriate authority before application.

The following actions will not be approved and cannot be condoned in any circumstances: forcing an individual to perform or simulate sexual acts or to pose in a sexual manner; exposing an individual to outrageously lewd and sexually provocative behavior; intentionally damaging or destroying an individual’s religious articles.

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<sup>1</sup> Nothing in this enclosure should be understood to affect the U.S. obligations under the law of war.

#### **5-75. If used in conjunction with intelligence interrogations, prohibited actions include, but are not limited to—**

- Forcing the detainee to be naked, perform sexual acts, or pose in a sexual manner.
- Placing hoods or sacks over the head of a detainee; using duct tape over the eyes.
- Applying beatings, electric shock, burns, or other forms of physical pain.
- “Waterboarding.”
- Using military working dogs.
- Inducing hypothermia or heat injury.
- Conducting mock executions.
- Depriving the detainee of necessary food, water, or medical care.

5-76. While using legitimate interrogation techniques, certain applications of approaches and techniques may approach the line between permissible actions and prohibited actions. It may often be difficult to determine where

permissible actions end and prohibited actions begin. In attempting to determine if a contemplated approach or technique should be considered prohibited, and therefore should not be included in an interrogation plan, consider these two tests before submitting the plan for approval:

- If the proposed approach technique were used by the enemy against one of your fellow soldiers, would you believe the soldier had been abused?
- Could your conduct in carrying out the proposed technique violate a law or regulation? Keep in mind that even if you personally would not consider your actions to constitute abuse, the law may be more restrictive.

5-77. If you answer yes to either of these tests, the contemplated action should not be conducted. If the HUMINT collector has any doubt that an interrogation approach contained in an approved interrogation plan is consistent with applicable law, or if he believes that he is being told to use an illegal technique, the HUMINT collector should seek immediate guidance from the chain of command and consult with the SJA to obtain a legal review of the proposed approach or technique. (See paras 5-80 and 5-81 for information on responding to illegal orders.) If the HUMINT collector believes that an interrogation approach or technique is unlawful during the interrogation of a detainee, the HUMINT collector must stop the interrogation immediately and contact the chain of command for additional guidance.

**CAUTION:** Although no single comprehensive source defines impermissible coercion, certain acts are clearly prohibited. Certain prohibited physical coercion may be obvious, such as physically abusing the subject of the screening or interrogation. Other forms of impermissible coercion may be more subtle, and may include threats to turn the individual over to others to be abused; subjecting the individual to impermissible humiliating or degrading treatment; implying harm to the individual or his property. Other prohibited actions include implying a deprivation of applicable protections guaranteed by law because of a failure to cooperate; threatening to separate parents from their children; or forcing a protected person to guide US forces in a dangerous area. Where there is doubt, you should consult your supervisor or servicing judge advocate.

5-78. Security internees are detainees who are not combatants but who pose a security threat, may be under investigation, or who pose a threat to US forces if released. HUMINT collectors are required to treat all detainees humanely. EPWs are entitled to additional protections guaranteed by the GPW that security internees may not be eligible for. For example, allowing a security internee to communicate with a family member (a right that an EPW has under the Geneva Conventions) could allow him to pass information that would compromise a sensitive investigation and endanger the lives of soldiers and civilians. HUMINT collectors should consult with their SJA for clarification of detainees' status and rights.

5-79. HUMINT collectors are employed below brigade level when the combat situation requires limited tactical interrogation at battalion or lower.

HUMINT collectors should also provide training in the area of tactical questioning to designated S2 personnel. The potential for abuse of the detainee is greatest at initial capture and tactical questioning phase. With the excitement and stress of the battlefield, unskilled personnel may exercise poor judgment or be careless and thus resort to illegal techniques to elicit critical information. Personnel who are not trained HUMINT collectors will not attempt to use approach techniques. Instructions must stress the importance of the proper treatment of detainees. Emphasize that in addition to legal requirements, the abuse of a detainee at the initial stage of contact often renders future interrogation futile. All treatment of detainees must be consistent with the Geneva Conventions. (See ST 2-91.6 for further information on tactical questioning.)

5-80. Orders given to treat detainees in any way that violate the Law of War, including the Geneva Conventions, or that result in detainees being treated in any prohibited manner are unlawful. Every soldier must know how to respond to orders that he perceives to be unlawful. If a soldier receives an order that he knows to be unlawful, or that a person of ordinary sense and understanding would know to be unlawful, or if the order is not clear enough to determine if it is legal or not, he should follow the steps set out below (preferably in the order listed):

- Ask for clarification.
- State that the order is illegal if he knows that it is.
- Use moral arguments against the order.
- State the intent to report the act.
- Ask the senior interrogator to stop the act.
- Report the incident or order if the order is not withdrawn or the act in question is committed.
- If there appears to be no other recourse, refuse to obey the unlawful order.

NOTE: If the order is a lawful order, it should be obeyed. Failure to obey a lawful order is an offense under the UCMJ.

5-81. None of the above actions should be taken in the presence of any detainee. Witnessing actions taken to determine the legality of an order may lead to increased resistance of the detainee and could lead to increased resistance throughout the detainee population if they believe they are being treated unlawfully.

5-82. Illegal orders or incidents must be reported to the chain of command. However, if the chain of command itself is implicated, report the incident or order to the SJA, IG, chaplain, or provost marshal.

## OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS

### EPW Evacuation System

5-83. The MPs are responsible for evacuating detainees, civilian internees, and other detainees, as stipulated in AR 190-8. HUMINT collection assets must be placed to take advantage of the evacuation system the MPs will put into place. The evacuation of detainees and civilian internees normally is a slow and cumbersome process that can severely tax a maneuver unit's resources. Appendix D explains the handling of detainees in detail, including the 5Ss—Search, Silence, Safeguard, Segregate, and Speed to the Rear. The 5Ss are authorized with respect to handling detainees for the purposes of movement of detainees and security. The 5Ss are not authorized for use as interrogation approach techniques.

5-84. The initial evacuation of detainees and civilian internees is the responsibility of the capturing unit. That unit is normally responsible for moving the detainees and civilian internees from the point of capture to the nearest DCP. Under MP doctrine, the MPs are responsible for the detention, security, processing, safety, well-being, accountability, and humane treatment of detainees and civilian internees.

5-85. Normally the MPs assume responsibility for the further evacuation of the detainees and civilian internees; however, under certain circumstances, other units could be charged with this task. The detainees are normally evacuated from a DCP to a short-term collection facility and then finally to a theater internment facility. Once the theater internment facility (joint) is established, dependent on METT-TC factors, the internment facility escort guard units may go forward as far as the initial collection points and escort detainees and civilian internees to a short-term collection facility or straight to a theater internment facility.

5-86. Senior MP commanders coordinate and synchronize transportation and security requirements with MP divisional and BCT leaders. It may take 8 hours for a detainee to reach the DCP; 8 to 16 hours more to reach a short-term collection facility; and 24 additional hours to reach the theater internment facility. Mandatory timelines will be determined in command policy guidance. Critical during this process is that MPs work closely with MI, SJA, and interagency personnel to determine the proper status of individuals detained. Determining whether an individual is an EPW, a criminal insurgent, or in another status is crucial to facilitate the release or transportation, holding, and security requirements. This determination will be used when the individual's biometric data is taken and entered into the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT).

5-87. The HUMINT collection assets need to be positioned to maximize their collection potential and take advantage of the time available during evacuation. The rapidity of operations and the need to facilitate the commander's situational understanding—coupled with the technological innovations that link the HUMINT collector to databases, analysts, and technical support from anywhere on the battlefield—require placing the HCTs forward into brigade and even maneuver battalion areas to provide

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immediate access to EPWs/detainees. EPWs/detainees are normally interrogated for tactical information in the maneuver battalion trains areas and then questioned in detail at the theater JIDC.

## Security

5-88. When dealing with detainees, the HUMINT collector faces two security considerations: his own physical security and information security. Particularly when operating in support of tactical operations, the HUMINT collector is in close contact with enemy soldiers who could attempt to escape and may attack the HUMINT collector in doing so. Detainees during a stability and reconstruction operation are often people committed to a cause who find themselves in desperate circumstances. Although the detainees are normally under guard, the HUMINT collector must always be alert to any physical threat posed by these individuals. He must also ensure that his own actions do not provide the detainee with the means with which to harm the collector or anyone else.

5-89. The HUMINT collector should also be aware that EPWs and other detainees may attempt to elicit information. Since HUMINT collectors, by virtue of their position, may possess a great deal of classified information, they must be careful not to reveal it unwittingly in the process of questioning a detainee.

## PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF FORCE

Acts of violence or intimidation, including physical or mental torture, or exposure to inhumane treatment as a means of or aid to interrogation are expressly prohibited. Acts in violation of these prohibitions may be a violation of US law and regulation and the law of war, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and may be criminal acts punishable under the UCMJ and other US law. Moreover, information obtained by the use of these prohibited means is of questionable value. If there is doubt as to the legality of a proposed form of interrogation, the advice of the SJA must be sought before using the method in question.

Limitations on the use of methods identified herein as expressly prohibited should not be confused with psychological ploys, verbal trickery, or other nonviolent or non-coercive subterfuge used by the trained HUMINT collector in the successful interrogation of hesitant or uncooperative sources. Use of torture by US personnel would bring discredit upon the US and its armed forces while undermining domestic and international support for the war effort. It also could place US and allied personnel in enemy hands at a greater risk of abuse by their captors. Conversely, knowing the enemy has abused US and allied POWs does not justify using methods of interrogation specifically prohibited by law, treaty, agreement, and policy. In conducting intelligence interrogations, the J2/G2/S2 has primary staff responsibility to ensure that these activities are performed in accordance with these laws and regulations. **[\*The commander bears the responsibility to ensure that these activities are performed in accordance with applicable law, regulations, and policy. The unit must have an internal SOP for execution of the interrogation mission.]**

The psychological techniques and principles in this manual should neither be confused with, nor construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized techniques such as brainwashing, physical or mental torture, including drugs that may induce lasting or permanent mental alteration or damage. Physical or mental torture and coercion revolve around eliminating the source's free will, and are expressly prohibited by GWS, Article 13; GPW, Articles 13 and 17; and GC, Articles 31 and 32.

*Torture is an act committed by a person under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain and suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control. (Extracted from Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 2340A).*

\*Emphasis added for use in this manual.

### Capture Rates

5-90. Anticipating not only overall capture rates but also capture rates linked to specific operations is vital to the correct placement of HUMINT collectors supporting interrogation operations. Defensive and stability and reconstructions operations normally provide a small but steady flow of detainees while successful offensive operations can overwhelm HCTs. To be successful, HUMINT collection support to tactical operations must be carefully planned and prioritized. Available HUMINT collection assets must be balanced against the operations objective, enemy situation estimate, and projected EPW capture rates. The unit S2 is responsible for projecting capture rates.

### Interrogating Wounded and Injured Detainees

5-91. Commanders are responsible to ensure that detainees receive adequate health care. Decisions regarding appropriate medical treatment of detainees and the sequence and timing of that treatment are the province of medical personnel. Detainees will be checked periodically in accordance with

command health care directives, guidance, and SOPs, applicable to all detainees to ensure they are fit for interrogations. Detainees determined by medical personnel to be medically unfit to undergo interrogation will not be interrogated. Health care personnel will be on call should a medical emergency arise during interrogation. Health care personnel will report detainees' conditions, as appropriate, to the commander. Health care providers shall not be placed in a position to advise on the application or duration of interrogation approach techniques.

5-92. Wounded and otherwise injured detainees can be a valuable source of information. For evacuation purposes, medical personnel may classify detainees as walking wounded or sick or as non-walking wounded or sick. Walking wounded detainees are evacuated through normal evacuation channels. Non-walking wounded are delivered to the nearest medical aid station and evacuated through medical channels.

5-93. HUMINT collectors may interrogate a wounded or injured detainee provided that they obtain permission from a competent medical authority and that the questioning will not delay or hinder medical treatment. Questioning will not delay the administration of medication to reduce pain or the evacuation of the detainee to where they may receive medical treatment, nor will interrogation be allowed if it would cause a worsening of the condition of the detainee. In most cases, this simply requires the HUMINT collector to ask the doctor, medic, or other medical personnel if it is all right to talk to the detainee.

5-94. With the doctor's permission, the HUMINT collector may talk to the detainee before, after, or during medical treatment. The HUMINT collector cannot at any time represent himself as being a doctor or any other type of medical personnel. Nor can he state, imply, or otherwise give the impression that any type of medical treatment is conditional on the detainee's cooperation in answering questions.

## TYPES OF INTERROGATION OPERATIONS

5-95. There are two general categories of interrogation operations: **field interrogation operations** and **interrogation facility operations**.

### FIELD INTERROGATION OPERATIONS

5-96. Field interrogation operations constitute the vast majority of interrogation operations at echelons corps and below. Field interrogations include all interrogation operations not conducted at a fixed facility. Current doctrine emphasizes the placement of HCTs forward with maneuver units to provide immediate interrogation support while the information is fresh and the detainee may still be susceptible to approaches, due to the shock of capture. The rationale for this method of employment is twofold:

- First, the pace of the modern battlefield no longer allows the luxury of waiting for a detainee to reach a collection point prior to interrogation. Commanders need more timely information, including HUMINT. Also, automated tools and improved communications now permit rapid transmittal of information from forward-deployed HCTs.

- Second, current MP doctrine has the theater level EPW escort companies picking up detainees as far forward as the division forward collection points and bypassing the intervening collection points.

5-97. An added benefit of placing the HCTs with maneuver units is that it allows them to conduct other HUMINT collection activities, such as the debriefing of local civilians and refugees concurrently with interrogation operations. HCTs are allocated to maneuver units based on—

- The relative importance of that subordinate element's operations to the unit's overall scheme of maneuver.
- The potential for that subordinate element to capture detainees, documents, and materiel or encounter civilians on the battlefield.
- The criticality of information obtained from those sources to the success of the parent unit's overall OPLANs.

5-98. As the mission and situation change, the HCTs are redistributed. As MI assets, they should never be kept in reserve.

5-99. During offensive and defensive operations, HCTs normally operate with maneuver brigades and battalions. HUMINT collectors with battalions or brigades should be equipped with vehicles and communications systems that are compatible with the systems organic to the supported unit. HUMINT collectors with brigades and battalions receive their collection priorities from the S2 of the supported unit. In stability and reconstruction operations, the HCTs normally operate in the AOs of battalion and brigade TFs.

## INTERROGATION FACILITY OPERATIONS

5-100. Joint interrogation operations are operations conducted at higher echelons, usually at, and in coordination with, EPW and detainee internment facilities. The Joint Forces Commander (JFC) normally tasks the Army component commander to establish, secure, and maintain the EPW internment facility system. The corps may have the mission of establishing an interrogation facility when it is acting as the Army Forces (ARFOR) or Land Component Command (LCC) element.

5-101. An echelon above corps (EAC) MP brigade normally operates the theater internment facility. The subordinate JFC with a J2 staff lead establishes a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center as an activity within the theater internment facility. The MI Brigade Commander or other named SIO is normally designated as the JIDC commander. Army interrogation operations are normally carried out in an area of the MP-operated internment facility set aside for that use.

5-102. The JIDC is normally administratively and operationally self-sufficient. A JIDC will function as part of an overall detainee command and control structure as outlined in FM 3-19.40 and/or by policy. Continuous coordination between the JIDC commander and internment facility commander is essential. The JIDC will—

- Normally consist of facility headquarters, operations, analysis, editorial, interrogation, screening, and DOCEX elements.



- Collocate with the theater detainee internment facility.
- Organizationally structure itself to meet METT-TC requirements within the theater.
- Include HUMINT collectors, CI personnel, technical experts, personnel for CEDs and DOCEX, and intelligence analysts, as applicable, from the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, and other government agencies.
- Maintain the capability to deploy HCTs forward, as needed, to conduct interrogations or debriefings of sources of interest who cannot be readily evacuated to the JIDC.
- Often establish a combined interrogation facility with allied HUMINT collector or interrogator augmentation if operating as part of a multinational operation.
- Receive collection guidance from the C/J/G2X and send its intelligence reports to the C/J/G2X and to the supported C/J/G/S2.

5-103. The exact size and organizational structure of these elements will vary dependent on METT-TC.

### Headquarters Element

5-104. The activity headquarters provides all command, administrative, logistic, and maintenance support to the JIDC. It coordinates with—

- Higher headquarters for personnel, intelligence, and operational and logistical support prior to and after deployment.
- Theater J2 for reporting procedures, operational situation updates, theater and national level intelligence requirements, and collection priorities.
- Provost marshal for location of theater detainee internment facilities and for procedures to be followed by HUMINT collectors and MPs for the processing, interrogating, and internment of EPWs.
- Commanders of theater medical support units and internment facility for procedures to treat, and clear for questioning, wounded EPWs.
- Commanders of supporting CI and TECHINT assets to establish support requirements and procedures.
- The servicing SJA.
- Magistrate for Article 78 issues.
- Commanders of Air Force, Marine, Navy, and national level organizations to arrange administrative and logistic interoperability.

### Operations Element

5-105. The operations element controls the daily activities within the JIDC. The JIDC operations element—

- Ensures that work areas are available for all JIDC elements.
- Establishes and maintains JIDC functional files, logs, and journals.
- Makes detainee files available to detainee release boards to assist the board members in their determinations.
- Establishes interrogation priorities.

- Disseminates incoming and outgoing distribution.
- Conducts coordination with local officials, adjacent and subordinate intelligence activities, CI, MP, PSYOP, the Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (JCMEC), Plans and Policy Directorate (J5), and provost marshal.
- Conducts coordination with holding area officer in charge (OIC) for screening site, medical support, access, movement, and evacuation procedures for detainees.
- Conducts operations briefings when required.
- Supervises all JIDC operations and establishes SOPs.
- Supervises all intelligence collection activities within the JIDC.
- Ensures observers are present when OGAs use the JIDC's interrogation rooms.

### **Analytical Element**

5-106. The analytical element normally is directly subordinate to the operations element. The JIDC analytical element ensures that collection requirements are current and validated. It reviews reports to ensure that the information reported is in response to validated collection requirements. In addition, they ensure an up-to-date common operational picture (COP) by maintaining digital mapping of the current tactical situation and with OB updates to help HUMINT collectors maintain their situational awareness. At locations where digital mapping is not possible, paper situation maps (SITMAPs) are maintained. This element also—

- Obtains, updates, and maintains the database.
- Works with interrogators to provide collection focus for interrogations.
- Establishes and maintains OB workbooks and files including data generated by intelligence information which has not been verified.
- Maintains digital or paper SITMAPs, as available, displaying enemy and friendly situations.
- Catalogs, cross-references, and disseminates collection requirements to JIDC collection elements.
- Reviews interrogation reports for inclusion into the database.
- Conducts situation briefings when required.
- Conducts intelligence reach with the J2 analytical cell and other analytical elements, such as INSCOM Information Dominance Center, for relevant information and analysis.

### **Editorial Element**

5-107. The editorial element is normally directly subordinate to the operations element. It reviews all outgoing reports for format, content, and completeness.

### **DOCEX Element**

5-108. At a minimum, the JIDC will contain a small DOCEX element to translate, screen, and extract information from and report on information of

intelligence interest from source-associated documents. The theater joint document exploitation facility (JDEF) may be collocated with the JIDC. In this instance, the JDEF will translate, screen, categorize, and exploit all types of CEDs.

### **Screening Element**

5-109. The JIDC normally has a separate screening element to receive and screen all incoming detainees and their personal effects. The screening element will review previous screening reports, which should have been sent along with the detainees; recommend priorities for interrogation; identify individuals of interest to other agencies; and may conduct limited interrogations for PIR information. The exact size of the element will vary based on detainee capture rates and detainee flow. Interrogation elements should use their most experienced interrogators as screeners in order to quickly and effectively select the detainees for interrogation who are most likely to possess useful information.

### **Interrogation Element**

5-110. The interrogation element assigns HUMINT collectors to specific detainees, uses interrogation and other HUMINT collection methods to obtain information in response to intelligence requirements, and produces intelligence reports (IIRs and SALUTE reports) as well as source-related operational reports. The interrogation element may also debrief returning US POWs and other personnel as deemed relevant.

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## PART THREE

# The HUMINT Collection Process

Part Three discusses the logical progression of phases involved in all HUMINT collection. There are five phases and the related task of screening that are critical to HUMINT collection. This remains consistent with previous doctrine as captured in the interrogation process but adds screening as a phase and combines approach and termination. The five phases are screening, planning and preparation, approach and termination strategies, questioning, and reporting.

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## Chapter 6

# Screening

6-1. Available human sources and documents almost always exceed the qualified HUMINT collection assets and resources that can be applied against them. Screening facilitates the efficient application of these limited assets and resources to maximize the collection of relevant information.

## HUMAN SOURCE SCREENING

6-2. As it applies to HUMINT operations, screening is the process of evaluating and selecting human sources and documents for the prioritized collection of information based on the collection requirements and mission of the unit conducting the screening or its higher headquarters. Screening categorizes and prioritizes sources based on the probability of a particular source having priority information and the level of cooperation of the source. Screening is also used to determine if a source matches certain criteria that indicate that the source should be referred to another agency. Screening is conducted at all echelons of command and in all operational environments. There are two general categories of screening: human source screening and document screening. Human source screening will be explained in depth in this chapter. Document screening is explained in Appendix I.

6-3. The resources (time and personnel) allocated to screening must be balanced against those required for interrogations, debriefings, and other collection methodologies. Although screening is not in itself an information collection technique, it is vital to the rapid collection of information. Through screening, the effectiveness of limited collection assets can be maximized by targeting those assets against the sources with the highest potential of providing key information. Screening requires experienced individuals with

maturity and judgment who are totally knowledgeable of the collection requirements and able to make well-reasoned decisions based on limited information. Collection (interrogation, debriefing, and elicitation) can be integrated into screening activities; however, it slows the screening process and decreases the number of potential sources that can be screened.

6-4. Human source screening is the evaluation of an individual or a group of individuals to determine their potential to answer collection requirements or to identify individuals who match a predetermined source profile. The purpose of screening is to—

- Identify those select individuals among the target audience who have information of potential value and who are willing or can be persuaded to cooperate.
- Identify individuals who match certain criteria that indicate them as being potential subjects for source operations or matching the profile for collection by special interest groups such as TECHINT or CI.

6-5. Screening requires the development of criteria that are indicators of potential information. These might include rank, position, gender, ethnic group, appearance, and location.

6-6. Screening is an integral part to all HUMINT collection operations. While questioning an individual source, a HUMINT collector may switch between screening (finding out general source areas of knowledge) to interrogation, debriefing, or elicitation (finding out detailed information about a specific topic). In operations, such as EPW or refugee operations that involve large numbers of potential sources, screening will normally be conducted as a separate but collocated operation as part of the overall interrogation or debriefing effort. The high number of potential sources being dealt with in most human source screening operations requires a systematic approach be developed and utilized to make the most effective use of the personnel and resources being allocated to the source screening operation.

## SCREENING OPERATIONS

6-7. Like all intelligence operations, human source screening operations are focused on certain targets. Although the exact target population group will depend on the requirements of the theater of operations, the target focus of source screening operations is best described as the permanent and transitory population in the AO. This definition includes local indigenous populations, refugees, and travelers in the area, and detainees (including EPWs). Specifically excluded from this definition are members of the HN forces (military and paramilitary), members of allied forces, and members of HN government agencies who are available to US forces through liaison operations. Other personnel not indigenous to the AO (such as legitimate NGOs, humanitarian organizations, UN personnel) are available to US forces for voluntary debriefing and should be excluded from screening operations.

6-8. Screening operations may be conducted in a variety of situations and are dependent on the operational situation and the population. Although every source screening operation has the same basic purpose, each can be directed against different segments of the population in different locations throughout

the AO. In order to accommodate the differences in the screening audience and location, different types of source screening operations are employed.

- **Tactical Screening.** Tactical screening is conducted in support of combat or contingency operations. It can include the screening of EPWs or detainees at the point of capture, the screening of refugees, or the screening of local civilians in cordon and search. At the tactical level, there is no time for elaborate approach techniques so the degree of cooperation becomes a prime concern. Tactical area screening is characterized by rapidly changing requirements, the need to evacuate noncombatants and detainees to a secure area, and the need to collect priority tactical information while operations are in progress. Although the most lucrative type of source is often the detainee, all available sources should be screened for priority tactical information. In tactical screening, the HUMINT collector normally accompanies the maneuver force (OPCON or DS). If the HUMINT collector establishes that the source has information of value during screening, he immediately questions the source. Information collected is passed to the maneuver commander, normally via SALUTE reports. The HUMINT collector may recommend to the commander that individual sources be further detained for additional questioning. Screening must be done accurately in order that a commander can make a decision to detain or release possibly hostile personnel, based on the recommendation of a HUMINT collector.
- **Checkpoint Screening.** Checkpoints are often established to screen the local populations as they transit through and within the AO or to screen large numbers of individuals such as refugees or DPs as they enter the AO. Screening checkpoints can be static or mobile. HUMINT collectors must pay particular attention to refugees leaving the area ahead of friendly forces (AO or AOI). It is likely that refugees can provide information of tactical value more quickly and easily than detainees. Refugees know the area and may be able to identify for the collector anything that is out of the ordinary, such as insurgent or terrorist activities.
- **Local Population Screening.** This refers to the screening of the local population within their own neighborhoods. When HUMINT collectors move into a new area, they must observe the local population and determine who may be able and willing to provide the information they have been tasked to collect. Once this determination is made, the collectors must engage those individuals in conversation to assess their level of knowledge.
- **Collection Facility Screening.** Screening is conducted as a normal part of HUMINT collection operations at collection facilities such as theater interrogation and debriefing facilities and refugee camps. Screening is coordinated with the unit, normally an MP unit that is responsible for the operation of the facility.
- **Local Employee Screening.** CI personnel periodically screen local employees to determine possible security risks. Concurrently, local employee screening may identify sources who can provide information to answer the CCIRs. Close coordination between HUMINT and CI collection assets is a must in local employee screening.

- **Variations and Combinations.** All types of screening can be adapted to meet specific circumstances slightly different from those for which they were designed. Additionally, it is possible to use more than one type of screening in an operation if the specific circumstances require it.

6-9. Screening of refugees, EPWs, and other detainees normally occurs at two locations: initially at the point where friendly forces first encounter them and again when they arrive at the theater and other holding areas or refugee camps. The capturing or detaining forces should enforce segregation of EPWs from refugees and other detained civilians; they should be screened in separate operations, one screening for EPWs and one for refugees and other detained civilians. Depending on METT-TC factors, segregation should be conducted as follows:

- **Refugees:** Refugees, even if of the same nationality as the enemy, are not treated as enemies exclusively based on their nationality and are not automatically subject to control measures. If refugees are encountered on the battlefield, they are segregated from EPWs and screened separately. They are generally not detained further unless some additional reason requires their detention. At a refugee camp, screening will be done in coordination with the NGO operating the refugee camp. If there is a reason to detain refugees for further questioning for intelligence purposes, or because they pose a security threat, they will then be treated as a detainee. Under all circumstances, refugees will be treated humanely. If they are transported to an internment facility, they will be in-processed by MPs and their Geneva Conventions status will be determined. Their status under the Geneva Conventions will afford them certain privileges.
- **EPWs:** Officers are segregated from enlisted. The enlisted are divided into NCOs and lower enlisted. Males are segregated from females. This segregation facilitates rapid screening for EPWs who may have information to answer PIRs and IRs as well as prohibits officers from influencing enlisted personnel to resist questioning.
- **Other Detainees:** Civilians should be screened separately from EPWs. As with refugees, if there is a reason to detain civilians for further questioning for intelligence purposes, or because they pose a security threat, they will then be treated as a detainee. Whether or not civilian detainees are released or detained further, screeners should ensure that the civilian detainees are treated humanely. If the civilian detainees are transported to an internment facility, they will be in-processed by MPs and their Geneva Conventions status will be determined. Once detainees are in-processed into an internment facility, they are then considered to be civilian internees and their status as such will afford them certain privileges under the Geneva Conventions.

## SCREENING AT FORWARD LOCATIONS

6-10. The initial screening and subsequent questioning should be accomplished as far forward as is operationally expedient. If a HUMINT collector is not available, the unit S2 must ensure initial screening and questioning of sources are completed by qualified personnel. At this level, the individual (military or civilian) is questioned for job, unit (if applicable),



mission, PIR and IR, and supporting information (JUMPS). If time allows, the HUMINT collector may collect additional information, such as the source's name, to start a formal source file to preclude duplication at higher echelons. S2s and personnel other than HUMINT collectors should not attempt an approach at this stage.

6-11. HUMINT collectors will only use approach techniques as time and circumstance allow. The prime requirement is to identify the individuals with information of immediate tactical value, to collect that information expediently, and to evacuate the source. In this case, tactical questioning is normally integrated seamlessly into the screening process. This initial screening can also be used to identify individuals for immediate evacuation to a higher echelon facility for detailed questioning. Any screening reports or information reports generated at this level must accompany the EPWs or detainees as they are evacuated. Typically, battlefield screening reports, such as the screening sheet shown in Figure 6-1, will be done on paper in order to allow multiple screeners to work simultaneously. If automation support is available for each screener, an electronic version of the screening report is used, or the "KB Easy" (Figure 10-2), which allows the screener to easily put screening information into a DIA report format and transmit it electronically. (See Chapter 10 for a KB-EZ worksheet.)

6-12. US forces capturing enemy forces or detaining civilians on the battlefield search each individual for weapons, documents, or other material of intelligence interest. Each individual receives a Capture Tag which records basic biographic data such as name, rank, serial number, unit of assignment (military), location of capture, and any special circumstances concerning the capture. (See Appendices E and F.) Each document or item removed from the captive is also "bagged and tagged" to identify from whom it was taken. This initial step is vital, as properly processing captives and their equipment greatly simplifies the screening process. All documents associated with the source and any possessions taken from him must be evacuated with the source, but not on his person. This is to ensure that the next echelon of screeners and interrogators will have the ability to exploit these items for intelligence value, or to support determination of approach strategies.

## **SCREENING AT REFUGEE CAMPS OR DETENTION FACILITIES**

6-13. When a detainee or refugee arrives at an internment facility, refugee camp, or similar facility, a more extensive screening is conducted. The screening sheet is used to facilitate this process. This screening is normally done in conjunction with in-processing into the facility. During in-processing, the MP will assign an Internment Serial Number (ISN) that is registered with the Theater Detainee Reporting Center (TDRC). The ISN will be used to track the detainee throughout the MP detention system. The ISN should not be used in intelligence channels; however, HUMINT collectors should record the ISN on the screening sheet to aid in locating the detainee again. For intelligence reporting purposes, HUMINT collectors will assign the detainee a source reporting number that will be used to identify the detainee and information associated with him, regardless of whether or not the detainee is transported to another facility. The J2 issues source reporting numbers to HUMINT collectors through the OMT.

<b>MP ISN NUMBER:</b>		<b>EVACUATION DATE:</b>	
<b>P E R S O N A L</b>	LNAME(P): _____ LNAME(M): _____ FNAME: _____ MNAME: _____ SVC/ID NO: _____ DOB: _____ LANGUAGES: _____ MARITAL STATUS: M S W D	<b>C A P T U R E  D A T A</b>	DATE: _____ TIME: _____ PLACE: _____ CAP UNIT: _____ CIRCUMSTANCES: _____ DOCUMENTS: _____ WPNS/EQUIP: _____
	*** STATUS: M = Military C = Civilian P = Paramilitary ? = Other		
<b>M I L I T A R Y</b>	BRANCH: AF AR CG MC NY _____ RANK: _____ FULL UNIT DSG: _____  DUTY PPSN: _____ JOB: _____ STATION: _____ SKILLS: _____ EXPERIENCE: _____	<b>A S S E S S M E N T  D A T A</b>	PHYSICAL CONDITION: SEX: M F WOUNDED: Y N _____ REMARKS: _____  MENTAL CONDITION: EDUCATION = _____ YRS INTELLIGENCE: AVG+ AVG AVG- MENTAL STATE: _____
	JOB: _____ ORG: _____ DUTIES: _____  SKILLS: _____		SCREENER: _____ DATE: _____ TIME: _____ COOPERATION: 1(High) 2 3(Low) KNOWLEDGE: A(High) B C(Low) BGW LIST: Y N BGW CODE: _____ SOURCE CATEGORY: A B C D APPROACH: _____
<b>SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIREMENT CODES:</b> _____			
<b>P I R  &amp;  I R</b>	_____ _____ _____ _____ _____	<b>R E M A R K S</b>	_____ _____ _____ _____ _____

Figure 6-1. Screening Sheet.

6-14. When a detainee is in-processed into an internment facility, MPs will assign the detainee's status as an EPW, retained person, protected person, or other status under the Geneva Conventions. Figure 6-2 provides excerpts from FMI 3-19.40 on MP internment and resettlement operations. In an international conflict, individuals entitled to POW status (EPWs) include—

- Members of the regular armed forces.
- Other militias or volunteer corps, and organized resistance movements of a State Party to a conflict, provided they meet each of the following criteria:
  - Commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.
  - Having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.
  - Carrying arms openly.
  - Conducting operations in accordance with the law of war.
- Civilians who accompany the force.
- Crew members of the merchant marine and crews of civilian aircraft of a State Party to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other provisions of international law.

6-15. There are other categories specified in Article 4, GPW. Questions with respect to an individual's entitlement to EPW status should be directed to your SJA.

6-16. Retained personnel (see Articles 24 and 26, GWS):

- Official medical personnel of the armed forces exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of wounded or sick, or in the prevention of disease, and staff exclusively engaged in the administration of medical units and facilities.
- Chaplains attached to the armed forces.
- Staff of National Red Cross Societies and that of other Volunteer Aid Societies, duly recognized and authorized by their governments to assist Medical Service personnel of their own armed forces, provided they are exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of wounded or sick, or in the prevention of disease, and provided that the staff of such societies are subject to military laws and regulations.

6-17. Protected persons include civilians entitled to protection under the GC, including those we retain in the course of a conflict, no matter what the reason. A "civilian internee" is a person detained or interned in the United States or in occupied territory for security reasons, or for protection, or because they have committed an offense against the detaining power, and who is entitled to "protected person" status under the GC.

6-18. The term "detainee" may also refer to enemy combatants. In general, an enemy combatant is a person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners during an armed conflict. The term "enemy combatant" includes both "lawful enemy combatants" and "unlawful enemy combatants."

- **Lawful enemy combatants:** Lawful enemy combatants, who are entitled to protections under the Geneva Conventions, include members of the regular armed forces of a State Party to the conflict;

militia, volunteer corps, and organized resistance movements belonging to a State Party to the conflict, which are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the laws of war; and, members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power.

- **Unlawful enemy combatants:** Unlawful enemy combatants are persons not entitled to combatant immunity, who engage in acts against the United States or its coalition partners in violation of the laws and customs of war during armed conflict. For purposes of the war on terrorism, the term “unlawful enemy combatant” is defined to include, but is not limited to, an individual who is or was part of supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.

### **Excerpts from FMI 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations**

#### **ACTIVITIES**

The MPs assist MI screeners by identifying captives who may have answers that support PIR and IR. Because MPs are in constant contact with captives, they see how certain captives respond to orders and see the types of requests they make. The MPs ensure that searches requested by MI personnel are conducted out of sight of other captives and that guards conduct same-gender searches.

The MI screeners examine captured documents, equipment and, in some cases, personal papers (journals, diaries, and letters from home). They are looking for information that identifies a captive and his organization, mission, and personal background (family, knowledge, and experience). Knowledge of a captive’s physical and emotional status or other information helps screeners determine his willingness to cooperate.

#### **LOCATION**

Consider the following when planning an MI screening site:

- The site is located where screeners can observe captives as they are segregated and processed. It is shielded from the direct view of captives and is far enough away that captives cannot overhear screeners’ conversations.
- The site has an operation, administrative, and interrogation area. The interrogation area accommodates an interrogator, a captive, a guard, and an interpreter as well as furniture. Lights are available for night operations.
- Procedures are implemented to verify that sick and wounded captives have been treated and released by authorized medical personnel.
- Guards are available and procedures are implemented for escorting captives to the interrogation site.
- Procedures are published to inform screeners who will be moved and when they will be moved.
- Accountability procedures are implemented and required forms are available.

**Figure 6-2. MP Support to Screening.**

6-19. It may not be immediately evident in a particular theater of operation whether an individual is an unlawful enemy combatant or is associated with or supporting the unlawful enemy combatants of the United States. Consult your J/G/S2 and servicing SJA for information relevant to your theater of operations.

6-20. All captured or detained personnel, regardless of status, shall be treated humanely, and in accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and DOD Directive 2310.1E, "Department of Defense Detainee Program", and no person in the custody or under the control of DOD, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, in accordance with and as defined in US law. (See Appendix A, GPW Articles 3, 4, 5, 13, and 14.)

6-21. The rights of EPWs are stated in the GPW. They include the right to quarters, rations, clothing, hygiene and medical attention, property, and other rights. EPWs may not renounce their rights to renounce EPW status. (See Appendix A, GPW Article 7, Section I.)

6-22. Retained personnel must receive at least the same benefits as EPWs. They may only be required to perform religious or medical duties, and they may only be retained as long as required for the health and spiritual needs of the EPWs. Retained persons must be returned to their home country when no longer needed.

6-23. Protected persons' rights include protection from physical or moral coercion and from being taken hostage. Protected persons are protected from murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation, medical experimentation, and any form of brutality. Protected persons rights are limited, though. They do not have the right to leave captivity and are not immune from prosecution. Protected persons can be screened and identified for intelligence purposes.

## SCREENING PROCESS

6-24. At the internment facility, the screening process normally is distinct from the questioning (interrogation or debriefing) process. Dependent on the criticality of the information identified, the source may be questioned immediately for relevant information but will more likely be identified for future questioning. The screening is a more formal process in which the screener attempts to obtain basic biographic data, areas of general knowledge, source cooperation, and vulnerability to select approach techniques in addition to identifying knowledge of critical intelligence tasks. Once the screener has established the basics (source identification, cooperation, and knowledge), he normally passes the source on to the personnel that conduct the questioning. The screener will complete a screening report that will be forwarded in accordance with unit SOPs (see Chapter 10). If a detainee's knowledge is of Joint Forces interest, a knowledgeability brief (KB) should be written and submitted electronically. (A short form KB worksheet is shown at Figure 10-2.) Complete guidance on KBs is contained in DIAM 58-12 (S//NF).

6-25. If the source freely discusses information of PIR value, the screener normally exploits the information fully and completes a SALUTE report. (See Appendices H and I.) If the source's knowledge of PIR information is extensive and he is freely giving the information, the senior screener and the OIC or noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) of the interrogation or debriefing element are notified immediately. They decide if the screener should continue questioning the source or if the source should be handed off to another HUMINT collector. If source-associated documents contain PIR information, the collector will exploit them as fully as possible and write a SALUTE report. (See Appendix H.)

6-26. The source normally is assigned a standard screening code. The screening code is an alphanumeric designation that reflects the level of cooperation expected from the source and the level of knowledgeability the source may possess. Table 6-1 shows the codes for assessing sources. Those sources assigned to the same category are interrogated in any order deemed appropriate by the interrogation or debriefing element.

**Table 6-1. Source Screening Codes.**

<b>CODE</b>	<b>COOPERATION LEVEL</b>
1	Responds to direct questions.
2	Responds hesitantly to questioning.
3	Does not respond to questioning.
	<b>KNOWLEDGEABILITY LEVEL</b>
A	Very likely to possess PIR information.
B	Might have IR information.
C	Does not appear to have pertinent information.

6-27. Figure 6-3 shows the order in which detainees in the assessed screening categories should be interrogated. Category 1-A sources normally should be the first priority to be questioned. Category 1-B and 2-A would be Priority II. Category 1-C, 2-B and 3-A would be next as Priority III sources, with 2-C, and 3-B being in the fourth group to be interrogated. Category 3-C sources are normally not questioned. This order ensures the highest probability of obtaining the greatest amount of relevant information within the available time. Screening codes may change with the echelon. The higher the echelon, the more time is available to conduct an approach. Appendix B discusses the reliability ratings of information obtained.




Figure 6-3. Interrogation Priorities by Screening Category.

## SCREENING METHODOLOGIES

6-28. Depending on the specific operation or echelon, screening may be a separate operation or may be integrated into a specific collection mission. For example, a HUMINT collector accompanying a patrol encounters a civilian who may have information that is relevant to collection requirements. The HUMINT collector screens the source (that is, asks some general questions to determine the source's level of cooperation and knowledge). Upon receiving a positive response, the HUMINT collector may debrief the civilian on a specific topic or question him on areas of PIR interest. He then reverts to the screening role to determine other relevant knowledge. If the HUMINT collector determines through screening that the source either has no relevant information or cannot be persuaded to cooperate within an operationally expedient timeframe, he is not debriefed as part of the screening process. In detainee or refugee operations, a separate element will normally conduct all screenings. They establish a prioritized list of sources who are then systematically questioned on specific topics by other HUMINT collectors or other technical specialists.

## SCREENING REQUIREMENTS

6-29. In addition to potential sources, screening requires several components.

- **Collection Requirements.** Without a clear list of specific collection requirements, screening becomes virtually impossible. The concept behind screening is to rapidly identify source knowledgeability as it relates to requirements. Screeners should obtain a copy of the supported element's collection requirements and become familiar with the intelligence indicators listed therein. Screeners must use their experience and imagination to devise ways to identify EPWs and detainees who might possess information pertinent to these indicators. Vague requirements (such as "What is the threat doing?") do not provide the focus necessary to make a source selection. The HUMINT collection element must break these SIRs into indicators if the supported intelligence officer has not already done this. The indicators must take into account the type of sources anticipated. For example, a refugee probably will not know if the threat intends to defend a particular ridgeline. However, he might know whether or not there are threat forces on the ridge, if an improvised explosive device (IED) is being employed on a route, if they are digging in, or if engineer type equipment is in the area.
- **Selection Criteria.** After reviewing the collection requirements, the HUMINT collection element will develop preliminary criteria to identify the source type that will most likely have the required information. The source type may include gender, appearance, military rank, age, or occupation. Some of these criteria are determined by visual observation, thereby saving time in not having to question everyone. Other criteria such as occupation or place of residence may require brief questions.
- **Trained Screeners.** Screening is possibly the most difficult HUMINT skill. A HUMINT collector must use his experience, questioning skill, cultural knowledge, and knowledge of human nature to decide in a matter of minutes or possibly seconds whether limited HUMINT collection assets and valuable time should be spent talking to an individual based on the way he looks and the answers to a few questions. A wrong decision will mean wasted assets and valuable information missed.
- **Language Capability and Cultural Awareness.** Screening involves more than asking a series of questions. The HUMINT collector must be able to evaluate the answers, the specific language used, and other clues such as body language to determine the value of an individual to the collection effort. This requires a mature and experienced screener. If the HUMINT collector does not possess the target language, he and his interpreter must be able to work together quickly with mutual trust and confidence.
- **Area Conducive to Screening Operations.** Effective screening operations must allow the HUMINT collector to speak to the source where the source is not exposed to outside influences or dangers that may inhibit his responses. For that reason, sources should never be screened within the sight or hearing of other potential sources.



HUMINT collectors can use rooms within a building, tents, or other field-expedient methods to isolate the individual being screened. Screening a source within view or hearing of other potential sources may not only pose a danger to the source but also will tend to inhibit the source from freely cooperating.

- Security. The personnel conducting the screening need to be able to concentrate on the individual being screened. Although the collector is ultimately responsible for his own personal security, screening is facilitated by having dedicated personnel present (for example, MPs) who are responsible for security. Screeners coordinate with MP or other security personnel concerning their role in the screening process.

## INITIAL DATA AND OBSERVATIONS

6-30. Screening is a filtering process whereby, under ideal circumstances, all potential sources would be questioned to determine if they have information of intelligence interest. In actuality this is often impossible. Screeners often use visual and other aids to “prescreen” the sources in order to eliminate a substantial portion of the target population before conducting detailed screening. For example, if the HUMINT collector at a checkpoint is only interested in information concerning a specific denied geographic area, screeners may ask all refugees if they are from or have been in that denied area recently. A less experienced screener could do this allowing the experienced screener to conduct more extensive screening of the select target audience.

6-31. If time and circumstances permit, screeners should question any friendly personnel who have had extensive contact with the persons to be screened. In the case of detainees, this could include holding area personnel or personnel from the capturing unit. These personnel may be able to help identify sources that might answer the collection requirements or who might match a particular source profile.

6-32. Normally the screener will not have time to conduct any extended observation of the person to be screened; however, the screener should make a quick visual observation of the source prior to questioning him. He should note anything in the source’s appearance and behavior that indicates he is willing to cooperate immediately or is unlikely to cooperate. The screener should also note any physical indicators that the source may have the type of information or belong to a certain source profile category.

6-33. Physical indicators include overall appearance such as rank, insignia, and condition of the uniform and type and condition of equipment for military sources and general type and condition of dress (for example, business suit as opposed to work clothes) for civilians. Certain physical indicators (dress, medals such as religious medals, physical type) may be indicators that the source belongs to a specific ethnic or religious group. The source’s physical reactions may also indicate a willingness or lack of willingness to cooperate. For example, does the source move forward in the group or attempt to hide within the group; does he intentionally place himself in the wrong segregation group; or does he show any overt signs of nervousness, anxiety, or fright?

6-34. The screeners will also examine all documents and possessions found on the source (if any) and all documents pertaining to the source (if any). **At a minimum, a detainee should have a properly filled out capture tag, which will indicate to the screener where the detainee was captured, by which unit, and under what circumstance.** (See para 6-12 and Appendix D.) Documents such as personal letters, orders, rosters, signal operating instructions (SOIs) and map sections can provide information that identify the source, his organization, mission, and other personal background information (family, knowledge, experience, education). They may in themselves provide information, may identify a source for questioning, and may provide information helpful in assessing a source's susceptibility to an approach.

6-35. Documents pertaining to the source, beginning at the point of capture throughout the evacuation process, such as previous screening and intelligence reports and administrative documents (such as source personnel records prepared by the MPs) help the screener by providing information concerning the source's physical status, emotional status, level of knowledge, level of experience, and other background data. Making timely use of reports from lower echelons can be difficult for the screener, especially when dealing with large numbers of potential sources.

## SOURCE ASSESSMENT

6-36. Screeners use standard reporting formats to identify the results of their screening (see Chapter 10). The determination must be made as to whether the source is of any intelligence value to the HUMINT collector. The HUMINT collector will basically place the source within one of four categories.

- Of Immediate Intelligence Interest. This category includes personnel who are assessed, based upon the screening process, who possess information in response to requirements. They are interrogated or debriefed (dependent on their status) to retrieve relevant information. This questioning may be conducted by the same person conducting the screening or by another HUMINT collector.
- Of Interest to Other Agencies. In most cases, the HUMINT collector will be provided with collection requirements by other agencies or disciplines such as TECHINT or CI. In this case the HUMINT collector will question the source on these requirements and report the information appropriately. However, in some instances, particularly in the case of CI, the HUMINT collector may be given a list of topics or a profile of personnel who are of interest to CI. The HUMINT collector will notify the local CI representative when a person matching the "CI profile" is identified. After the HUMINT collector has extracted any relevant intelligence information, he will "pass" the individual off to the CI agents. In many cases, particularly with individuals of TECHINT or other specialized interest, the HUMINT collector will be asked to conduct the questioning with the technical support of the individual from the interested agency. This is coordinated through the HUMINT collector's OMT and the chain of command.

- Of Potential Interest as a Contact Source. On occasion, especially during stability and reconstruction operations, the HUMINT collector may identify an individual who has the potential to provide information in the future, due to his placement or access. Although the individual may not have information of immediate interest, the HUMINT collector will pass his recommendation to the appropriate office, normally the C/J/G/S2X, provided that source operations are authorized (see Chapter 5).
- Of No Interest. This category includes sources who prove (based upon the screening process) to be of no interest to the HUMINT collector or other agencies. Their biographic data is recorded, but they are not questioned further. This category will likely include the bulk of individuals screened. Individuals who have been screened are kept separated from those who have not yet been screened.

## OTHER TYPES OF SCREENING OPERATIONS

### LOCAL EMPLOYEE SCREENING

6-37. CI personnel conduct local employee screening, primarily to identify individuals who may be a security risk. HUMINT collectors also can use local employee screening as a means to obtain intelligence information or to identify personnel with placement and access to answer information requirements. Employee screening must be conducted in a secure environment and out of the hearing and sight of other employees. Formal written reports of the screening must be maintained.

### LOCAL COMMUNITY OR AREA SCREENING

6-38. Local area screening is normally done in coordination with other operations such as a cordon and search operation. The HUMINT collectors accompany the forces conducting the operation and screen the general population to identify individuals of intelligence or CI interest.

### SCREENING FOR CI REQUIREMENTS

6-39. Before initiating the screening process, the HUMINT collector establishes liaison with supporting CI agents. The CI element provides CI requirements and provides a profile of personnel of CI interest. CI is normally interested in personnel who—

- Have no identification documents.
- Have excessive or modified identification documents.
- Possess unexplainable large amounts of cash or valuables.
- Are illegal border-crossers.
- Attempt to avoid checkpoints.
- Are on the CI personalities list, which includes members of an intelligence service.
- Request to see CI personnel.
- Have family in the denied area.
- Speak a different language or dialect than is spoken in the area.

6-40. Personnel of CI interest include two general categories of people: The first type of “person of interest” is any individual or group involved in adversary intelligence collection operations or who is attempting to enter the AO to conduct such operations. Examples of these individuals include but are not limited to—

- Known or suspected members and/or supporters of foreign intelligence and security services and known or suspected members and/or supporters of the intelligence activities of non-state entities such as organized crime, terrorist groups, and drug traffickers.
- Known or suspected hostile espionage agents, saboteurs, subversives, or hostile political figures.
- Known or suspected enemy collaborators and sympathizers who may pose a security threat to US forces.
- Personnel known to have engaged in intelligence, CI, security, police, or political indoctrination activities.
- Known or suspected officials of enemy governments whose presence poses a security threat to US forces.
- Political leaders known or suspected to be hostile to the military and political objectives of the US or an allied nation.

6-41. The second type of “person of CI interest” is any individual who possesses information concerning the identification, location, or activities of personnel in the first category.

#### **SCREENING FOR OTHER TECHNICAL COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS**

6-42. Other technical areas such as TECHINT, SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT, or other services need to supply the HUMINT collectors with a profile of the individuals with whom they wish to speak. The HUMINT collectors upon identifying such an individual will contact the requesting agency after extracting PIR information.

## Chapter 7

# Planning and Preparation

7-1. Planning and preparation is one of the five phases of HUMINT collection. HUMINT collection, regardless of the methodology employed, must be a systematic, carefully prepared enterprise. The HUMINT collector engages in general preparation throughout his career. He focuses that preparation to a specific area of the world, specific mission, and specific collection requirements as those become available. Finally, the HUMINT collector focuses his planning and preparation on a specific collection effort with a specific source.

### COLLECTION OBJECTIVES

7-2. Each HUMINT collection mission is conducted for a definite purpose. The HUMINT collector must keep this purpose firmly in mind as he proceeds to obtain usable information to satisfy the requirements, and thus contributes to the success of the unit's mission. The HUMINT collector must use the objective as a basis for planning and conducting questioning. The HUMINT collector should not concentrate on the objective to the extent he overlooks or fails to recognize and exploit other valuable information extracted from the source. For example, during HUMINT collection, the HUMINT collector learns of the presence of a heretofore unknown, highly destructive weapon. Although this information may not be in line with his specific objective, the HUMINT collector must develop this important lead to obtain all possible information concerning this weapon.

### RESEARCH

7-3. The key to good HUMINT collection is preparation on the part of the collector. The HUMINT collector must understand the environment and particularly its human component, the mission of the supported unit, that unit's intelligence requirements, his source, and the cultural environment. The ultimate success of a questioning session is often decided before the HUMINT collector even meets the source.

### GENERAL RESEARCH

7-4. Due to the quickly changing world circumstances, it is impossible to conduct all the specific research required immediately prior to questioning a source. General research should be completed before entering an AO and continues until operation completion. Areas of research include but are not limited to—

- OPLANs and OPORDs. The HUMINT collector must be familiar with the unit OPLAN and that of its higher headquarters. By thoroughly understanding the unit OPLAN and OPORD, the HUMINT collector

and HUMINT commanders and leaders can anticipate collection requirements, develop source profiles, recommend deployment strategies, and otherwise integrate HUMINT operations into the overall unit operation. Although the OPORD needs to be read and understood in its entirety, certain areas are of critical importance to the HUMINT collection effort. They include—

- Task organization. This will show where HUMINT C2, staff support, and collection assets will fit into the organizational structure.
- Situation. This gives the friendly and enemy situation.
- Mission. This gives the HUMINT collectors insight into how their operations will integrate into the parent unit's operation.
- Execution. The four execution subparagraphs explain the commander's intent on how the mission is to be carried out:
  - Subparagraph 3a (Concept of Operation) includes how subordinate units' operations will be included in the overall plan.
  - Subparagraph 3a(3) (Reconnaissance and Surveillance) details how HUMINT collection operations will integrate into the overall ISR plan. Additional information on ISR is found in Annex L.
  - Subparagraph 3a(4) (Intelligence), along with Annex A (Task Organization) and Annex B (Intelligence), explains how the Intelligence BOS will support the scheme of maneuver.
  - Subparagraph 3d (Coordinating Instructions) lists the CCIRs and initial PIRs.
- Current events. The HUMINT collector must be knowledgeable about current events in all potential operational areas, especially those events that indicate the populace's feelings or intentions toward the US. This will facilitate a better understanding of the cultural, political, and socio-economic conditions that could influence the attitude and behavior of a source. This knowledge can be obtained and updated through classified periodic intelligence publications and/or military or civilian open sources, including both print and broadcast media, CA and PSYOP databases, and the J/G/S2 analytical elements.
- SOPs. The HUMINT collector must be familiar not only with his own unit's SOP but also with that of any supported unit. The HUMINT collector will be able to obtain specific information about report numbers and formats, as well as information about distribution channels for reports from these SOPs. The SOP will also explain unit policy on source exploitation and evacuation procedures, logistic and maintenance functions, and other C2 and support issues.
- Umbrella concept. The TF commander through the J/G2 and J/G2X issues an umbrella concept for HUMINT operations. When operating under this concept, collection parameters will be established in writing, and it is imperative that the HUMINT collector understands his role. Types of sources will be outlined concerning placement, motivation, and access. The umbrella concept will also specify the types of information against which the HUMINT collector can collect. The umbrella concept is governed by AR 381-100 (S//NF), AR 381-172 (S//NF), DIAM 58-11 (S//NF), and DIAM 58-12 (S//NF).

- Legal guides, SOFAs, operations and execute orders, ROE, and other legal and administrative requirements. The HUMINT collector must be thoroughly familiar with all documents that may set the legal parameters for his collection operations. These are available through the chain of command and from the SJA office. He must know how these requirements apply and to what type of sources each is applied.
- Collection requirements. The HUMINT collector needs not only to know but also to understand the requirements that he will be attempting to answer. These requirements can include CCIRs (PIRs and IRs), essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs), Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning (IPSP), specific requests from national level consumers such as HUMINT collection requirements (HCRs), SDRs, or even vocal orders given by the local commander. These all will determine the objective of the questioning plan.
- Databases. Intelligence databases can give the HUMINT collector detailed information about the source's unit, its organization, and its capabilities. They also have information on personalities. The HUMINT collector will use information obtained from databases to control the source and assess his answers for truthfulness. They will also give the HUMINT collector ideas of other areas to research. For example, if the threat is primarily a lightly armed insurgent force, studying similar organizations will provide the HUMINT collector with valuable insights into the possible methods of operation of the current target organization.
- SITMAP and COP. The current situation, both friendly and enemy, is vital for the movement of the HCT and for its collection operations. It reflects enemy unit identification, disposition, and boundaries; major roads or trails for movement of personnel, equipment, weapons; and locations of artillery, minefields, roadblocks, entrenchments, obstacles, staging areas, NBC contaminated areas, and ground surveillance devices. All of this information can be used in source questioning as control questions or in otherwise determining source veracity. The HUMINT collector will be able to identify indicators and predict what should be PIRs and IRs.
- INTSUM. The INTSUM provides a summary of the intelligence situation covering a specific period as dictated by the commander. It is already analyzed intelligence.
- Intelligence estimate. The intelligence estimate is derived from the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). It is based on all available intelligence and considers everything of operational significance. It will help point out gaps in the intelligence database. It is from these gaps that requirements are derived. It will provide information on the mission, AO, weather, terrain, enemy situation, enemy capabilities, and conclusions. It will cover all of the standard OB topics.
- Weapons and equipment guides. Weapons and equipment guides can assist the HUMINT collector in becoming familiar with the type of equipment employed in the AO. Guides are available in hardcopy and softcopy.

- Area handbooks. These handbooks provide detailed information about a specific area of the world. They provide information on political, economic, sociological, cultural, military, biographic, transportation, and geographic topics. The CIA and other agencies publish area handbooks annually. The US Department of State website also has continuously updated information on trouble spots around the world.
- Previous HUMINT reporting. The HUMINT collector should familiarize himself with all previous relevant reporting from the AO. This will provide him with insight into current operations, the types of information collected, and may help identify information gaps.
- Photographs, maps, and other geospatial products. In conducting general research, the HUMINT collector should become familiar with the AOs. This not only will help identify specific areas of HUMINT collection potential but also will be invaluable in both the questioning of specific sources and the maneuver of the HCT.
- Subject matter experts (SMEs) and technical research. Before deploying to an AO or before supporting on a particular mission, the HUMINT collector may identify particular areas in which he lacks critical knowledge. For example, a HUMINT collector who has previously been operating in an area with a conventional enemy may be deployed to an area with an unconventional threat from irregular forces. Also, intelligence requirements may focus on equipment that is unfamiliar to the HUMINT collector. In order to prepare himself, the HUMINT collector contacts SMEs or analysts or uses technical materials to gain background information.
- Other reports. Intelligence agencies publish numerous reports and summaries that are readily available to the HUMINT collector.

### **CLOSED AND OPEN-SOURCE INFORMATION (USE OF REACH)**

7-5. Reach is a process by which deployed military forces rapidly access information from, receive support from, and conduct collaboration and information sharing with other units and organizations (deployed in theater and from outside the theater) unconstrained by geographic proximity, echelon, or command. Intelligence support is established based on requirements that will help the commanders (regardless of echelon) make decisions. Reach can be accomplished in various ways. There is no requirement for all intelligence functional areas or echelons to use the same approach; hence, there is no common standard for all units to use. Each organization or section should develop its strategy on using the various intelligence reach components. Standard enabling tools will provide for easier access than ever before (for example, access to the INSCOM Information Dominance Center).



## INTELLIGENCE REACH COMPONENTS

7-6. Intelligence reach requires the G2/S2 to develop a strategy on how best to support the unit's mission with intelligence reach capabilities. There are eight basic elements of the strategy:

- **Push:** Push occurs when the producers of intelligence or information are knowledgeable of the customer's requirements and are able to send the desired intelligence to the customer without further requests. Push is accomplished through the Joint Dissemination System (JDS) and/or the Automated Message Handling System (AMHS).
- **Pull:** Pull occurs when the customer is familiar enough with existing databases to be able to anticipate the location of the desired information. Pull is greatly enhanced through the use of portals and homepages with hyperlinks to the various categories of information available to the user. This requires the establishment of such a homepage at each echelon, thus enabling higher echelons to research and pull from lower databases and homepages.
- **Database Access:** Access to local, theater, DOD, non-DOD, and commercial databases allows analysts to leverage stored knowledge on topics ranging from basic demographics to OB information. A validated DIA Customer Number (acquired by the J2/G2/S2) in combination with SIPRNET and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) connectivity establishes access to most of the databases online.
- **Integrated Broadcast Services (IBS):** IBS is an integrated, interactive dissemination system, focusing on tactical user's information requirements using a common message Data Element Dictionary (DED) and J-series family of message formats. The goal of IBS is to resolve the uncoordinated proliferation of "stovepiped" intelligence or information broadcasts by providing the tactical commander with integrated time-sensitive tactical information.
- **Collaborative Tools:** Collaborative tools are computer-based tools (groupware) that help individuals work together and share information. They allow for virtual on-line meetings and data sharing. As much as possible, collaborative tools should be emplaced with all necessary echelons and centers prior to deployment.
- **Request for Information:** Reach includes the ability of an intelligence officer at any level to request information that is beyond what is available at his location, using the Community On-Line Intelligence System for End Users and Managers (COLISEUM) System. Once an RFI is entered into the system every other user of that system can see it. Hence, an echelon several echelons above the actual requester can and often does become aware of the request and may, in fact, answer it. Reach is also provided through INSCOM's Information Dominance Center and other nodes at J2 and G2.
- **Leveraging Collection Management:** The collection and ISR management system is established to provide a mechanism for tasking and managing collection assets for required information. Analysts who are trained and familiar with the system and the various tasking procedures can leverage the system for refined information.

- Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A): DCGS-A is the ISR fusion and processing system for the future, as part of the overarching DOD-directed DCGS-A surface system family of systems. It will bring national and joint ISR capabilities down to JTF level, corps and division levels and BCT level to provide leaders with NRT information and visualization of threat, weather, and terrain information and intelligence. DCGS-A consolidates the capabilities of the following current-force ground processing systems:
  - All-Source Analysis System (ASAS).
  - Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence (CI/HUMINT) Single-Source Workstation.
  - Tactical Exploitation System (TES).
  - Guardrail Information Node (GRIFN).
  - Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS) Intelligence Processing Facility (IPF).
  - Prophet Control.
  - Joint STARS Common Ground Sensor (CGS).

7-7. For more information on Intelligence Reach, see FM 2-33.5/ST.

## SOURCE-SPECIFIC RESEARCH

7-8. Source-specific research is done immediately prior to questioning the source. The HUMINT collector may have to respond spontaneously in the case of a walk-in source in tactical operations, or if the HUMINT collector has advanced warning as in the case of a planned meeting with a source, a long-term debriefing, or an invitational source. Areas of research include but are not limited to—

- Screening Reports, KBs, Other Reports: Reports about the source not only can provide specific information about the type of information the source can provide to answer specific collection requirements but also can give the HUMINT collector extensive background information about the source. This background information can give clues to information the source might possess and to possible approach techniques. Information contained in screening reports and KBs may provide insight into—
  - Geographic Area: This area may show information about the source's ethnic background, political affiliation, religion, and customs. Information can be obtained from databases, locally registered vital statistics, and residence registries.
  - Languages: Determining the languages and dialects spoken, written, and understood by a source can provide valuable insights into that source's geographic and ethnic or tribal background, education, and social status. This determination of languages and dialects can be facilitated by the use of "flash cards" specific to the battlefield.
  - Other Reports: This can include other reports collected from this source at other echelons or reports from other sources from the same unit or location as the source. It can also include reports or documents published by the ACE at your request.

- **Political Group:** This area can provide information on the source's beliefs as well as provide information on political leaders and goals. Additionally, political affiliation can sometimes provide information about subversive groups and paramilitary ties. Knowing the goals of the political organization can also assist the HUMINT collector in choosing an approach or establishing rapport.
- **Religious Affiliation:** The source's religious affiliation may provide insight into his motivation, moral strengths and weaknesses, and other motivational factors.
- **Technical Field:** Having knowledge about the source's technical field can assist the HUMINT collector in deciding upon which questions to ask. It will also assist the HUMINT collector in verifying the source's truthfulness because the HUMINT collector will have an understanding of the source's specialty.
- **Employment:** By researching the source's employment history, the HUMINT collector can discover other areas of information that the source may be able to provide.
- **Education:** The source's education level and educational history can not only give the HUMINT collector insight into the possible information the source can provide but also provide insight into possible approach strategies.
- **Social Status:** Knowledge of the source's social status may provide a clue to a good approach strategy because the source may be accustomed to a certain type of treatment. It may also provide a clue to biographical information that the source may be able to provide.
- **Criminal Records:** Criminal records may also indicate possible approach strategies. Additionally, they may indicate which groups or organizations the source may have knowledge about.
- **Documents and Other Media Captured on or in Immediate Association with a Detainee or Brought in by a Debriefing Source:** Documents captured with or otherwise pertaining to the source may give the HUMINT collector information about the source, his unit, or his role within that unit. They may answer requirements or indicate knowledge of PIRs. Personal letters, for example, could be used during the approach phase. If a source comes in voluntarily and provides documents, they should be reviewed prior to debriefing the source.
- **Photographs, Maps, and Other Geospatial Products:** Maps and photographs of the area about which the source is being questioned can give the HUMINT collector an idea of where the source has been and in what kind of terrain he operated, which might indicate knowledge or use of certain tactics. If the HUMINT collector is not familiar with the area the source was in, the HUMINT collector should take some time to look over the map so he can more readily relate when the source mentions locations or dispositions. Aerial photographs show more detailed up-to-date information than maps. They will not normally be as readily available as maps. Maps and other geospatial products will also be needed for use in the map-tracking portion of an interrogation. The HUMINT collector should work with the ACE of the supported unit to obtain them for the AO.

- **SMEs:** There will be occasions when the HUMINT collector will talk to sources about subjects of which the HUMINT collector has no knowledge. In that case, the HUMINT collector will want to talk to personnel who are SMEs. Depending on the depth of knowledge that the source is expected to have and the time available to prepare, the HUMINT collector may arrange for a technical expert to support the questioning (see Chapter 9).
- **Technical Manuals:** There are various weapon and equipment identification guides available in hardcopy, softcopy, and off the Internet that can assist the HUMINT collector in identifying any equipment mentioned by the source.
- **Source Physical and Mental Condition:** HUMINT collectors should observe the source prior to questioning if possible and also talk to anyone available who has relevant information concerning the source. MP guards can be an especially valuable source of information based on source observation and should be debriefed periodically. This can prevent surprises at the onset of the questioning session and can help the HUMINT collector assess the source's physical and mental condition as well as provide insights to possible approaches.
- **Databases:** Collectors should review source information and reports contained in the various databases available to them. The CHATS system, BAT database, and other databases can provide collectors with source information and previous reporting.

## HUMINT COLLECTION PLAN

7-9. After conducting appropriate research, the HUMINT collector working with an analyst, if available, develops a source-based collection plan. This is geared to the specific source that is going to be questioned. The amount of time spent in preparing this plan depends on the operational circumstances. This may range from a quick mental review by an experienced HUMINT collector in a tactical environment to a formal written plan submitted by a subordinate to a team leader. The source collection plan will vary from source to source. It will also vary with the conditions under which the source is questioned. It serves as a checklist to ensure that all steps necessary to prepare for questioning are conducted. Whether written or oral, the HUMINT collection plan should contain at least the following items:

- HUMINT collection requirements.
- Serial number of EPW/detainee to be questioned.
- Location and time for the questioning.
- Primary and alternate approaches.
- Questioning plan including topics to be covered and the planned sequence of these topics.
- Prepared questions for unfamiliar or highly technical topics.
- Method of recording and reporting information obtained.

## OBJECTIVE

7-10. The HUMINT collector will first determine the objective of his questioning. The objective is the set of collection requirements that the HUMINT collector will attempt to satisfy during the questioning session. A number of circumstances including the intelligence requirements, the time available, and the source will set the objective. Determining the objective consists of three parts:

- Identify the intelligence requirements. The primary objective of any questioning session is to answer or confirm PIR or other collection requirements.
- Identify the subject: The HUMINT collector will want to consider the source; for example, who he is, what he may know. The HUMINT collector will also want to consider the legal and other restrictions based on the type of source (contact source, EPW, refugee, strategic). For a military source (EPW) this includes rank, position specialty, and unit of assignment. For a civilian source it includes job, placement and access, associations, area of residence, and employment.
- Identify the intelligence requirements that the source may be able to answer. The HUMINT collector cannot normally waste time “fishing” for information. He must determine based on screening, what collection requirements the source can answer. The HUMINT collector compares the information that he gathered through his general and source-specific research and compares it to his list of collection requirements. He compares that list to the identity of the source and refines the list including all requirements that the source can be expected to be able to answer. The HUMINT collector will approach those areas first while staying aware of leads into other collection topics.

## LOCATION

7-11. In most cases, the location for the questioning will be determined by operational requirements. However, the HUMINT collector should ensure some basic requirements are met:

- Each questioning session should be conducted outside the hearing and view of third parties. Even in the case of a source meeting in a public place, the HUMINT collector should choose a location where they cannot be overheard and where their meeting will not arouse suspicion.
- The location should be in a place that has reasonable security for the HUMINT collector and the source. In contact operations, the risk cannot always be eliminated but the acceptable risk levels should be based on the expected intelligence gain. In combat operations, most questioning (interrogation, debriefing of civilians on the battlefield) will take place in forward combat areas, but it cannot be done if it increases the risk to the source. Safe evacuation of the sources has priority over questioning.
- The location should provide ready access to the chosen method of recording and reporting the information.

7-12. When conducting military source operations, the location of the questioning will have psychological effects on the source. The questioning location should be chosen and set up to correspond to the effect that the HUMINT collector wants to project and his planned approach techniques. For example, meeting in a social type situation such as a restaurant may place the source at ease. Meeting in an apartment projects informality while meeting in an office projects more formality. Meeting at the source's home normally places him at a psychological advantage, while meeting in the HUMINT collector's work area gives the collector a psychological edge. The HUMINT collector should consider the status and level of the source, security, the workspace available, furnishings, the amount of lighting provided, and the ability to heat or cool the room as needed.

## **TIME**

7-13. Time to conduct questioning should be estimated based on the source, the type of information that the HUMINT collector expects to get, and the complexity of that information. Other considerations include expected evacuation times for sources in tactical situations, the number of other sources that need to be spoken to; and in contact operations, the estimated time that the HUMINT collector can meet with the source without increasing the risk.

7-14. The HUMINT collector must also consider the physical conditions of the source and himself. After extended operations, there may be a limit on how long either the HUMINT collector or source can concentrate on a given subject. Even if the HUMINT collector has an unlimited time period (such as at a joint interrogation and debriefing facility), he must break his questioning down into topical sessions to maximize effectiveness. Time is only an estimate and should be modified based on the circumstances. It may be extended, for example, if the source has a greater than expected amount of information, or critical information in unforeseen areas. The time may be curtailed if the HUMINT collector has met his requirements, the source does not possess the expected information, or a more valuable source is identified.

## **PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE APPROACHES**

7-15. In most circumstances, if the HUMINT collector is meeting with the source for the first time, he should select at least two alternate approaches to use if the direct approach is unsuccessful (see Chapter 8). These approaches need to be based on the HUMINT collector's source-specific research, his general area research, knowledge of the current situation, and knowledge of human nature. There are four primary factors that must be considered when selecting tentative approaches:

- The source's mental and physical state. Is the source injured, angry, crying, arrogant, cocky, or frightened?
- The source's background. What is the source's age and level of military or civilian experience? Consider cultural, ethnic, and religious factors.
- The objective of the HUMINT collection. How valuable is the source's potential information? Is it beneficial to spend more effort convincing this source to talk?

- The HUMINT collector himself. What abilities does he have that can be brought into play? What weaknesses does he have that may interfere with the HUMINT collection? Are there social or ethnic barriers to communication? Can his personality adapt to the personality of the source?

7-16. If the HUMINT collector has a screening sheet or KB, he can use it to help select his approaches. After reviewing the information, the HUMINT collector will analyze the information for indicators of psychological and/or physical weakness that would make a source susceptible to a specific approach. The HUMINT collector also needs to consider his particular strengths and weaknesses in conducting specific approaches. He must consider what immediate incentives he may possibly need and ensure that they are available. Also, if incentives had been previously offered or promised, the collector needs to know if they were in fact provided. If the HUMINT collector has previously questioned the source, he must evaluate the approaches he used and decide if they need to be modified or if additional approach techniques will be needed (see Chapter 8.)

#### **ADDITIONAL SUPPORT REQUIRED**

7-17. The HUMINT collector must decide if he will need technical support to include interpreter support.

- Technical support. The HUMINT collector must decide if he will need additional support including analytical, technical, or interpreter support.
- Analytical or technical support. The HUMINT collector must decide if he has the analytical or technical capability to question a specific source. If not, he must decide what degree of support from advice to participation is required of the analyst or technical expert. Any request for analytical or technical support must be coordinated with the 2X. On rare occasions, it may be desirable for the HUMINT collector to seek polygraph support or support from a Behavioral Science Consultant (BSC). BSCs are authorized to make psychological assessments of the character, personality, social interactions, and other behavioral characteristics of interrogation subjects and advise HUMINT collectors of their assessments, as needed.
- Interpreter support. If the HUMINT collector does not speak the needed language or does not speak the needed language well enough to conduct questioning, an interpreter will be required. If the HUMINT collector will need an interpreter, the HUMINT collector will also have to consider the clearance needed to complete the questioning and the availability of the interpreter, as well as the extra time necessary to complete the questioning session. The HUMINT collector will also have to brief the interpreter on the method of interpretation and the HUMINT exploitation plan. Also, he should determine whether there are any cultural aspects associated with the interpreter that may enhance or detract from the success of the meet. (See Chapter 11 for detailed information on HUMINT collection using an interpreter.)

**DEVELOP A QUESTIONING PLAN**

7-18. The HUMINT collector must develop a plan that will guide his questioning of the source. This includes general topics to be exploited and the sequence in which they will be covered.

7-19. There are two general sequences used in questioning: topical and chronological.

- Topical questioning is used when time is a prime concern, when the source is believed to possess key information in a limited area, when the questioning is concerning a technical topic, or when the source has been talked to previously and this is a subsequent questioning to expand on earlier topics.
- Chronological questioning normally is used when the HUMINT collector is uncertain of the areas of source knowledge, when time is not a factor in questioning, during initial questioning when the source is believed to have knowledge on a large number of topics, and in friendly force mission debriefing.

7-20. A topical sequence is an outline of topics to be questioned in a selected sequence and is based on intelligence requirements or HCRs, as well as a specific source's potential to provide information pertinent to those requirements. The plan serves as a checklist for the HUMINT collector to ensure that all subjects pertinent to the collection objective are questioned in an efficient and organized manner. The HUMINT collector uses his estimate of the type and extent of knowledge possessed by the source to modify the basic topical sequence of questioning. He selects only those topics in which he believes the source has pertinent knowledge. In this way, the HUMINT collector refines his element's overall objective into a set of specific HUMINT collection subjects. In OB factors questioning in either a tactical or strategic setting, and across the full spectrum of operations, the topics covered include missions and the nine major OB factors:

- Composition.
- Strength.
- Dispositions.
- Tactics.
- Training.
- Combat effectiveness.
- Logistics.
- Electronic technical data.
- Miscellaneous.

7-21. See Appendix G for questioning quick reference examples of topics covered under the nine OB factors.

7-22. In strategic and operational debriefing operations the relevant HCR or SDR will guide the HUMINT collector. Regardless of which tasking document is referenced, the topical sequence is established by collection requirements, modified or sequenced, based on source knowledge and time.

7-23. The nine OB factors are not the only guideline that may be used by the HUMINT collector. If the collection objective is something other than a



military unit, many of the OB factors will not fit the collection plan. A helpful memory aid, in this case, is mission, identification, location, and organization (MILO). MILO gives a short, easily remembered structure for questioning nonmilitary or strategic topics. The MILO factors can be questioned in any order, but often the most logical sequence of MILO questioning is identification, organization, location, and mission. Many of the nine OB factors can also fit into the MILO format.

## IDENTIFY MEANS OF RECORDING AND REPORTING

7-24. The HUMINT collector will want to decide upon a means of recording the information obtained through source questioning. If the HUMINT collector is planning to use a sound or video recorder, he will also have to consider the availability of the equipment and its positioning (see Chapter 9). Along with the method of recording the information, the HUMINT collector will have to decide on the means of reporting the information (see Chapter 10). Tapes of interrogations must be safeguarded in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

## FINAL PREPARATIONS

7-25. After the source-specific questioning plan is developed, the HUMINT collector takes some final preparatory steps.

- Review plan. The HUMINT collector should always go over his collection plan with his supervisor. This review can be written or oral. In addition to the obvious requirements to keep the chain of command informed, this review helps identify any weaknesses in the plan and is a means to effect required coordination and support.
- Collect questioning support materials. The HUMINT collector will want to collect the various references and other guides that he will use to support his questioning. These materials may include source documents, maps, aerial photographs, imagery, OB data, extra lights, extra tables, drawing templates, graph paper, questioning guides, technical reference manuals, city plans and handbooks, and recording devices.
- Conduct required coordination. The HUMINT collector coordinates any support requirements including analytical, technical, or interpreter support, questioning location, ICFs, recording equipment, security, and transportation.
- Organize. The HUMINT collector organizes his materials in a logical manner that will complement his topical sequence. By being organized, the HUMINT collector will not waste time trying to locate the correct manual or guide. Additionally, the HUMINT collector will present a professional appearance to his source.
- Reconnoiter the questioning location. If the questioning location is to be somewhere other than the HUMINT collector's normal AO, such as a public restaurant, the HUMINT collector should conduct an unobtrusive reconnaissance of the site. If at all possible, this should be at the same time and day of the week as the planned meeting. This allows the HUMINT collector to assess the possible security problems

of the location, judge the traffic flow, and identify any other items that might affect the questioning. He can also judge where within the meeting site he can set up for maximum security and psychological advantage. He must be careful that in doing so he does not set up patterns of operation that will increase rather than decrease security problems.

- Set up questioning site. If the HUMINT collector has control over the site where the collection is being conducted, the last step in preparing is the actual setup of the questioning site. The HUMINT collector will want to decide on the placement of the furniture and lighting and where everyone will be seated and decide where he will place his technical support materials.
- Question guards. If the person to be questioned is a detainee, the HUMINT collector should arrange to question MP guards who have been in contact with the detainee to ascertain source behavior, attitude, and other useful information that guards may be able to provide.
- Check with medical personnel. If the detainee was injured or ill, ensure that he was treated by medical authorities and released for questioning.

7-26. The supervisor reviews each plan for legal considerations, appropriate goals in accordance with the collection objectives of the supported unit, and makes any changes he thinks are necessary. The supervisor ensures that contract interrogators are utilized in accordance with the scope of their contract and current policy. (See Appendix K.) After the plan is approved, the collection operation is executed. Prior to execution, the supervisor ensures mission brief back, rehearsal, and pre-combat inspections are conducted.

## Chapter 8

# Approach Techniques and Termination Strategies

8-1. Regardless of the type of operation, the initial impression that the HUMINT collector makes on the source and the approach he takes to gain the source's cooperation will have a lasting effect on the continuing relationship and the degree of success in collecting information. The approach used will vary based on the type of operation; the operational environment; the status of the source; the personality, position, and identity of the source; and the personality and experience level of the HUMINT collector and the time available.

8-2. The MPs will not take any actions to set conditions for interrogations (for example, "softening up" a detainee). Additionally, in accordance with DOD Directive 3115.09, military working dogs, contracted dogs, or any other dog in use by a government agency shall not be used as a part of an interrogation approach nor to harass, intimidate, threaten, or coerce a detainee for interrogation purposes. Leadership throughout the chain of command is responsible to ensure that HUMINT operations are in compliance with these governing regulations and guidelines, whether the HUMINT collection is to take place as part of HCT operations or in an internment facility.

8-3. The only authorized interrogation approaches and techniques are those authorized by and listed in this manual, in accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. Two approaches, Mutt and Jeff and False Flag, require approval by the first O-6 in the interrogator's chain of command. The restricted interrogation technique "Separation" requires COCOM commander approval for use, and approval of each interrogation plan using "Separation" by the first General Officer/Flag Officer (GO/FO) in the chain of command. Coordination may also be required with the C/J/G2X, security, legal, or other personnel. Regardless of the coordination efforts required, use of all techniques at all locations must carefully comply with this manual and additional instructions contained in the latest DOD and COCOM policies.

NOTE: The word "source" will be used in this chapter to mean any person who is the objective of the HUMINT collector's approach, and is applicable in any collection situation unless otherwise noted in the text. This use of the term "source" is consistent with US Army Intelligence Center HUMINT collector training.

## APPROACH PHASE

8-4. During the approach phase, the HUMINT collector establishes the conditions of control and rapport to facilitate information collection. The approach begins with initial contact between the source and the HUMINT collector. Extreme care is required since the success of the collection effort

hinges, to a large degree, on the early development of the source's willingness to communicate. Interrogators must have a deep understanding of the cultural norms, anomalies, and emotional triggers of the person being interrogated in order to select appropriate approach strategies and to interrogate effectively.

8-5. The HUMINT collector's objective during this phase is to establish a relationship with the source that results in the source providing accurate and reliable information in response to the HUMINT collector's questions. The HUMINT collector adopts an appropriate persona based on his appraisal of the source but remains alert for verbal and non-verbal clues that indicate the need for a change in the approach techniques. The amount of time spent on this phase will depend mostly on the probable quantity and value of information the source possesses, the availability of other sources with knowledge on the same topics, and available time. At the initial contact, a businesslike relationship should be maintained. As the source assumes a cooperative attitude, a more relaxed atmosphere may be advantageous. The HUMINT collector must carefully determine which of the various approach techniques to employ.

8-6. Sources will cooperate with the HUMINT collector for various reasons ranging from patriotic duty to personal gain, such as material gifts or money. They may also respond to emotion or logic. Regardless of the type of source and his outward personality, every source possesses exploitable characteristics that, if recognized by the HUMINT collector, can be used to facilitate the collection process. These characteristics may be readily apparent or may have to be extrapolated from the source's speech, mannerisms, facial expressions, physical movements, involuntary responses (perspiration, changes in breathing, eye movement), and other overt indications that vary from source to source. From a psychological standpoint, the HUMINT collector must be cognizant of the following behaviors. People tend to—

- Want to talk when they are under stress and respond to kindness and understanding during trying circumstances. For example, enemy soldiers who have just been captured have experienced a significant stress-producing episode. The natural inclination is for people to want to talk about this sort of experience. If the EPW has been properly segregated and silenced, the HUMINT collector will be the first person the EPW has a chance to talk to. This is a powerful tool for the collector to use to get the subject talking. The desire to talk may also be manifested in refugees, DPs, and even local civilians when confronted by an unsettled situation.
- Show deference when confronted by superior authority. This is culturally dependent but in most areas of the world people are used to responding to questions from a variety of government and quasi-government officials.
- Operate within a framework of personal and culturally derived values. People tend to respond positively to individuals who display the same value system and negatively when their core values are challenged.
- Respond to physical and, more importantly, emotional self-interest. This may be as simple as responding to material rewards such as extra

food or luxury items for their personal comfort or as complex as responding to support in rationalizing guilt.

- Fail to apply or remember lessons they may have been taught regarding security if confronted with a disorganized or strange situation.
- Be more willing to discuss a topic about which the HUMINT collector demonstrates identical or related experience or knowledge.
- Appreciate flattery and exoneration from guilt.
- Attach less importance to a topic if it is treated routinely by the HUMINT collector.
- Resent having someone or something they respect belittled, especially by someone they dislike.

8-7. HUMINT collectors do not "run" an approach by following a set pattern or routine. Each approach is different, but all approaches have the following in common. They—

- Establish and maintain control over the source and collection effort. This does not necessarily equate to physical control. Rather it means that the HUMINT collector directs the conversation to cover the topics that are of interest to him. This may be overt in a debriefing or an interrogation or subtle in an elicitation. In a very basic sense, the HUMINT collector is in control if he is asking questions and receiving answers. If the source is asking questions, refusing to answer questions, or directing or attempting to direct the exchange, he is challenging for control. If the source challenges this control, the HUMINT collector must act quickly and firmly to reestablish control.
- Establish and maintain a rapport between the HUMINT collector and the source. Rapport is a condition established by the HUMINT collector that is characterized by source confidence in the HUMINT collector and a willingness to cooperate with him. This does not necessarily equate to a friendly atmosphere. It means that a relationship is established and maintained that facilitates the collection of information by the HUMINT collector. The HUMINT collector may establish a relationship as superior, equal, or even inferior to the source. The relationship may be based on friendship, mutual gain, or even fear.
- Identify the source's primary emotions, values, traditions, and characteristics and use them to gain the source's willing cooperation.

8-8. The successful application of approach techniques, coupled with measures to ensure source veracity, results in the source providing accurate information in response to the HUMINT collector's requirements. The source may or may not be aware that he is providing the HUMINT collector with needed information. The approach does not end when the source begins providing information but is reinforced as necessary throughout the questioning.

## DEVELOPING RAPPORT

8-9. The basis of rapport is source confidence in the HUMINT collector, which leads to a willingness to cooperate. Rapport does not necessarily mean a friendly relationship, although that may be the case. It means an establishment of a relationship in which the HUMINT collector presents a realistic persona designed to evoke cooperation from the source. The source responds with relevant, truthful information. Rapport is established during the approach and must be maintained throughout the questioning of the source. If the HUMINT collector has established good rapport initially and then abandons the effort, the source would rightfully begin to question the HUMINT collector's sincerity and may cease answering questions.

## BUILDING RAPPORT

8-10. Building rapport is an integral part of the approach phase. The establishment of rapport begins when the HUMINT collector first encounters the source. Depending on the situation, the HUMINT collector may introduce himself to the source. In debriefing and liaison operations, this will normally be the collector's true name and affiliation. In elicitation, the requirement and type of introduction depends on the operation. In interrogation operations, the HUMINT collector normally will not introduce himself unless he is laying the groundwork for an approach. If he does introduce himself, normally he will adopt a duty position and rank supportive of the approach strategy selected during the planning and preparation phase. The HUMINT collector must select a rank and duty position that is believable based on the HUMINT collector's age, appearance, and experience. A HUMINT collector may, according to international law, use ruses of war to build rapport with interrogation sources, and this may include posing or "passing himself off" as someone other than a military interrogator. However, the collector must not pose as—

- A doctor, medic, or any other type of medical personnel.
- Any member of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or its affiliates. Such a ruse is a violation of US treaty obligations.
- A chaplain or clergyman.
- A journalist.
- A member of the US Congress.

8-11. The HUMINT collector should seek advice from his SJA concerning representing himself as holding any other sensitive position.

8-12. A good source assessment is the basis for the approach and vital to the success of the collection effort. The HUMINT collector continually assesses the source to see if the approaches—and later the questioning techniques—chosen in the planning and preparation phase will indeed work. Approaches chosen in planning and preparation are tentative and based on the limited information available from documents, guards, and personal observation. This may lead the HUMINT collector to select approaches that may be totally incorrect for obtaining this source's willing cooperation. Thus, careful assessment of the source is critical to avoid wasting valuable time in the approach phase. Whether the HUMINT collector is using reasoned argument

or emotion to get the source to cooperate, he must be convincing and believable and appear sincere.

## RAPPORT POSTURE

8-13. Unless there is rationale for acting otherwise, the HUMINT collector will begin his interaction with the source in a businesslike manner. He will be neither hostile nor overly friendly. Based on the tentative approaches developed during planning and preparation and the verbal and physical clues from the source, the HUMINT collector will modify this posture to facilitate collection.

8-14. Based on planning and preparation, the HUMINT collector may decide to adopt a stern posture. He presents himself as a person in a superior position to the interrogation source and demands proper deference and obedience by the interrogation source. In the case of an EPW this is manifested by having the source remain at attention and address the HUMINT collector as "Sir." This can be effective in dealing with lower ranking military personnel or members of oppressed ethnic, tribal, or religious groups who are conditioned to respond to authority or civilians in lower economic or social positions who are used to responding to directions from various bureaucrats and civilian superiors. This posture can have negative results since many persons in the positions mentioned above have developed mechanisms for dealing with superiors that mostly involve giving minimal information and agreeing with whatever the authority figure says.

8-15. In most cases, either initially or after the interrogation source has begun answering questions, the HUMINT collector will adopt a more relaxed or even sympathetic posture. The HUMINT collector addresses the interrogation source in a friendly fashion, striving to put him at ease. Regardless of the posture selected by the HUMINT collector, he must stay detached emotionally while maintaining the appearance of total involvement and stay within his adopted persona. The HUMINT collector must control his temper at all times. He must not show distaste, disgust, or unease at anything the source says unless that reaction is a planned part of the approach strategy. He should not show surprise at anything that the interrogation source says since it might undermine source confidence in the HUMINT collector and their relationship.

8-16. The HUMINT collector must support his verbal approaches with appropriate body language. Just as the HUMINT collector is observing the source to identify non-verbal clues that support or contradict the verbal message, the HUMINT collector is being scrutinized by the source to identify the same clues. The techniques used in an approach are a totality of effort, not just verbal conversation between the HUMINT collector and the source. Body language is in many instances culturally dependent. Standing at a given distance from an individual may be perceived as comforting in some societies and hostile in others. The HUMINT collector must adapt his body language to the culture in which he is working rather than expect the source to adapt to his.

## APPROACH TECHNIQUES

8-17. The approaches listed are not guaranteed solutions for every situation. Some individual approaches that may be suitable for one operating environment, such as when conducting HUMINT contact operations, may be ineffective in another, such as interrogation. Some will be successful with one source and ineffective with another. In any case, everything the HUMINT collector says and does must be in compliance with the applicable law and policy under which the HUMINT collector is operating. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs.

8-18. There are 18 approach techniques that can be employed on any detainee regardless of status or characterization, including EPWs. Additionally, there is one restricted interrogation technique called separation (see Appendix M). Separation cannot be employed on EPWs. With the exception of the direct approach, which may be effective by itself, approach techniques are used in combination with other approaches and techniques. Transitions from one approach to another must be smooth, logical, and convincing.

## DIRECT APPROACH

8-19. (Interrogation and Other MSO) Almost all HUMINT collection begins with the direct approach. The exception to this is during elicitation operations that by their very nature are indirect. In using the direct approach, the HUMINT collector asks direct questions (see Chapter 9). The initial questions may be administrative or nonpertinent but the HUMINT collector quickly begins asking pertinent questions. The HUMINT collector will continue to use direct questions as long as the source is answering the questions in a truthful manner. When the source refuses to answer, avoids answering, or falsely answers a pertinent question, the HUMINT collector will begin an alternate approach strategy. The fact that the source is answering questions does not preclude the HUMINT collector from providing an incentive to reward the source and continue his cooperation as long as that incentive does not slow down the collection. For example, a HUMINT collector might offer the source coffee or cigarettes to reward his cooperation. See Chapter 9 for the use of Repeat and Control questions in detecting deception.

8-20. Statistics from interrogation operations in World War II show that the direct approach was effective 90 percent of the time. In Vietnam and in Operations URGENT FURY (Grenada, 1983), JUST CAUSE (Panama, 1989), and DESERT STORM (Kuwait and Iraq, 1991), the direct approach was 95 percent effective. The effectiveness of the direct approach in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan, 2001-2002) and IRAQI FREEDOM (Iraq, 2003) are still being studied; however, unofficial studies indicate that in these operations, the direct approach has been dramatically less successful. The direct approach is frequently employed at lower echelons when the tactical situation precludes selecting other techniques, and where



the EPW's or detainee's mental state is one of confusion or extreme shock. However, the HUMINT collector must remember that just because a source is answering a direct question does not mean he is being truthful.

## INCENTIVE APPROACH

8-21. (Interrogation and Other MSO) The incentive approach is trading something that the source wants for information. The thing that you give up may be a material reward, an emotional reward, or the removal of a real or perceived negative stimulus. The exchange of the incentive may be blatant or subtle. On one extreme, the exchange may be a formal cash payment for information during some contact operations while on the other extreme it may be as subtle as offering the source a cigarette. Even when the direct approach is successful, the HUMINT collector may use incentives to enhance rapport and to reward the source for cooperation and truthfulness. The HUMINT collector must be extremely careful in selecting the options offered to a detainee source. He cannot deny the detainee anything that he is entitled to by law.

8-22. The HUMINT collector also should not offer anything that is not in his power to give. Although this might be expedient in the short term, in the long run it will eliminate source cooperation. When asked to provide something beyond his authority, the HUMINT collector can agree to help, check into, or otherwise support the request without committing himself to its successful accomplishment. HUMINT collectors must be cautious in the use of incentives for the following reasons:

- There is an inherent suspicion of the truthfulness of "bought" information. Sources may manufacture information in order to receive or maintain an incentive. Sources may also "hold back" information in the hopes of trading it at a later date for greater incentives. They may also hold back information if the incentive is not immediately available or guaranteed.
- The incentive must be believable and attainable. The incentive must be within the capability of the HUMINT collector's assumed persona to achieve. For example, if the detainee was captured after killing a US soldier, an incentive of release would not be realistic or believable. Likewise, if the interrogator is presenting himself as being a "harmless clerk" at the detention center, it would be unrealistic to expect a detainee to believe that a clerk could arrange to have the detainee's girlfriend brought to visit him. Such a visit might be possible, but the interrogator's assumed persona would not seemingly provide him with the authority to make it happen.
- The HUMINT collector must provide any promised incentive. A simple promise of an incentive may be sufficient to obtain immediate cooperation. If, however, the HUMINT collector does not follow through on providing the incentive, he will lose credibility and rapport with his source. This may end the cooperation of not only that source but also possibly any potential source who has contact with that source.
- The HUMINT collector may not state or even imply that the basic human rights guaranteed by applicable national and international

laws, regulations, and agreements will be contingent on a detained source's cooperation. An incentive for cooperation is viable only if the HUMINT collector has or is perceived to have the authority to withhold the incentive if the source is not cooperative. A HUMINT collector cannot promise an EPW that he will be treated in accordance with the GPW if he cooperates. This statement implies that the EPW will not be treated properly if he does not cooperate. Since the EPW must be treated in accordance with the GPW whether he cooperates or not, the HUMINT collector will rapidly lose credibility.

## EMOTIONAL APPROACHES

8-23. (Interrogation and Other MSO) Emotional approaches are centered on how the source views himself and his interrelationships with others. Through source observation and initial questioning, the HUMINT collector can often identify dominant emotions that motivate the EPW/detainee. The motivating emotion may be greed, love, hate, revenge, or others. The emotion may be directed inward (feelings of pride or helplessness) or outward (love of family). The HUMINT collector employs verbal and emotional ruses in applying pressure to the source's dominant emotions. He then links the satisfaction of these emotions to the source's cooperation. Often, the presentation of like experiences and presenting the source with an opportunity to express his emotions is sufficient to result in cooperation. However, sometimes the source must be presented with a specific action or tangible manifestation of support.

8-24. Although the emotion is the key factor, an emotional approach is normally worthless without an attached incentive. The incentive must meet the criteria listed above for the incentive approach to ensure that the incentive is believable and attainable. For example, this technique can be used on the EPW/detainee who has a great love for his unit and fellow soldiers. Simply having the source express this emotion is not enough. After the source expresses this emotion, the HUMINT collector can take advantage of this by telling the EPW/detainee that by providing pertinent information, he may shorten the war or battle in progress and save many of his comrades' lives, but his refusal to talk may cause their deaths. This gives the source the alternatives of facing the status quo or expressing love of comrades through cooperating with the HUMINT collector.

8-25. Religion is an especially difficult topic to use in any emotional approach. An approach using religion may encourage the source to be further motivated by love, remorse, futility, or even pride to cooperate with the interrogator. On the other hand, an approach using religion may also encourage the source to end any rapport and cooperation with the interrogator. Although it is acceptable to use religion in all interrogation approaches, even to express doubts about a religion, an interrogator is not permitted to denigrate a religion's symbols (for example, a Koran, prayer rug, icon, or religious statue) or violate a religion's tenets, except where appropriate for health, safety, and security reasons. Supervisors should carefully consider the experience level of their subordinates before permitting the use of religion in any interrogation approach.

8-26. Similarly, supervisors should question the appropriateness of demeaning any racial group, including the source's, to elicit an emotional response during an interrogation approach.

8-27. One common danger to the use of emotional approaches is the development of an emotional attachment on the part of the HUMINT collector. It is natural that a source will develop an emotional attachment to the HUMINT collector. The HUMINT collector will often foster this attachment. However, it is vital the HUMINT collector not develop a corresponding emotional attachment to the source. This problem normally develops when a HUMINT collector has contact with one source or a group of similar sources over an extended period of time. There is transference of the source's problems to the HUMINT collector. For example, HUMINT collectors working in a refugee camp frequently begin to view the welfare of the refugees as a greater concern than HUMINT collection. The HUMINT collector, while developing emotion within the source, must act believably but at the same time he must remain detached. He must remember that the emotion is a means to an end (that is, information collection). Supervisors must carefully observe HUMINT collectors for signs of this emotional attachment to the source and take appropriate action ranging from counseling to reassignment.

8-28. The following are types of emotional approaches.

### **Emotional Love Approach**

8-29. (Interrogation and Other MSO) Love in its many forms (friendship, comradeship, patriotism, love of family) is a dominant emotion for most people. The HUMINT collector focuses on the anxiety felt by the source about the circumstances in which he finds himself, his isolation from those he loves, and his feelings of helplessness. The HUMINT collector directs the love the source feels toward the appropriate object: family, homeland, or comrades. If the HUMINT collector can show the source what the source himself can do to alter or improve his situation or the situation of the object of his emotion, the approach has a chance of success.

8-30. The key to the successful use of this approach is to identify an action that can realistically evoke this emotion (an incentive) that can be tied to a detained source's cooperation. For example, if the source cooperates, he can see his family sooner, end the war, protect his comrades, help his country, help his ethnic group. A good HUMINT collector will usually orchestrate some futility with an emotional love approach to hasten the source's reaching the breaking point. In other words if the source does not cooperate, these things may never happen or be delayed in happening. Sincerity and conviction are critical in a successful attempt at an emotional love approach as the HUMINT collector must show genuine concern for the source, and for the object at which the HUMINT collector is directing the source's emotion. The emotional love approach may be used in any MSO where the source's state of mind indicates that the approach may be effective.

### **Emotional Hate Approach**

8-31. (Interrogation and Other MSO) The emotional hate approach focuses on any genuine hate, or possibly a desire for revenge, the source may feel. The HUMINT collector must clearly identify the object of the source's hate and, if necessary, build on those feelings so the emotion overrides the source's rational side. The source may have negative feelings about his country's regime, immediate superiors, officers in general, or fellow soldiers. The emotional hate approach may be used in any MSO where the source's state of mind indicates that the approach may be effective.

8-32. The emotional hate approach may be effective on members of racial or religious minorities who have or feel that they have faced discrimination in military and civilian life. The "hate" may be very specific. For example, a source may have great love for his country, but may hate the regime in control. The HUMINT collector must be sure to correctly identify the specific object of the hate. The emotional hate approach is most effective with the immature or timid source who may have had no opportunity up to this point for revenge, or never had the courage to voice his feelings.

8-33. As in the emotional love approach, the key to the successful application is the linking of the emotion with a tangible manifestation of that emotion. The HUMINT collector must be extremely careful that he does not promise anything that would be contrary to national or international law or US interests or goals. For example, if an EPW feels he has been treated unfairly in his unit, the HUMINT collector can point out that, if the source cooperates and divulges the location of that unit, the unit can be destroyed, thus affording the source revenge. But he cannot promise that the unit if attacked would not be allowed to surrender or that the unit if it surrenders will be treated badly.

8-34. The HUMINT collector must be careful that he does not assume that casual negative comments equate to a strong hate. Many soldiers will make negative comments against their army but will support and defend their army against any "outsider." The HUMINT collector should also not assume generalities; for example, assuming that a member of an ethnic minority hates the ethnic majority just because most ethnic minorities hate those in the ethnic majority.

### **Emotional Fear-Up Approach**

8-35. (Interrogation and Other MSO) Fear is another dominant emotion that can be exploited by the HUMINT collector. In the fear-up approach, the HUMINT collector identifies a preexisting fear or creates a fear within the source. He then links the elimination or reduction of the fear to cooperation on the part of the source. The HUMINT collector must be extremely careful that he does not threaten or coerce a source. Conveying a threat may be a violation of the UCMJ. The HUMINT collector should also be extremely careful that he does not create so much fear that the source becomes unresponsive. The HUMINT collector should never act as if he is out of control or set himself up as the object or focal point of the source's fear. If the HUMINT collector acts in this manner, it is extremely difficult to then act as

the outlet for the fear. Supervisors should consider the experience level of their subordinates before approving their use of this approach.

8-36. If there is a justifiable fear, the HUMINT collector should present it and present a plan to mitigate it if the source cooperates (combination of emotional and incentive approaches). For example, an EPW source says that he will not cooperate because if he does his fellow prisoners will kill him or, if a contact source says that if people find out he is cooperating, his family will suffer. In these cases, the HUMINT collector can point out that the source has already placed himself at risk and he or his family may suffer whether he cooperates or not (justified fear). But if he cooperates, the HUMINT collector will do his best to ensure that either no one will find out or that he will be protected (incentive).

8-37. If there is no justified fear, the HUMINT collector can make use of non-specific fears. "You know what can happen to you here?" A fear-up approach is normally presented in a level, unemotional tone of voice. For example, "We have heard many allegations of atrocities committed in your area and anyone that was involved will be severely punished" (non-specific fear). "If you cooperate with me and answer all of my questions truthfully, I can make sure you are not falsely accused" (incentive). The source should demonstrate some indication of fear, whether verbal or non-verbal, prior to using this approach. If a fear is pre-existing, the approach will work and is legal. If there is no indication of fear, another approach should be considered.

8-38. It is often very effective to use the detainee's own imagination against him. The detainee can often visualize exactly what he is afraid of better than the HUMINT collector can express it.

8-39. The "fear-up" approach is frequently used in conjunction with the emotional love or hate approaches. For example, the HUMINT collector has already established that a detainee source has a strong love of family but is now separated from them. He may state, "I wonder how your family is getting along without you?" (fear of the unknown). He then promises to allow the detainee more than the minimum two letters a month required by the GPW.

### **Emotional Fear-Down Approach**

8-40. (Interrogation and Other MSO) The emotion of fear may dominate the source to the point where he is unable to respond rationally to questioning, especially in interrogation sources. However, the fear-down approach may be used in any MSO where the source's state of mind indicates that it would be an appropriate approach to use. In the fear-down approach the HUMINT collector mitigates existing fear in exchange for cooperation on the part of the source. This is not normally a formal or even voiced agreement. Instead, the HUMINT collector through verbal and physical actions calms the source. Psychologically, the source then views the HUMINT collector as the protector or the one who is providing the calm and wishes to help the HUMINT collector in gratitude and in order to maintain the HUMINT collector as the protector. When used with a soothing, calm tone of voice and appropriate body language, a fear-down approach often creates rapport and nothing else may be needed to get the source to cooperate. At times, however, the

HUMINT collector must describe concrete actions that he will take in order to remove the source's fear.

8-41. Frequently the object of the fear is too traumatic for the source to face directly. While calming the source, the HUMINT collector may initially ask nonpertinent questions and avoid the subject that has caused the source's fear. This develops rapport and establishes communication. The HUMINT collector must remember that his goal is collecting information, not concern with the psychological well being of the source. He will be concerned with the latter only insofar as it helps him obtain the former. This approach technique may backfire if allowed to go too far. After convincing the source he has nothing to fear, the source may cease to be afraid and may feel secure enough to resist the HUMINT collector's pertinent question.

### **Emotional-Pride and Ego-Up Approach**

8-42. (Interrogation and Other MSO) The emotional-pride and ego-up approach may be used in any MSO. It exploits a source's low self-esteem. Many HUMINT sources including EPWs and other detainees, retained persons, civilian internees, or refugees may suffer from low self-esteem and feelings of helplessness due to their immediate circumstances. Others, such as individuals or members of social or ethnic groups that have been discriminated against or low-ranking members of organizations (including the military), may also show low self-worth. In this technique, the source is flattered into providing certain information in order to gain credit and build his ego. The HUMINT collector must take care to use a flattering somewhat-in-awe tone of voice, and speak highly of the source throughout this approach while remaining believable. This should produce positive feelings on the source's part as he receives desired recognition. The source will eventually reveal pertinent information to solicit more favorable comments from the HUMINT collector.

8-43. This technique can also be employed in another manner—by flattering the source into admitting certain information in order to gain credit. For example, while interrogating a suspected saboteur, the HUMINT collector states: "This was a smooth operation. I have seen many previous attempts fail. I bet you planned this. Who else but a clever person like you would have planned it? When did you first decide to do the job?"

8-44. A variation of this approach can also be used on individuals with strong egos. It is based on the premise that everyone likes to talk about what they do best. The HUMINT collector shows interest in and asks the source to explain an aspect of his job. The questioning begins with nonpertinent aspects of the source's job. The HUMINT collector displays interest and asks increasingly technical and pertinent questions. For example, if the source is an EPW who was a pilot, the HUMINT collector might begin by asking him what it is like to fly. As the source talks about this, the collector demonstrates interest and gradually uses questions to lead the conversation to capabilities of specific aircraft, specific missions that the pilot has flown, tactics, or whatever topic is a priority for collection.

## Emotional-Pride and Ego-Down Approach

8-45. (Interrogation) The emotional-pride and ego-down approach is based on attacking the source's ego or self-image. The source, in defending his ego, reveals information to justify or rationalize his actions. This information may be valuable in answering collection requirements or may give the HUMINT collector insight into the viability of other approaches. This approach is effective with sources who have displayed weakness or feelings of inferiority. A real or imaginary deficiency voiced about the source, loyalty to his organization, or any other feature can provide a basis for this technique.

8-46. The HUMINT collector accuses the source of weakness or implies he is unable to do a certain thing. This type of source is also prone to excuses and rationalizations, often shifting the blame to others. An example of this technique is opening the collection effort with the question, "Why did you surrender so easily when you could have escaped by crossing the nearby ford in the river?" The source is likely to provide a basis for further questions or to reveal significant information if he attempts to explain his surrender in order to vindicate himself. He may give an answer such as, "No one could cross the ford because it is mined."

8-47. The objective is for the HUMINT collector to use the source's sense of pride by attacking his loyalty, intelligence, abilities, leadership qualities, slovenly appearance, or any other perceived weakness. This will usually goad the source into becoming defensive, and he will try to convince the HUMINT collector he is wrong. In his attempt to redeem his pride and explain his actions, the source may provide pertinent information. Possible targets for the emotional-pride and ego-down approach are the source's—

- Loyalty.
- Technical competence.
- Leadership abilities.
- Soldierly qualities.
- Appearance.

8-48. There is a risk associated with this approach. If the emotional-pride and ego-down approach fails, it is difficult for the HUMINT collector to recover and move to another approach without losing his credibility. Also, there is potential for application of the pride and ego approach to cross the line into humiliating and degrading treatment of the detainee. Supervisors should consider the experience level of their subordinates and determine specifically how the interrogator intends to apply the approach technique before approving the interrogation plan.

## Emotional-Futility

8-49. (Interrogation and Other MSO) The emotional-futility approach is generally used in an interrogation setting, but may also be used for other MSO, if indicated by the source's state of mind. In the emotional-futility approach, the HUMINT collector convinces the source that resistance to questioning is futile. This engenders a feeling of hopelessness and helplessness on the part of the source. Again as with the other emotional approaches, the HUMINT collector gives the source a "way out" of the

helpless situation. For example “it is hopeless for your forces to continue fighting because they can no longer get supplies, but you can help end the war and their suffering.” When employing this technique, the HUMINT collector must have factual information. The HUMINT collector presents these facts in a persuasive, logical manner. He should be aware of and able to exploit the source's psychological and moral weaknesses, as well as weaknesses inherent in his society.

8-50. The futility approach is effective when the HUMINT collector can play on doubts that already exist in the source's mind. Factual or seemingly factual information must be presented in a persuasive, logical manner, and in a matter-of-fact tone of voice. Making the situation appear hopeless allows the source to rationalize his actions, especially if that action is cooperating with the HUMINT collector. When employing this technique, the HUMINT collector must not only have factual information but also be aware of and exploit the source's psychological, moral, and sociological weaknesses. Another way of using the futility approach is to blow things out of proportion. If the source's unit was low on, or had exhausted, all food supplies, he can be easily led to believe all of his forces had run out of food. If the source is verging on cooperating, it may aid the collection effort if he is told all the other sources have cooperated.

8-51. The futility approach must be orchestrated with other approach techniques (for example, love of comrades). A source who may want to help save his comrades' lives may be convinced the battlefield situation is hopeless and they will die without his assistance. The futility approach is used to paint a bleak picture for the prisoner, but it is not normally effective in and of itself in gaining the source's cooperation.

### Other Approaches

8-52. There are numerous other approaches but most require considerable time and resources. Most are more appropriate for use with sources who are detainees, but some, such as change of scenery, may have application for elicitation or MSO.

8-53. **We Know All.** (Interrogation) In the “we know all” approach technique, the HUMINT collector subtly convinces the source that his questioning of the source is perfunctory because any information that the source has is already known. This approach may be employed in conjunction with the “file and dossier” technique or by itself. If used alone, the HUMINT collector must first become thoroughly familiar with available data concerning the source and the current situation. To begin the collection effort, the HUMINT collector asks questions based on this known data.

8-54. When the source hesitates, refuses to answer, or provides an incorrect or incomplete reply, the HUMINT collector provides the detailed answer himself. The HUMINT collector may even complete a source's answer, as if he is bored and just “going through the motions.” When the source begins to give accurate and complete information, the HUMINT collector interjects pertinent questions. Questions to which answers are already known are also asked periodically to test the source's truthfulness and to maintain the deception that the information is already known. There are some inherent



problems with the use of the "we know all" approach. The HUMINT collector is required to prepare everything in detail, which is time consuming. He must commit much of the information to memory, as working from notes may show the limits of the information actually known. It is also only usable when sufficient prior information exists to convince the source that "we know all."

**8-55. File and Dossier.** (Interrogation) The file and dossier approach is a variation of the "we know all" approach. The HUMINT collector prepares a dossier containing all available information concerning the source or his organization. The information is carefully arranged within a file to give the illusion that it contains more data than actually there. The file may be padded with extra paper if necessary. Index tabs with titles such as education, employment, criminal record, military service, and others are particularly effective. It is also effective if the HUMINT collector is reviewing the dossier when the source enters the room and the source is able to read his name on the dossier and sees the numerous topics and supposed extent of the files.

**8-56.** The HUMINT collector proceeds as in the "we know all" approach. He refers to the particular labeled segment of the dossier before, during, or after asking a question. In the early stages of questioning, the HUMINT collector asks questions to which he has the answer. He may answer along with the source, complete the information for the source, or even show the source where the information is entered in the dossier. He never lets the source physically handle the dossier. As the source becomes convinced that all the information that he knows is contained within the dossier, the HUMINT collector proceeds to topics on which he has no or little information. In doing so, he still refers to the appropriate section of the dossier and may even nod his head knowingly or tell the source that the information the source is providing still matches what is in the dossier.

**8-57.** This technique has several limitations and drawbacks. The preparation time in developing the dossier is extensive. The success of this technique is largely dependent on the naiveté of the source, volume of data on the subject, and skill of the HUMINT collector in convincing the source that the dossier is more complete than it actually is. There is also the risk that a less naïve source will refuse to cooperate, claiming that, if the collector already knows everything, there is no need for him to talk. Also with this technique, the HUMINT collector is limited in the method he may use to record new information. If the HUMINT collector writes down information, it destroys the illusion that all the information has already been obtained. The HUMINT collector is normally limited to using electronic recording devices or his memory. The HUMINT collector can also arrange ahead of time for another interrogator or analyst to take notes for him, undetected by the source. This could be especially effective in a situation where a separate monitoring area (for oversight) is used by the analyst.

**8-58. Establish Your Identity.** (Interrogation) In using this approach, the HUMINT collector insists the detained source has been correctly identified as an infamous individual wanted by higher authorities on serious charges, and he is not the person he purports to be. In an effort to clear himself of this

allegation, the source makes a genuine and detailed effort to establish or substantiate his true identity. In so doing, he may provide the HUMINT collector with information and leads for further development. The HUMINT collector should initially refuse to believe the source and insist he is the individual wanted by the ambiguous higher authorities. This will force the source to give even more detailed information in order to convince the HUMINT collector he is who he says he is.

8-59. **Repetition.** (Interrogation) The repetition approach is used to induce cooperation from a hostile source. In one variation of this approach, the HUMINT collector listens carefully to a source's answer to a question, and then repeats the question and answer several times. He does this with each succeeding question until the source becomes so thoroughly bored with the procedure, he answers questions fully and candidly to satisfy the HUMINT collector and gain relief from the monotony of this method. The repetition technique must be judiciously used, as it will generally be ineffective when employed against introverted sources or those having great self-control. It may also provide an opportunity for a source to regain his composure and delay the collection effort. In this approach, the use of more than one HUMINT collector or a tape recorder has proven effective.

8-60. **Rapid Fire.** (Interrogation) The rapid-fire approach is based upon the principles that—

- Everyone likes to be heard when he speaks.
- It is confusing to be interrupted in mid-sentence with an unrelated question.

8-61. This approach may be used by one, two, or more HUMINT collectors to question the source. In employing this technique, the HUMINT collectors ask a series of questions in such a manner that the source does not have time to answer a question completely before the next one is asked. This confuses the source, and he will tend to contradict himself as he has little time to formulate his answers. The HUMINT collectors then confront the source with the inconsistencies causing further contradictions. In many instances, the source will begin to talk freely in an attempt to explain himself and deny the HUMINT collector's claims of inconsistencies. In this attempt, the source is likely to reveal more than he intends, thus creating additional leads for further exploitation. This approach may be orchestrated with the emotional-pride and ego-down or fear-up approaches. Besides extensive preparation, this approach requires experienced and competent HUMINT collectors, with comprehensive case knowledge and fluency in the source's language.

8-62. **Silent.** (Interrogation) The silent approach may be successful when used against either a nervous or confident source. When employing this technique, the HUMINT collector says nothing to the source, but looks him squarely in the eye, preferably with a slight smile on his face. It is important not to look away from the source but force him to break eye contact first. The source may become nervous, begin to shift in his chair, cross and re-cross his legs, and look away. He may ask questions, but the HUMINT collector should not answer until he is ready to break the silence. The source may blurt out questions such as, "Come on now, what do you want with me?" When the HUMINT collector is ready to break silence, he may do so with questions

such as, "You planned this operation for a long time, didn't you? Was it your idea?" The HUMINT collector must be patient when using this technique. It may appear the technique is not succeeding, but usually will when given a reasonable chance.

**8-63. Change of Scenery.** (Interrogation and Other MSO) The change-of-scenery approach may be used in any type of MSO to remove the source from an intimidating atmosphere such as an "interrogation" room type of setting and to place him in a setting where he feels more comfortable speaking. Bringing a source into a formal setting to conduct an interrogation or debriefing has psychological implications. On the positive side, it places the HUMINT collector in a superior position since he is operating on his "home turf" and has set the conditions for the meeting. It allows the HUMINT collector control over the immediate environment including the positioning of the participants, to establish the desired atmosphere for the approach.

8-64. However, there are potential negative factors in the conduct of questioning in an "Interrogation Room" environment. The source may be intimidated and more guarded; he may consider the formal setting in terms of an adversarial relationship; and he may limit his answers as a mode of self-protection. In some circumstances, the HUMINT collector may be able to invite the source to a different setting for coffee and pleasant conversation. When removed from the formal environment, the source may experience a feeling of leaving the interrogation behind. The perceived reduced pressure may lower his guard and allow him to attach less significance to conversation that occurs outside the formal setting, even though pertinent information is still being discussed. During the conversation in this more relaxed environment, the HUMINT collector steers the conversation to the topic of interest. Through this somewhat indirect method, he attempts to elicit the desired information. The source may never realize he is still being questioned.

**8-65. Mutt and Jeff. (Interrogation)** The goal of this technique is to make the source identify with one of the interrogators and thereby establish rapport and cooperation. This technique involves a psychological ploy that takes advantage of the natural uncertainty and guilt that a source has as a result of being detained and questioned. Use of this technique requires two experienced HUMINT collectors who are convincing actors. The two HUMINT collectors will display opposing personalities and attitudes toward the source. For example, the first HUMINT collector is very formal and displays an unsympathetic attitude toward the source. He may, for instance, be very strict and order the source to follow all military courtesies during questioning. Although he conveys an unfeeling attitude, the HUMINT collector is careful not to threaten or coerce the source. Conveying a threat of violence is a violation of the UCMJ.

8-66. At the point when the interrogator senses the source is vulnerable, the second HUMINT collector appears (having received his cue by a signal, hidden from the source, or by listening and observing out of view of the source), and scolds the first HUMINT collector for his uncaring behavior and orders him from the room. The second HUMINT collector then apologizes to soothe the source, perhaps offering him a beverage and a cigarette. He

explains that the actions of the first HUMINT collector were largely the result of an inferior intellect and lack of sensitivity. The inference is that the second HUMINT collector and the source share a high degree of intelligence and sensitivity.

8-67. The source is normally inclined to have a feeling of gratitude towards the second HUMINT collector, who continues to show sympathy in an effort to increase rapport and control for the questioning that will follow. If the source's cooperation begins to fade, the second HUMINT collector can hint that he is a busy person of high rank, and therefore cannot afford to waste time on an uncooperative source. He can broadly imply that the first HUMINT collector might return to continue the questioning. The Mutt and Jeff approach may be effective when orchestrated with Pride and Ego Up and Down, Fear Up and Down, Futility, or Emotional Love or Hate.

8-68. **Oversight Considerations:** Planned use of the Mutt and Jeff approach must be approved by the first O-6 in the interrogator's chain of command. The HUMINT collector must include as a part of the interrogation plan—

- No violence, threats, or impermissible or unlawful physical contact.
- No threatening the removal of protections afforded by law.
- Regular monitoring of the interrogation shall be performed by interrogation personnel.

8-69. **False Flag. (Interrogation)** The goal of this technique is to convince the detainee that individuals from a country other than the United States are interrogating him, and trick the detainee into cooperating with US forces. For example, using an interrogator who speaks with a particular accent, making the detainee believe that he is actually talking to representatives from a different country, such as a country that is friendly to the detainee's country or organization. The False Flag approach may be effectively orchestrated with the Fear Down approach and the Pride and Ego Up.

8-70. **Oversight Considerations:** The interrogation chain of command must coordinate an interrogation plan that uses the False Flag approach with the legal representative and the 2X, and receive approval from the first O-6 in the interrogator's chain of command for each specific use of the False Flag approach.

- The use of the False Flag approach must complement the overall interrogation strategy and other approach techniques listed in the interrogation plan.
- When a HUMINT collector intends to pose as a national of a third-party country, that country must be identified in the interrogation plan.
- No implied or explicit threats that non-cooperation will result in harsh interrogation by non-US entities.
- HUMINT collectors will not pose or portray themselves as any person prohibited by this manual, paragraphs 8-10 and 8-11 (for example, an ICRC representative).

8-71. **Separation.** See Appendix M, Restricted Interrogation Technique – Separation.

### Selecting an Approach

8-72. There often is insufficient information available to determine an approach other than the direct approach. In this case where the source answers questions but will not discuss pertinent issues, the HUMINT collector may ask direct but nonpertinent questions to obtain sufficient information to develop an approach strategy. This technique is also useful in debriefing to establish rapport. Nonpertinent questions may include—

- Asking about immediate past events. This includes asking an EPW about the circumstances of his capture or asking a refugee about the circumstances concerning his arrival at the refugee point or checkpoint. By doing this, the HUMINT collector can gain insight into the source's current state of mind and, more importantly, he can ascertain his possible approach techniques.
- Asking background questions. This includes asking about the source's family, work, friends, likes, and dislikes. These types of questions can develop rapport and provide clues as to the source's areas of knowledge or reveal possibilities for incentives or emotional approaches.
- Considering what are culturally and socially acceptable topics of discussion. For example, asking an Arab male about his wife could be considered extremely rude, whereas not asking an American the same question might be seen as insensitive.

### Making Smooth Transitions

8-73. With the exception of the direct approach, no other approach is effective by itself. HUMINT collectors use different approach techniques or combine them into a cohesive, logical technique. Smooth transitions, sincerity, logic, and conviction are needed to make a strategy work. HUMINT collectors must carefully assess the source's verbal or nonverbal clues to determine when a change in approach strategy is required. The HUMINT collector must guide the conversation smoothly and logically, especially when moving from one approach technique to another. Using transitional phrases can make logical and smooth tie-ins to another approach. By using nonpertinent questions, the HUMINT collector can move the conversation in the desired direction and, as previously stated, sometimes can obtain leads and hints about the source's stresses or weaknesses or other approach strategies that may be more successful.

### Recognizing Source Cooperation

8-74. Each source has a point where he will begin to cooperate and answer questions. Some sources will begin answering questions completely and truthfully with no preparation; others might require hours or even days of work. The amount of time that a HUMINT collector spends on an approach depends on a variety of factors. These include—

- The quality and criticality of the information believed to be possessed by the source.
- The presence or absence of other sources that probably possess that information.
- The number of HUMINT collectors and sources available.
- The LTIOV that the HUMINT collector is attempting to obtain.

8-75. The HUMINT collector needs to identify the signs that the source is approaching or has reached the point of cooperation. For example, if during the approach the source leans forward with his facial expression indicating an interest in the proposal or is more hesitant in his argument, he is probably nearing the point where he will cooperate. The HUMINT collector must also be aware of the fact that a source can begin to cooperate in certain areas while continuing to resist strongly in other areas. The HUMINT collector should recognize the reason for refusal, overcome the objection, and stress the benefit of cooperating (reinforce the approach). Once the HUMINT collector determines the source is cooperating, he should interject pertinent questions. If the source does not answer the question, the HUMINT collector should continue with his approach or switch to an alternate approach technique and continue to work until he again believes the source will cooperate. If the source answers the pertinent question, the HUMINT collector continues asking relevant questions until the questioning session is completed.

8-76. If a cooperative source balks at answering a specific line of questions, the HUMINT collector must assess the reason for the refusal. The HUMINT collector may have arrived at a topic that the source finds particularly sensitive. Other reasons that might cause a source to stop answering questions are fatigue or unfamiliarity with the new topic. If this topic is critical, the HUMINT collector may have to reinforce the previously successful approach or may have to use a different approach.

## **APPROACH STRATEGIES FOR INTERROGATION**

8-77. Interrogation does not mean a hostile relationship between the HUMINT collector and the source. In fact, most interrogation sources (90 percent or more) cooperate in response to the direct approach. Unfortunately, those sources who have the placement and access to make them high priority sources are also the ones with the highest degree of security awareness. A source who uses counter-interrogation techniques such as delaying, trying to control the conversation, or interrogating the HUMINT collector himself may—

- Be an intelligence trained soldier.
- Be survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) trained.
- Be a terrorist.
- Have been a detainee or previously incarcerated.

8-78. In stability and reconstruction operations and civil support operations, detainees are often politically motivated and resistant to most approaches.

8-79. EPWs are normally vulnerable to basic incentive and emotional approach techniques. Most EPWs are traumatized to various degrees by the events preceding or surrounding their capture. They tend to be disoriented and exhibit high degrees of fear and anxiety. This vulnerable state fades over time, and it is vital for HUMINT collectors to interrogate EPWs as soon as and as close to the point of capture as possible. The earlier that an EPW is questioned the more likely he is to cooperate. And the earlier that he begins to cooperate, the more likely he is to continue to cooperate. It is also vital that the HUMINT collector be the first person that the EPW has a chance to talk to. This means that proper silencing and segregation of the sources by whoever is transporting them is an important part of a successful approach.

8-80. The vulnerability of civilian detainees to approach techniques available to the HUMINT collector may be dependent on the exact nature of the conflict. US HUMINT collectors are obligated to treat all detainees in accordance with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD Directive 2310.1E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program"; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. Detainees and, in particular, EPWs are guaranteed certain rights and privileges. The HUMINT collector may not take any action to remove, state that he will remove, or imply that he will remove any guaranteed right if a detainee fails to cooperate. Under the GPW, EPWs cannot be denied their rights or their privileges accorded them by rank as guaranteed by the GPW. Privileges afforded to them, however, which are not guaranteed by the Geneva Conventions or other applicable law or agreements, may be withheld. (See Appendix A, Section I.) Consult your SJA for questions concerning rights and privileges.

8-81. The HUMINT collector is frequently under a great deal of pressure to "produce results." This situation, coupled with the facts that the HUMINT collector is dealing with threat personnel who may have been attempting to kill US personnel just minutes before questioning and the fact that the source is in a vulnerable state, leads to a tendency to use fear-up techniques. This may, in some circumstances, be the proper approach; however, the HUMINT collector must ensure that in doing so he neither loses control of his own emotions nor uses physical or mental coercion.

## **APPROACH STRATEGIES FOR DEBRIEFING**

8-82. Sources who are debriefed vary even more widely than those who are interrogated. Since debriefing is the systematic questioning of individuals not in the custody of the questioning forces, the HUMINT collector needs to engender an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual benefit. Some sources for debriefing include members of the friendly forces and local personnel. HUMINT collectors often believe that approach techniques are not required for friendly forces and that friendly forces should view debriefing as part of their duties and in their own best interest. However, this is not necessarily the case.

8-83. Many people see debriefing as an interruption in their normal duties and a waste of their time. HUMINT collectors must be sure to stay focused on the purpose and goals of the debriefing. They should be businesslike and must maintain the proper relationship with the source based on his rank and position. The HUMINT collector should allow senior sources more latitude to interpose their opinions and evaluations. A change of scene often facilitates the debriefing of a high-level source since it removes him from his normal distractions, such as the telephone, and allows him to concentrate on the topics being discussed.

8-84. Refugees and DPs are subject to many of the same anxieties and trauma that are experienced by EPWs or other detainees, with the added benefit to the HUMINT collector that they normally have an obvious vested interest in cooperating. Basic incentives usually are sufficient to induce their willing cooperation. The emotional support that can be provided by the HUMINT collector by simply listening and commiserating with their hardship is often sufficient to gain cooperation. The emotional approaches such as love of family and hate toward those who made them refugees are strong motivators toward cooperation.

8-85. The approach techniques used in the questioning of local civilians are probably the most difficult. The approach techniques chosen must take into consideration the attitude of the local population toward the US and its presence and cultural considerations. The local population must see their cooperation as self-beneficial.

## **APPROACH STRATEGIES FOR ELICITATION**

8-86. Elicitation is a sophisticated technique used when conventional collection techniques cannot be used effectively. Of all the collection methods, this one is the least obvious. However, it is important to note that elicitation is a planned, systematic process that requires careful preparation. It is always applied with a specific purpose in mind. This objective is the key factor in determining the subject (which source to question), the elicitor, and the setting. The subject will be selected based on access to or knowledge of the desired information.

8-87. Before approaching the subject, it is necessary to review all available intelligence files and records, personality dossiers, and knowledge possessed by others who have previously dealt with the subject. This will help determine the subject's background, motivation, emotions, and psychological nature. It also may require unobtrusive observation of the subject to establish such things as patterns of activity and likes and dislikes. The setting can be any number of social or official areas. It is important to note that the source should be approached in his natural surroundings, as this will diminish suspicion.

8-88. The key to elicitation is the establishment of a rapport between the elicitor and the source, normally based on shared interests. In the initial stages of an elicitation, the collector confines his conversations to innocuous subjects such as sports and social commentary. Dependent on the value of the source, the collection environment, and the security consciousness of the



source the initial stage could last from a few minutes to numerous seemingly accidental meetings over a period of weeks or months. The HUMINT collector will gradually shift the conversation to topics of collection interest but will be prepared to return to more unthreatening topics based on negative reactions on the part of the subject. Once a topic of interest has been introduced, the HUMINT collector keeps the conversation going by asking for clarification (for example, "I agree, however, what did you mean by....?") or expressing a hypothetical situation.

8-89. There are two basic elicitation approaches: mild flattery and provocation.

- **Mild Flattery:** Most people like talking about their interests and like talking to those who are knowledgeable and interested in the same topics. People also like to speak to someone who values their opinion on shared interests. The HUMINT collector takes advantage of this. The HUMINT collector leads the conversation into areas that he wishes to collect but does it in such a way that it appears to the source that the source is leading the conversation. Above all in elicitation, the HUMINT collector plays the role of the rapt, attentive, and inquisitive listener.
- **Provocation:** This is a more dangerous approach and, if used too early in an operation, can alienate the source. Once the HUMINT collector has established shared interests with the source, he can selectively challenge some of the source's statements, encouraging the source to provide more information in support of his view. The HUMINT collector can also insert bits of actual information into the conversation to cause the source to confirm and expound on the topic. Care must be taken so as not to give away more information than is gained.

## TERMINATION PHASE

8-90. When it is necessary or prudent, the HUMINT collector will terminate the questioning of a particular source. Whatever the reason for terminating, the HUMINT collector must remember there is a possibility that someone may want to question the source at a later date. There are many reasons why a HUMINT collector may want or need to terminate questioning:

- The source remains uncooperative during the approach phase.
- The collection objective cannot be met in one questioning session.
- The HUMINT collector fails to maintain rapport and loses control of the questioning.
- The collection objectives have been satisfied.
- The HUMINT collector or the source becomes physically or mentally unable to continue.
- Information possessed by the source is of such value that his immediate evacuation to the next echelon is required.
- The HUMINT collector's presence is required elsewhere.

8-91. There are many ways to conduct a termination, but the following points must be conveyed to the source:

- The HUMINT collector should sincerely and convincingly reinforce successful approaches. All promised incentives should be rendered.
- The source must be told the information he gave will be checked for truthfulness and accuracy. His reaction to this statement should be closely monitored. The exact form of this statement will be dependent on the situation. It should not be done in a manner to alienate a cooperative source.
- The source must be told that the same or another individual may speak to him again. This sets the stage for future contacts.
- Any identification must be returned to the source. If the HUMINT collector has other documents or belongings of the detainee (such as letters or photographs), he will either return them to the detainee, if appropriate, or will turn them over to the MP guard. Depending on the circumstances and the legal status of the detainee, the MPs will retain the detainee's property and return the property to him at the end of his internment.
- In a debriefing, the HUMINT collector will normally ask the source not to discuss the subject of the questioning for his own protection. In interrogation operations, the HUMINT collector normally coordinates with the holding area guards to have the detainees who have been interrogated kept separate from sources who have not yet been interrogated if the situation allows.

## Chapter 9

# Questioning

9-1. Questioning is one of the five phases of HUMINT collection. Developing and using good questioning techniques enable the HUMINT collector to obtain accurate and pertinent information and to extract the maximum amount of information in the minimum amount of time. The HUMINT collector must know when to use different types of questions.

### GENERAL QUESTIONING PRINCIPLES

9-2. Questions should be presented in a logical sequence to avoid neglecting significant topics. The HUMINT collector begins the questioning phase with the first topic in the sequence he tentatively established as part of his questioning plan. He obtains all of the source's pertinent knowledge in this topical area before moving on to the next topic in his sequence. The only exception is exploiting a hot lead, which is discussed in paragraph 9-21.

9-3. The HUMINT collector must at all times remember that his mission is the rapid collection and dissemination of accurate information. He must not allow himself to be sidetracked into nonpertinent discussions or debates nor should he express distaste or value judgments on the information being supplied unless that is a planned part of his approach technique. The HUMINT collector uses vocabulary that is clear, unambiguous, and understandable by the source. The source may not be on the same intellectual level or have the same degree of education as the HUMINT collector, so the HUMINT collector must adapt his questioning to the level of the source. The source may also have specific technical knowledge, more education and/or a higher intellectual level than the HUMINT collector. In this case, the HUMINT collector normally relies on prepared questions or technical support for his questioning. Without good systematic questioning techniques, even the most cooperative source may provide only minimal usable information.

### DIRECT QUESTIONS

9-4. Direct questions are basic questions normally beginning with an interrogative (who, what, where, when, how, or why) and requiring a narrative answer. They are brief, precise, and simply worded to avoid confusion. The HUMINT collector must consider the probable response of the source to a particular question or line of questioning and should not, if at all possible, ask direct questions likely to evoke a refusal to answer or to antagonize the source.

## TYPES OF DIRECT QUESTIONS

9-5. The HUMINT collector must be able to use the following types of direct questions:

- Initial, topical.
- Follow-up.
- Nonpertinent.
- Repeat.
- Control.
- Prepared.

### Initial Questions

9-6. The HUMINT collector begins his questioning with the first topic in his collection plan and asks all the basic questions necessary to cover the topic. The answers to the basic questions will determine the requirements for follow-up questioning. The initial questions are directed toward obtaining the basic information on the topic. In other words, they are the “who, what, where, when, how, and why” of each topic.

### Follow-up Questions

9-7. Follow-up questions are used to expand on and complete the information obtained from the initial questions. Often even if the initial question is a well-constructed direct question, it will elicit only a partial answer. For example, when asked, “Who is going to attack?” The source might say, “My unit.” Follow-up questions are used to determine precisely what the source means by “my unit” and what other units may also attack. The answer to follow-up questions may lead to more follow-ups until the source’s knowledge on a given topic is exhausted. At a minimum, upon receiving a positive answer to an initial question, the HUMINT collector needs to ask “Who (what, where, when, why, how) else?” For example, if the HUMINT collector asks the source, “Who, in the local government is collaborating with the insurgents?” and is told a name in response, he will ask follow-up questions to determine all the required information about this individual and then will ask, “Who else, in the local government is collaborating with the insurgents?” This will continue until the source’s knowledge in this area is exhausted.

### Nonpertinent Questions

9-8. Nonpertinent questions are questions that do not pertain to the collection objectives. They are used to conceal the collection objectives or to strengthen rapport with the source. They are essential when the collector is using the elicitation technique. Nonpertinent questions may be used to gain time for the HUMINT collector to formulate pertinent questions and may also be used to break the source’s concentration, particularly, if the HUMINT collector suspects the source is lying. It is hard for a source to be a convincing liar if his concentration is frequently interrupted.

## Repeat Questions

9-9. Repeat questions ask the source for the same information obtained in response to earlier questions. They are a method to confirm accuracy of important details such as place names, dates, and component parts of technical equipment and to test truthfulness. Repeat questions should not be exact repetitions of an earlier question. The HUMINT collector must rephrase or otherwise disguise the previous question. The repeat question also needs to be separated in time from the original question so that the source cannot easily remember what he said. Repeat questions may also be used to develop a topic the source had refused to talk about earlier.

## Control Questions

9-10. Control questions are developed from recently confirmed information from other sources that is not likely to have changed. They are used to check the truthfulness of the source's responses and should be mixed in with other questions throughout the questioning. If a source fails to answer a control question as expected, it may be an indicator that he is lying. However, there are other possible explanations. The source—

- Could have misunderstood the question.
- Could be making up information in order to please the questioner and/or receive a promised incentive.
- Could have answered the question truthfully to the best of his ability, but his information could be wrong or outdated.
- May be correct and the information that the control question was based on is no longer true.

9-11. It is the responsibility of the HUMINT collector to determine, through follow-up questions, which of the possibilities is the case. The HUMINT collector should also consult with the HAT for assistance in verifying the source reporting through all-source analysis.

## Prepared Questions

9-12. Prepared questions are questions developed by the HUMINT collector, normally in writing, prior to the questioning. Prepared questions are used primarily when dealing with information of a technical nature or specific topic, which requires the HUMINT collector to formulate precise and detailed questions beforehand. The HUMINT collector may have to research analytical or technical material or contact SMEs to assist him in preparing questions. HUMINT collectors must not allow the use of prepared questions or any limitations to their education or training to restrict the scope and flexibility of their questioning. In many instances, the HUMINT collector should have an analyst or technical expert "sit in" on the questioning as well.

9-13. The HUMINT collector must be able to use the different types of questions effectively. Active listening and maximum eye-to-eye contact with the source will provide excellent indicators for when to use follow-up, repeat, control, and nonpertinent questions. The HUMINT collector must use direct and follow-up questions to fully exploit subjects pertinent to his interrogation objectives. He should periodically include control, repeat, and nonpertinent

questions in order to check the truthfulness and consistency of the source's responses and to strengthen rapport.

## **TYPES OF QUESTIONS TO AVOID**

9-14. When using the questioning methodologies of interrogation, HUMINT collectors should avoid using negative, compound, or vague questions. Leading questions are usually to be avoided, but some special questioning techniques, such as use of a polygraph, require the use of leading questions.

### **Leading Questions**

9-15. Leading questions are questions that are constructed so as to require a yes or no answer rather than a narrative response. They generally begin with a form of the verb "to be" (such as "is," "was," "were," "will," "are"). For example, "Is the mayor working with the insurgents?" Leading questions should generally be avoided for the following reasons:

- They make it easier for the source to lie since the source only provides minimal information.
- It takes longer to acquire information.
- A source, particularly one that is frightened or trying to get an incentive, will tend to answer in the way that he thinks the HUMINT collector wants him to answer.

9-16. Although normally avoided during questioning, an experienced HUMINT collector may use leading questions when the technical nature of the subject matter or the specific information needed leaves no alternatives. Leading questions can be used to—

- Verify specific facts.
- Pinpoint map locations.
- Confirm information obtained during map tracking.
- Transition from one topic area to another.

### **Negative Questions**

9-17. Negative questions are questions that contain a negative word in the question itself such as, "Didn't you go to the pick-up point?" If the source says "yes," the HUMINT collector is faced with the question of whether he means "yes, I went to the pick-up point" or "yes, I didn't go to the pick-up point." When the source answers, the HUMINT collector cannot be sure what the answer means; therefore, he must ask additional questions. This can be particularly confusing when working with an interpreter. Other cultures may interpret a negative question in a way other than what the HUMINT collector meant. Negative questions should never be used during questioning unless they are being used deliberately during the approach to make the source appear to contradict himself. In other instances, the insertion of negative words within the question makes them impossibly open-ended. For example, "Who didn't attend the meeting?"

## Compound Questions

9-18. Compound questions consist of two questions asked at the same time; for example, "Before you were captured today, were you traveling north or south?" Or "Where were you going after work and who were you to meet there?" They are easily misunderstood and may confuse the source or force him to give an ambiguous answer. Compound questions allow the source to evade a part of the question or to give an incomplete answer.

## Vague Questions

9-19. Vague questions do not have enough information for the source to understand exactly what the HUMINT collector is asking. They may be incomplete, general, or otherwise nonspecific and create doubt in the source's mind. Vague questions confuse the source, waste time, and are easily evaded. They result in answers that may confuse or mislead the HUMINT collector and require further follow-up questions.

## ELICITATION

9-20. Elicitation is the gaining of information through direct interaction with a human source where the source is not aware of the specific purpose for the conversation. Elicitation is a sophisticated technique used when conventional questioning techniques cannot be used effectively. Of all the collection methods, this one is the least obvious. However, it is important to note that elicitation is a planned, systematic process that requires careful preparation. Elicitation is always applied with a specific objective in mind and normally directed toward a specific source.

## LEADS

9-20. A lead is a statement made by a source spontaneously or in response to questioning that leads the questioner to believe that the source has information on a topic other than the one currently under discussion. Documents captured with or on the source may also be exploited as sources of leads. Leads are referred to as either "hot" or "cold."

## HOT LEADS

9-21. A hot lead is a statement made by a source either spontaneously or in response to questioning that indicates he has information that could answer intelligence requirements on a topic other than the one currently under discussion. The lead could also be on a topic that although not listed as a requirement is, based on the HUMINT collector's experience, of critical importance. Information on WMD and information on US personnel being held by threat forces are normally considered hot leads even if not listed as requirements. The HUMINT collector will normally question the source immediately on a hot lead, unless he is already asking questions on another topic. In this case, he completes questioning and reports the information on the priority topic, as appropriate, and then immediately questions on the hot lead. As soon as the HUMINT collector is sure he has obtained and recorded all the details known to the source, he reports the hot lead information by the

most expedient means available, normally in SALUTE report format. The HUMINT collector then resumes his questioning of the source at the point where the hot lead was obtained.

## **COLD LEADS**

9-22. A cold lead is a statement made by a source either spontaneously or in response to questioning that indicates he has information on a topic of interest other than the one currently under discussion but that would not answer PIRs. The HUMINT collector makes note of the cold lead and exploits it after the planned questioning objectives have been satisfied or at the appropriate time during the questioning sequence.

## **DETECTING DECEIT**

9-23. HUMINT information often has the capability to be more accurate and reliable than other disciplines. SIGINT information, for example, is not always able to return to the original source of the information to determine the reliability of the information, and interpretation of IMINT information may be uncertain. However, while HUMINT can be reviewed for reliability, determining the reliability of human sources is a continuous process accomplished by carefully assessing not only the sources of information but also assessing the information itself.

9-24. Detection of deception is not a simple process, and it normally takes years of experience before a HUMINT collector can readily identify deliberate deceit. Inconsistencies in the source's actions or words do not necessarily indicate a lie, just as consistency is not necessarily a guarantee of the truth. However, a pattern of inconsistencies or unexplainable inconsistencies normally indicate deceit.

## **TECHNIQUES FOR IDENTIFYING DECEIT**

9-25. Techniques for identifying deceit include but are not limited to the following:

- Repeat and control questions (see paras 9-9 and 9-10).
- Internal inconsistencies. Frequently when a source is lying, the HUMINT collector will be able to identify inconsistencies in the timeline, the circumstances surrounding key events, or other areas within the questioning. For example, the source may spend a long time explaining something that took a short time to happen, or a short time telling of an event that took a relatively long time to happen. These internal inconsistencies often indicate deception.
- Body language does not match verbal message. An extreme example of this would be the source relating a harrowing experience while sitting back in a relaxed position. The HUMINT collector must be careful in using this clue since body language is culturally dependent. Failing to make eye contact in the US is considered a sign of deceit while in some Asian countries it is considered polite.
- Knowledge does not match duty position or access. Based on the source's job, duty position, or access the HUMINT collector should have



developed a basic idea of the type and degree of information that an individual source should know. When the source's answers show that he does not have the expected level of information (too much or too little or different information than expected), this may be an indicator of deceit. The HUMINT collector needs to determine the source of unexpected information.

- Information is self-serving. Reporting of information that is self-serving to an individual or his group should be suspect. For example, a member of one ethnic group reporting generic atrocities by an opposing ethnic group or a source reporting exactly the right information needed to receive a promised incentive should be suspect. That is not to say that the information is necessarily false, just that the HUMINT collector needs to be sure to verify the information.
- Lack of extraneous detail. Often false information will lack the detail of truthful information, especially when the lie is spontaneous. The HUMINT collector needs to ask follow-up questions to obtain the detail. When the source is unable to provide the details that they should know, it is an indicator of deceit. If the source does provide this additional information, it needs to be checked for internal inconsistencies and verified by repeat questions.
- Repeated answers with exact wording and details. Often if a source plans on lying about a topic, he will memorize what he is going to say. If the source always relates an incident using exactly the same wording or answers repeat questions identically (word for word) to the original question, it may be an indicator of deceit. In an extreme case, if the source is interrupted in the middle of a statement on a given topic, he will have to start at the beginning in order to "get his story straight."
- Source appearance does not match story. If the source's physical appearance does not match his story, it may be an indication of deceit. Examples of this include the source who says he is a farmer but lacks calluses on his hands or the supposed private who has a tailored uniform.
- Source's language usage does not match story. If the type of language, including sentence structure and vocabulary, does not match the source's story, this may be an indicator of deceit. Examples of this include a farmer using university level language or a civilian using military slang.
- Lack of technical vocabulary. Every occupation has its own jargon and technical vocabulary. If the source does not use the proper technical vocabulary to match his story, this may be an indicator of deceit. The HUMINT collector may require the support of an analyst or technical expert to identify this type of deceit.
- Physical cues. The source may display physical signs of nervousness such as sweating or nervous movement. These signs may be indicators of deceit. The fact that an individual is being questioned may in itself be cause for some individuals to display nervousness. The HUMINT collector must be able to distinguish between this type of activity and nervous activity related to a particular topic. Physical reaction to a

particular topic may simply indicate a strong emotional response rather than lying, but it should key the HUMINT collector to look for other indicators of deceit.

- Failure to answer the question asked. When a source wishes to evade a topic, he will often provide an answer that is evasive and not in response to the question asked. For example, if the source is asked, "Are you a member of the insurgent organization?" and he replies, "I support the opposition party in the legislature," he has truthfully answered a question, but not the question that was asked. This is a subtle form of deceit since the source is seemingly cooperative but is in fact evading providing complete answers.

### **ACTIONS UPON IDENTIFYING INDICATORS OF DECEIT**

9-26. The exact actions by the HUMINT collector when identifying possible deceit are dependent on the type of collection, the circumstances of the collection, the specific sign of deceit observed, the type of approach used, and cultural factors. The HUMINT collector may—

- Question the topic in more detail looking for additional indicators.
- Reinforce the approach.
- Move to another topic and revisit the original topic later with repeat questions. Ask control questions (confirmed by known data) and questions to which the source should know the answer to see if he answers honestly.
- Point out the inconsistency to the source and ask for an explanation.
- Seek assistance from a more experienced HUMINT collector, analyst, or a technical expert on the culture or the topic being questioned.
- Conduct continuous assessments of source (see FM 34-5 (S//NF)).
- Research established databases.
- Ask yourself if the information makes sense; if not, conduct more research.
- Consider how the information was obtained.
- Compare the information provided to the source's placement and access.
- Compare answers with other sources with similar placement and access. Be aware that this method is merely a rough tool to check veracity and should not be used by the collector to confirm intelligence.
- Use the polygraph.
- Consider that a source motivated primarily by money will likely be tempted to fabricate information in order to get paid.
- Be aware that a source may read the local newspaper to report information that is already known or may also be providing information to another agency.

9-27. The one thing that the HUMINT collector cannot do is to ignore signs of deceit.

## HUMINT COLLECTION AIDS

9-28. There are numerous procedural and recording aids that can assist the HUMINT collector in conducting rapid, accurate, yet systematic questioning. They include—

- **HUMINT Collector's Guide.** This guide is a pamphlet or notebook designed to guide the HUMINT collector through the questioning. The HUMINT team leader should ensure that team members prepare a HUMINT collector's guide, which could be included in the unit's SOP. The guide is made based on the AO and supported command intelligence requirements. The HUMINT collector and available intelligence analysts should jointly prepare the guide. Appendix G provides the basic topics and example questions that can be adapted to construct a HUMINT collector's guide. The guide must be updated for each interrogation as part of planning and preparation. The guide should contain information such as—
  - Intelligence requirements and ISR tasks.
  - Topical questioning sequence format.
  - Actual prepared questions to be used during questioning.
  - Guidelines for employing the various approach techniques.
  - Formats or samples of completed reports used by HUMINT collectors.
- **Time Event Chart.** A timeline, or event chart, is a graphic display upon which the HUMINT collector enters chronological information as it is collected. This facilitates the HUMINT collector in understanding and organizing the collected information. It also enables the HUMINT collector to identify gaps in information, to sequence events properly to facilitate follow-up questions, and to identify deception. The HUMINT collector can develop a basic timeline prior to questioning. The source should not be able to observe the timeline since doing so will help a deceptive source "keep his story straight." See Chapter 12 for how to create and use a time event chart.
- **Organizational Chart.** An organizational chart is a graphic representation of an organization. It is the equivalent of a military line-and-block chart. This is used to facilitate the questioning of organizations and in establishing their hierarchical and lateral linkages. A basic chart can be developed prior to the questioning based on the expected organizational questioning.

## RECORDING TECHNIQUES

9-29. Accuracy and completeness are vital principles to reporting. However, it is usually not possible to completely record all information in a questioning session. Recording techniques may involve memory, handwritten or typed notes, tape recordings, and video recordings. Each has its advantage and corresponding disadvantage.

- **Memory:** Relying on one's memory has certain advantages. It does not require any equipment or extra time, and is the least intrusive method of recording information. It allows maximum interaction with the source and projects sincerity. An individual can train himself to

remember highly detailed information. Often in elicitation, memory is the only viable recording method. However, in general, using the memory exclusively to record information is the most inaccurate methodology. Particularly in a long questioning session, details are forgotten and information tends to be generalized.

- **Handwritten notes:** Handwritten notes require minimal equipment (a pad and pencil), are not intimidating to most sources, and can be as detailed as the HUMINT collector desires. If an analyst or second interrogator is present, he should also take notes. This second set of notes can aid in report writing. The interrogator should not rely solely on an analyst's notes unless absolutely necessary. However, writing notes while questioning an individual often interferes with the rapport between the collector and the source. The collector loses eye contact and can easily miss subtle body language that might indicate lying. Detailed note taking can be extremely time consuming and many sources will, over time, begin to limit their responses so they do not have to repeat information or wait for the collector to write it down. It is somewhat intrusive and inhibiting to the source and is totally inappropriate in certain situations such as liaison and most casual source contacts. Handwritten notes can also be inaccurate, have limited details, and can be hard to read after the fact.
- **Computer notes:** With the proliferation of computer equipment, particularly laptops and handheld devices, note taking on computers is increasingly commonplace. A computer can provide access to data-based information that may support questioning such as foreign language dictionaries or technical support manuals, either through the Internet (if connected) or on its harddrive. If the computer is linked to a communications system, it also allows the HUMINT collector to transmit data, including SALUTE reports, during the course of the questioning. Notes taken on a computer, however, have many of the same disadvantages as handwritten notes. In addition, computer notetaking requires more equipment and technological support and access to either electricity or a plentiful supply of batteries. Computers may be intimidating to some sources and the fact that what the source says is being entered into a computer may cause the source to alter the information he is providing. Computers tend to isolate the collector from the source by dividing the collector's attention between the computer and the source, and again may cause the collector to miss critical body language clues. Finally, the computer is even more inappropriate to casual and controlled source operations than are handwritten notes.
- **Audiotapes:** If recording equipment is discrete and functioning properly, audiotapes can be extremely accurate. Use of tapes also allows the HUMINT collector to place his entire attention on the source. This not only enhances rapport but also allows the HUMINT collector to observe the source's body language. Taping a questioning session, if done overtly though, tends to be extremely inhibiting to the source and may seriously curtail the information obtained. Surreptitious taping can be illegal in some situations and dangerous in some situations as well. Consult your legal advisor to determine if

taping is legal. Taped information can also be seriously affected by ambient noise and the relative positioning of the source and collector to the microphone. Writing a report based on a taped session can be extremely time consuming, since it takes as long to listen to a tape as it took to record it. This drawback can be reduced somewhat through the use of voice activated recording devices. Exclusive dependence on audiotapes tends to make the collector less attentive and more likely to miss follow-up questions. Also, if the tape is lost or damaged or does not function properly, the collector has no backup.

- **Video recording:** Video recording is possibly the most accurate method of recording a questioning session since it records not only the voices but also can be examined for details of body language and source and collector interaction. It is also the most resource intensive requiring proper lighting, cameras, viewing equipment, and possibly trained operators. If done overtly, video recording can be by far the most inhibiting to the source. Even if the source is willing to be videotaped, there is a tendency for both the source and the collector to “play to the camera,” creating an artificiality to the questioning. Consult your legal advisor to determine the legality of overt or covert videotaping.

## QUESTIONING WITH AN ANALYST OR A TECHNICAL EXPERT

9-30. The HUMINT collector may often find himself in the position where he needs to use an analyst or a technical expert, or both, in order to conduct questioning. Many of the techniques involved in using an analyst or technical expert are the same as those with using an interpreter (see Chapter 11). The HUMINT collector must pre-brief these supporting personnel. The degree to which the analyst or technical expert is involved in the actual questioning is dependent on the established relationship between the analyst or technical expert and the HUMINT collector. The HUMINT collector will always remain in charge of the questioning, be present throughout the questioning, and ensure that the questioning follows his questioning plan. He must ensure that the supporting analyst or technical expert has the proper security clearance.

9-31. An analyst or technical expert can participate in the questioning to various degrees listed below from least intrusive to most intrusive. As the degree of participation by the analyst or technical expert increases, the technical fidelity of the information collected usually increases but the rapport between the HUMINT collector and the source decreases as does the HUMINT collector’s ability to control the content and judge the truthfulness of the information. The analyst or technical expert may provide—

- **Advice Only:** The HUMINT collector does the questioning. The expert provides information prior to the meeting and may review the collected information after the meeting. The technical expert is not present at the actual questioning.
- **Remote Support:** The HUMINT collector does the questioning. In addition to the above, the expert monitors the questioning and provides input to the HUMINT collector after the questioning as required. Based on the technological support, this can involve the expert sitting in on, but not participating in the questioning (which

may make the source uncomfortable), or the expert viewing and listening to the questioning through a remote video and sound hook-up.

- **Local Support:** The HUMINT collector does the questioning. The expert sits in on the questioning and provides input to the HUMINT collector during the course of the questioning. This can break both the source's and the HUMINT collector's trains of thought and confuse the lines of control in the questioning.
- **Expert Participation:** The HUMINT collector initiates the questioning, but the expert participates throughout the questioning, asking for clarification and additional information as required. Unless properly trained, the expert can seriously taint the quality of the information through the use of poor questioning techniques. The HUMINT collector can lose rapport and control.
- **Trained Expert Questioning:** In rare instances, with particularly difficult technical topics or those areas of questioning that require a high degree of technical expertise, it may be easier to train the expert in basic questioning techniques than it is to train the HUMINT collector on the technical topic. In this instance, the HUMINT collector sits in on the questioning to ensure proper procedures and techniques are used and to advise the technical expert. The technical expert does most of the questioning.

9-32. In any case, if the source is to receive compensation for his time, it must come from the HUMINT collector, not the analyst or technical expert. This continues to reinforce that the HUMINT collector is in charge, and does not transfer the source's trust to the expert.

### **THIRD-PARTY OFFICIAL AND HEARSAY INFORMATION**

9-33. The source may have information that he did not observe firsthand. While this information is not as reliable as firsthand knowledge, it is often significant enough to report. The HUMINT collector must be careful to identify this information as to its origin, type, and the time and manner that the information was obtained by the source. This information will be entered into the report as a source comment or a collector comment. This will include—

- The origin of the information. This may be the name, rank, and duty position or job of an individual or may be an official or unofficial document such as an OPORD, official memorandum, or party newspaper.
- The complete organization to which the person who provided the information belongs or the identity of the organization that produced the official or unofficial document from which the source obtained the information.
- Date-time group (DTG) when the source obtained the information.
- The circumstances under which the source obtained the information.

9-34. Comparing the details of the hearsay information, such as DTG, where the information was obtained and the circumstances under which the source

claimed to have received it, to the source's known activities, may provide indications of truthfulness or deception on the part of the source.

## CONDUCTING MAP TRACKING

9-35. Map tracking is a specific questioning skill that the HUMINT collector uses in all operations. It is a vital skill in supporting targeting and operational planning. Map tracking identifies and verifies key information by tracking the source's movement and activities within a specific area over a fixed period using a map or similar graphic aid. The area and the time involved are dependent on the collection requirements and the source's knowledge level. Map tracking can occur at any point in the questioning process. Normally, the HUMINT collector begins map tracking as soon as his questioning identifies a priority disposition or activity that the source's information can locate on the map.

9-36. Map-tracking techniques, if properly applied, can extract information from friendly, neutral, or threat sources and can be used with individuals ranging from those with detailed map skills to illiterates, and those who have never seen a map. Through map tracking, the HUMINT collector pinpoints locations of any threat activity, threat dispositions, or any other priority terrain-related information, such as trafficability, known to the source.

9-37. The HUMINT collector will determine these locations with the degree of fidelity needed to support operational requirements. The degree of detail needed may range from an 8-digit grid coordinate for unit locations to locations of specific buildings, rooms, or even items within a room. The HUMINT collector uses a variety of map-tracking aids including standard military maps, aerial photographs, commercial imagery, building blueprints and diagrams, and commercial road maps. Some advantages to map-tracking techniques include—

- The source is led through his memory in a logical manner.
- Discrepancies in the source's statements are easier to detect.
- Locations are identified to support targeting and battlefield visualization.
- Map tracking is a four-step process:
  - Step 1: Determine the source's map-reading skills.
  - Step 2: Establish and exploit common points of reference (CPRs).
  - Step 3: Establish routes of travel.
  - Step 4: Identify and exploit key dispositions.

### DETERMINE THE SOURCE'S MAP-READING SKILLS

9-38. The first step in the map-tracking process is to determine the specific map-reading skills of the source. This step only occurs the first time that the HUMINT collector map tracks a particular source. This information will determine what methodology will be used for the rest of the process. In this step the HUMINT collector is determining existing skills; he should not attempt to teach the source additional map skills at this time. The HUMINT collector can use prior knowledge, such as the fact that the source is illiterate or cannot read a map, to skip some of the specific parts of the process. Below

is a detailed description of the process to establish the map-reading skills of the source.

- The HUMINT collector asks the source if he can read the map being used. If the source answers in the affirmative, the HUMINT collector asks some key questions to verify this.
- If the source cannot read the map being used, the HUMINT collector determines if the source can read another type of available map or graphic representation. For example, a source may not be able to read a military map but might be able to use a commercial map or an imagery product.
- The HUMINT collector then establishes the method that will be used to describe movement (direction and distance) on the map. If the source knows how to use compass directions, that may be the most expedient method for determining direction. Again, the HUMINT collector must verify that the source knows how to use compass directions. This can be done best by having the source tell the compass directions between known points. Distance is normally determined by using the standard units of measurement with which the source is familiar, such as kilometers or miles. This can cause some problems, for example, if the map is measured in kilometers and the source normally expresses distance in miles. The HUMINT collector must make the adjustment rather than trying to teach the source the unfamiliar system.
- Compass directions and standard units of measure are not the only method or necessarily even the best method of indicating direction and distance in all circumstances. When using an urban map, direction and distance can often be described by indicating blocks traveled and turns made (right or left) at intersections. Direction of travel can be indicated in reference to key features such as going toward the downtown area or moving toward the river. When describing the interior of a building, references may be to upstairs, downstairs, floor number, or other descriptive terms. When map tracking in rural areas, especially when questioning someone who does not know how to use compass directions, terrain association is normally the best method of establishing direction of travel and distance. Questions such as "Were you traveling uphill at that time?" "What prominent terrain features could you see from that location?" "What was the nearest town?" or "Was the sun behind you?" help to identify locations on the map. The HUMINT collector should allow the source to use his own frames of reference. However, the HUMINT collector must ensure he understands the source.

### **ESTABLISH AND EXPLOIT COMMON POINTS OF REFERENCE**

9-39. The second step of map tracking is to establish CPRs. It is important in accurate map tracking to talk the source through his past activities in the sequence in which they occurred and his movements in the direction in which they were traveled. Attempting to track a source backward in time and space is time consuming, inaccurate, and is often confusing to both the source and the HUMINT collector. Future activities should be tracked in the direction in



which they are planned to occur. The HUMINT collector will normally establish various CPRs throughout the questioning of the source.

9-40. For certain sources such as friendly forces, tasked sources, or other instances where the starting and ending points of the mission being questioned are easily established, the first point of reference is normally where that source began the mission. For other sources such as detainees, line crossers, informers, and refugees, it is often more difficult to establish a "starting point." In these instances the HUMINT collector uses a sequential approach to the map tracking. He establishes a point of reference that is a logical end point for the subject being discussed. This may be, for example, the point of capture for a detainee, the point where a line crosser entered the friendly force area, or where a refugee left the area of intelligence interest. Second and subsequent points of reference are established during questioning when the source mentions a disposition, activity, or location of interest that can be located on the map. The HUMINT collector locates the reference point on the map through direct questioning and terrain association. He uses leading questions as necessary to establish an exact location. He then establishes the route of travel.

#### **ESTABLISH ROUTES OF TRAVEL**

9-41. Once the CPR is established, the HUMINT collector questions the source until he has extracted all pertinent information on the CPR and its immediate surroundings. For past missions and activities, the HUMINT collector then establishes the route the source traveled between the newly established CPR and a previously established CPR and exploits the route. For future missions or activities, the route is established from the previously established CPR toward the future mission CPR.

9-42. The HUMINT collector should establish the route traveled by determining the source's direction and physical description of the route of travel. The description should include details such as surface on which the source traveled and prominent terrain features along the route of travel and the distance the source traveled or, in the case of future locations, would travel. The HUMINT collector should also identify any pertinent dispositions or any activities of military significance, belonging to the opposition forces, along or in the vicinity of the route of travel. For longer routes, the HUMINT collector may divide the route into segments for ease of questioning.

#### **IDENTIFY AND EXPLOIT KEY DISPOSITIONS**

9-43. The HUMINT collector must obtain the exact location and description of every pertinent disposition known to the source. This includes the locations established as CPRs and any other pertinent disposition established during map tracking. At a minimum, the collector should—

- Establish a physical description of the disposition. The degree of fidelity will depend on the collection requirements. This may be as detailed as the physical layout of a room to the general description of a training area. This will include security measures and modus operandi at the location as appropriate.

- Identify and describe the significance of the disposition in terms of ongoing and future threat operations.
- Identify and describe key activities, equipment, or organizations at the location, as well as people and leaders.
- Identify and describe all pertinent collocated activities, locations, or organizations, as well as people and leaders.
- Identify the basis (hearsay or personal experience) and DTG of the source's knowledge of each disposition.

## **SPECIAL SOURCE CATEGORIES**

9-44. Questioning of every source is unique and requires specific preparation. Special consideration and preparation must be made for some specific categories of sources. Some examples of special source categories include but are not limited to wounded or injured sources or illiterates.

### **WOUNDED OR INJURED SOURCES**

9-45. HUMINT collectors may question (interrogate, debrief, or elicit information from) a wounded or injured source provided that they obtain certification from a competent medical authority that the questioning will not delay or hinder medical treatment or cause a worsening of the condition of the source. The HUMINT collector can question the source before, after, or during medical treatment. The HUMINT collector cannot at any time represent himself as being a doctor or any other type of medical personnel or member of the ICRC. Nor can he state, imply, or otherwise give the impression that any type of medical treatment is conditional on the source's cooperation in answering questions.

### **ILLITERATES**

9-46. HUMINT collectors should never make the mistake of equating illiteracy with a lack of intelligence or an inability to provide meaningful information. In fact, many illiterates have developed extremely good memories to compensate for their inability to rely on the written word. An illiterate's frame of reference does not include street signs, mile markers, and calendars. It also will probably not include conventional time and distance measurements. The HUMINT collector must compensate for these differences. Map tracking, for example, must normally be accomplished by terrain association. If the source cannot tell time, time of day can be determined by the position of the sun.

## Chapter 10

# Reporting

10-1. Reporting is the final and in many cases the most vital phase in HUMINT collection. If the collected information is not reported accurately, in a timely manner, in the proper format, and to the correct recipient, it cannot become part of the all-source intelligence product or tip in time to affect operational decisions. Information that would support targeting must be reported by the fastest means possible.

### REPORTING PRINCIPLES

10-2. The HUMINT collector must be able, in a written report, to convey to the user the information obtained from a source. Therefore, the following principles of good report writing are to be followed:

- **Accuracy.** Accurately reflect the information obtained from the source. Reporter comments and conclusions must be clearly identified as such.
- **Brevity.** Report all relevant information; however, the report should be brief, to the point, and avoid unnecessary words.
- **Clarity.** Use simple sentences and understandable language. Proper grammar and punctuation are a must. Another team member, if possible, should read the reports to ensure clarity.
- **Coherence.** Present the information in a logical pattern based on standard reporting formats.
- **Completeness.** Report all information collected. The collector should not filter information since all information is of interest to an analyst. Report negative responses to pertinent topics to prevent a misunderstanding or duplication of effort in subsequent questioning based on SDRs.
- **Timeliness.** Report information as soon as operationally feasible. Most collection requirements contain a LTIOV as part of the requirement. While written reports are preferable, critical or time-sensitive information is passed by the most expedient means available.
- **Releasability.** Include only releasable information in reports that are to be shared with multinational units. When possible, reports to be shared with multinational units should be kept to the appropriate classification to ensure the widest dissemination of the reported information.

### REPORT TYPES

10-3. There are two major categories for reporting information: operational reports and source administrative reports. Figure 10-1 shows the HUMINT

reporting channels. Refer to DIAM 58-11 (S//NF) and DIAM 58-12 (S//NF) for specific guidance in using these reports.

## **OPERATIONAL REPORTS**

10-4. Operational reports is a broad category that encompasses all reports that do not contain information collected in response to intelligence requirements or the reporting of the technical, and usually sensitive, aspects of HUMINT collection. It includes but is not limited to all administrative and logistical reports. Unit SOPs and directives from higher headquarters establish operational reporting requirements, formats, and procedures. Operational reporting—

- Tells the commander where and when assets are conducting missions.
- Describes unit mission capability.
- Responds to administrative and logistical requirements.
- Describes support requirements.
- Includes but is not limited to unit status reports, mission planning reports, mission status reports, and equipment status.
- Reports ICF usage at any echelon where the use of ICFs is authorized.

## **SOURCE ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTS**

10-5. Source administrative reports include intelligence reports that are used to pass or request information in order to answer intelligence requirements, and reports that address the HUMINT collector's contacts with the source. Intelligence reports include but are not limited to IIRs and SALUTE reports.

### **Intelligence Information Reports**

10-6. The IIR is used to report all HUMINT information in response to collection requirements. It is used to expand on information previously reported by a SALUTE report or to report information that is either too extensive or not critical enough for SALUTE reporting. IIRs are written at any echelon and "released" by the appropriate authority before they enter the general Intelligence Community. Normally the G2X will be the release authority for IIRs.

10-7. At the tactical level, the HUMINT collectors will fill out the complete IIR; however, the requirements section may link the information collected against a unit requirement rather than against national requirements. In any case, the report will be forwarded to the OMT.

10-8. The team leader will review the IIR, place a copy of the IIR in the detainee's or source's local file and forward the IIR to the OMT. (When a detainee is transferred to another facility or evacuated to a higher echelon, a copy of each IIR written from interrogations of that detainee is forwarded with him.) The OMT reviews the report, requests additional information as necessary from the originator, adds additional administrative detail, and forwards the report to the HOC of the supporting C/J/G/S2X. The HOC and the 2X review the report, request additional information as required, add any

final required information including linking it to national requirements, and then the 2X releases the report.

10-9. In addition to the above, the text information from the IIR can be forwarded to the unit's analytical elements and when it contains critical time-sensitive information, such as an impending attack, it is sent to units which may be affected by the information; however, it must be clearly marked "unevaluated information, not finally evaluated intelligence." The use of IIRs and the formats are covered in DIAM 58-12 (S//NF).

### **SALUTE Reports**

10-10. The SALUTE report is a standard Army format used to report information of immediate interest by individuals at any echelon. (See Appendix H for a SALUTE report format.) The SALUTE report is the primary means used to report combat information to units that could be affected by that information. After review by the team leader, SALUTE reports are sent simultaneously to the supported unit S2, to the OMT in control of the HCT, and to the intelligence staff officer of any other tactical unit that may be affected by the information contained in the SALUTE report.

10-11. The OMT reviews the report and forwards it to the supporting HAT and supporting J/G/S2X for inclusion in the analysis picture. The supported S2 will—

- Review the information.
- Incorporate it into his unit intelligence products, as applicable.
- Forward the information to his higher echelon intelligence staff officer.
- Ensure that all affected units are notified.

10-12. Units must develop SOPs for the passing of information and intelligence to multinational units. Report writers and editors must ensure that reports that are to be shared with multinational units contain only releasable information. This will enable reports to have the widest dissemination. Arrangements are made through the C/J2X/LNO for distribution. When possible, reports to be shared with multinational units should be kept to the appropriate classification to ensure the widest dissemination of the reported information.

### **Basic Source Data Reports**

10-13. The basic source data (BSD) reports provide the HUMINT chain with biographic and operational information related to a source. BSDs are used at all echelons to collect biographic information on all contacts. The use of BSDs and BSD formats are covered in DIAM 58-11 (S//NF).

### **Contact Reports**

10-14. Collectors use contact reports to inform their technical chain (from OMT through J/G/S2X) of all relevant information concerning specific meetings with HUMINT sources. Information typically includes the circumstances of the contact (purpose, locations, time), the operational

matters relative to the contact (topics discussed, taskings given), reports produced as a result of the contact, and logistics expended.

### Other Reports

10-15. HUMINT collectors also use a number of other reports to administer source contacts and to report information. Copies of the following reports should be maintained in the detainee's permanent file for future reference. HUMINT collectors will review these reports when planning additional collection activities; release committees or tribunals can use the reports to help evaluate if a detainee can be released or not. These reports include—

- **Screening Reports.** Screening reports are used to report BSDs, knowledge areas and levels, cooperation, vulnerabilities to approaches, and other relevant source information between HUMINT collectors. It is normally filled out either electronically or manually by the initial HUMINT collector to speak to a source. The screening report is normally forwarded electronically to higher echelon HUMINT collection organizations and other MI organizations that might have interest in the source. Higher echelon organizations may add information to the screening sheet extracted through subsequent screenings. Available digital screening reports contained in the HUMINT collector's mission support software (for example, BAT or CI/HUMINT Automated Management System [CHAMS]) should be used whenever possible to ensure rapid transfer of data. If screening reports have to be handwritten, the information collected should conform to theater requirements and local SOPs.
- **Knowledgeability Briefs.** The KB is used to inform the Intelligence Community of a source's full identity, past history, and areas of knowledge, as well as to set a suspense date for the submission of intelligence requirements. It is normally only used at the strategic and operational echelons. When completed, a KB will be classified at least Confidential in accordance with the DIA Classification Guide to protect the identity of the source. The use of KBs and the formats are covered in DIAM 58-11 (S//NF). See Figure 10-2 for an example of a short form KB that can be used for screening at all echelons, and can also be prepared and published like the full KB. This allows the entire intelligence community to see who is either in custody or to whom US intelligence has access so that SDRs can be issued to help focus the intelligence collection effort.
- **Notice of Intelligence Potential (NIP).** A NIP is used to inform the US Intelligence Community of the availability of a source of potential interest and to notify them of what agency has responsibility for questioning that source and where to forward questions and requests for information from that agency. The use of NIPs and the formats are covered in DIAM 58-11 (S//NF).
- **Lead Development Report (LDR).** The LDR is used to inform the HUMINT chain of ongoing operations directed toward a specific source. It notifies them as to what element spotted the potential source, the

current steps in assessing of the source, and the general information on the potential source.

- **Interrogation Summary.** An interrogation summary may be written to record relevant facts concerning the interrogation. The summary may include the attitude of the source; approach techniques that were tried and which ones were effective; incentives promised and whether or not they were delivered yet; recommended topics for further exploitation; and any other topics the HUMINT collector considers relevant. Local SOPs will dictate the use of the interrogation summary.
- **Interrogation Plan.** The interrogation plan is a report prepared by the HUMINT collector to organize his plan to approach and question a source. It lists collection objectives, approach techniques, preparation and liaison tasks, and interpreter usage plan. The interrogation plan also has approval blocks for interrogation supervisor approval of selected approaches and medical release for questioning. The last part of the form has termination, approach effectiveness, recommendations for further exploitation, and a summary of information obtained and reports expected to be published. Figure 10-3 is an example of an interrogation plan format.
- **Termination Report.** The termination report is used at all echelons to inform the technical chain of the termination of a contact relationship between a HUMINT collector and a source.
- **Biographic Report.** The biographic report is a formatted IIR used at all echelons to report information collected from one human source about another individual of actual or potential intelligence interest. The biographic report format is found in DIAM 58-11 (S//NF).

## REPORTING ARCHITECTURE

10-16. There are three basic reporting channels (see Figure 10-1):

- The operational reporting chain consists of primarily the C2 elements for the HUMINT collection element. It includes the OMTs, unit commanders, and unit S3 and operation sections.
- The technical chain includes the OMTs, HOC, and the C/J/G/S2X, and in certain circumstances, the unit G2/S2s.
- The intelligence reporting chain includes the OMTs, HATS, C/J/G/S2Xs, and unit G2/S2s.

10-17. Many elements serve multiple and overlapping functions within the reporting architecture. Each element must be aware of its function within the architecture to ensure that information is disseminated expeditiously to the right place in the right format. This architecture should be established and published prior to implementation in order to avoid confusion.

## OPERATIONAL REPORTING

10-18. Operational reporting is sent via the organic communications architecture (see Chapter 13). Operational reports are normally sent per unit SOP or based on direction from higher headquarters. HCTs normally send all

operational reports through their OMT to the command element of the unit to which they are assigned. If an HCT is attached, it will normally send its operational reports to the unit to which it is attached with courtesy copies to their assigned unit as required. If there is an administrative or logistics relationship established with the supported unit, HCTs that are in DS send the principal copy of all related administrative and logistic reports to the supported unit with a courtesy copy to their parent unit. If the HCT is operating in GS, a courtesy copy of operational reports should be forwarded to all affected unit commanders in the supported AO.

### **TECHNICAL REPORTING**

10-19. Technical reporting includes the forwarding of source information and technical parameters of collection operations from lower to higher and the passing of tasking specifics, source information, technical control measures, and other information from higher to lower. Technical reporting is conducted through the technical chain that extends from the HCT through the OMT and Operations Section (if one exists) to the C/J/G/S2X.

### **INTELLIGENCE REPORTING**

10-20. The key to intelligence reporting is to balance the need for accurate reporting with the need to inform affected units as quickly as possible. The J/G/S2 and MI commander are key to ensuring the right balance.






Figure 10-1. HUMINT Reporting Channels.

**KB-EZ WORKSHEET**

**1. PERSONAL DATA:**

- 1A. Name:
- 1B. Source Number (Capturing Unit):
- 1C. Source Number (MPs):
- 1D. Source Number (Other):
- 1E. Source Number (MI):
- 1F. Country of Citizenship:
- 1G. Birth City:
- 1H. Birth Country:
- 1I. Birth Date:
- 1K. Date Departed Country of Origin/Date of Capture:
- 1N. Last County of Residence:
- 1O. Language Competency:

**2. Education: (Most Recent to Oldest)**

- 2A. Military or Civilian:
- 2B. Dates of Attendance:
- 2C. Name of Institution:
- 2D. City Location of Institution:
- 2E. Country Location of Institution:
- 2F. Completion Status/Degree Type:

**3. EMPLOYMENT: (Most Recent to Oldest)**

- 3A. Dates of Employment:
- 3B. Name of Place of Employment:
- 3C. City Location of Place of Employment:
- 3D. Country of Place of Employment:
- 3E. Employment Duty Position:
- 3F. Security Clearance:

**Figure 10-2. KB-EZ Worksheet.**

**4. MILITARY SERVICE: (Most Recent to Oldest)**

4A. Dates of Service:

4B. Name of Post/Base:

4C. Armed Service Component:

4D. Rank of Equivalent:

4E. Name of Unit/Group:

4F. City Location of Unit/Group:

4G. Country Location of Unit/Group:

4H. Military/Group Duty Position/Title:

4I. Security Clearance:

**5. Comments: (Character, intelligence, motivation, personality, cooperativeness)**

5A. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: Capture date, capturing unit, circumstances, documents, weapons, and equipment.

5B. ASSESSMENT: Physical condition, mental condition, intelligence, cooperation (1, 2, 3), knowledgeability (A, B, C), personality.

5C. ADDITIONAL PERSONAL INFORMATION: (Skills, experience, marital status, other).

**6. NAME OF SCREENER:**

Theater-specific collection requirements may require modification of the KB-EZ format. Consider adding entries for:

- Race
- Ethnicity
- Tribal Affiliation
- Religion and Sect
- Language and Dialect Spoken

Entries for "Location" may need to include a village or even neighborhood.

Figure 10-2. KB-EZ Worksheet (continued).



**PREPARATION:**

Coordinate with MP for access to the detainee.

Prepare for exploitation topics:

- Obtain appropriate map sheet(s)
- Obtain references
- Review previous reports, detainee correspondence
- Research collection topics
- Prepare questions

Prepare interrogation site (furnishings, lighting, climate, security, monitoring).

Ask Guard Questions.

Review Detainee Documentation:

- ID Card
- Capture Tag
- Documents captured with the detainee

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**Post-Interrogation Report**

Effectiveness of Approaches:

Attitude and Behavior of Detainee:

Summary of Topics Exploited:

Expected Reports Production in Response to Requirements:

Termination:

- Reason:
- Approach Reinforced:
- Incentive Promised:
- Delivered:

Recommendation for Further Interrogation and Rationale:

Recommended Approach(es):

Topics for Further Exploitation (Leads):

Disposition of Source: \_\_\_\_\_

Additional Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**Figure 10-3. Interrogation Plan Format (continued).**

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